City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

2-2016

Cops in Court: Assessing the Criminal Prosecutions of Police in
Six Major Scandals in the New York City Police Department from
1894 to 1994
Kevin E. McCarthy
Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/779
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

Cops in Court:
Assessing the Criminal Prosecutions of Police in Six Major
Scandals in the New York City Police Department from 1894 to 1994
By
Kevin E. McCarthy

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in
partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The City University of New York
2016

© 2016
Kevin E. McCarthy
All Rights Reserved

ii

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Candace McCoy

___________________
Date

______________________________
Chair of Examining Committee

Deborah Koetzle

____________________
Date

_______________________________
Executive Officer

F. Warren Benton

Andrew Karmen
Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

iii

Abstract
Cops in Court: Assessing the Criminal Prosecutions of Police in Six Major
Scandals in the New York City Police Department from 1894 to 1994
by
Kevin E. McCarthy
Advisor: Dr. Candace McCoy
From the 1890s to the 1990s, the police department in New York City experienced six
major corruption scandals that occurred at approximately twenty-year intervals. These cyclical
scandals all involved intense public attention, examination by an outside agency, and a
comprehensive report calling for departmental reforms to address corruption issues. The scandals
resulted in turnover of police commissioners and political fallout for sitting mayors. Police
officers faced transfers, administrative sanctions, dismissals, and forced retirements. Some faced
criminal prosecution.
This dissertation examines prosecutions of police in the context of the city’s changing
social and political circumstances surrounding the scandals, while recognizing the influence of
key individuals who served as district attorneys or in other prosecutorial positions. Prosecutors
charged over four hundred police officers in cases related to the scandals. Research disclosed
that the number of prosecutions and the outcomes of the cases varied greatly across the six
scandals. The conduct charged in the prosecutions reflected an evolution in the civilian illegal
conduct that supported most of the police corruption—from a mix of liquor, gambling, and
prostitution to the more recent dominance of illegal drugs.
Research confirmed that each era needed a triggering event to elevate public concerns
about ongoing police corruption to the levels of responses that characterized the cyclical
scandals. Those responses better explained the phenomenon of the cycles than the severity of the
underlying police corruption. Over time, outcomes of the related criminal prosecutions became
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more favorable to the prosecutors; that is, a higher percentage of cases resulted in convictions.
The number of cops prosecuted increased with the involvement of more prosecutorial agencies,
particularly as federal prosecutors picked up their pursuit of police cases and when New York
State experimented with a special corruption prosecutor in the 1970s.
The cyclical scandals reflected limits on the effectiveness of criminal prosecution as a
response to police corruption, although the prosecutorial response became more essential in the
last two scandal cycles. The examination suggests a waning role for federal prosecutors, the need
for consideration of a new model to revive the position of special prosecutor, and perhaps an end
to the cyclical scandals.
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Introduction

From the 1890s to the 1990s, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) suffered
through six major corruption scandals that seemed to appear in twenty-year cycles. Although
circumstances that can be categorized as police scandals certainly arose at other times, scholars
and other observers recognize the extraordinary phenomenon of the twenty-year cyclical
scandals.1 All of the scandals involved lengthy, highly publicized inquiries by appointed
commissions or other entities from outside the NYPD. Seen broadly, the cyclical scandals all
attacked police corruption with three types of remedies. First, the scandals produced public
exposure of corruption by hearings, reports, and media attention. Second, the NYPD took steps
internally to retire, transfer, discipline, or dismiss errant officers and, perhaps to enact
administrative reforms to reduce future corruption. Third, some allegedly corrupt officers were
criminally prosecuted. Examinations of the scandals have largely overlooked this third remedy,
with some attention devoted only to the most notorious prosecutions.
This dissertation examines information obtained through research on the scandal-related
criminal prosecutions of approximately four hundred police officers. Analysis and comparison
assist in answering questions about the nature of the cyclical scandals and the use of criminal
prosecutions in responding to and deterring police corruption. This introduction provides an
outline of the chapters to follow after brief factual overviews of the six scandals on which six of
the chapters focus.

Overview of the Scandals

1

In 1894, the New York State Legislature appointed a committee chaired by suburban
Republican Charles Lexow to investigate police corruption in New York City. 2 The action was
inspired by public allegations made by a crusading minister and the scandal occurred in a city
swirling with concerns about crime, immorality, and immigration. The Lexow Committee
exposed police abuses in the enforcement of gambling, prostitution, and liquor laws. Many
officers were paid off to allow the operation of gambling dens and prostitution locations
(“disorderly houses,” in the parlance of the time) and to ignore Sunday closure laws and other
liquor restrictions. The committee’s report in January 1895 (signed only by its Republican
members) found “an extraordinary disinclination on the part of the police, so efficient in other
respects, to display any desire or activity in the suppression of certain descriptions of vice and
crime.”3 Several dozen police officers were prosecuted criminally, mostly for bribery-related
charges, and Theodore Roosevelt returned to city politics as a reforming police commissioner.
In 1912, the New York City Board of Aldermen (forerunner of the city council)
appointed a special committee chaired by Henry Curran to investigate the police department.
Once again, the three vices of gambling, prostitution, and liquor were the major corrupting
influences on police conduct. The Curran Committee presented recommendations for
administrative reforms for the department. In particular, the committee’s report minced no words
in criticizing the police commissioner: “We have become convinced that the present Police
Commissioner, Rhinelander Waldo, is incompetent and unfit to perform the duties of his
office.”4 As in the previous scandal, criminal prosecutions used bribery as the most commonly
charged crime, along with the closely related offense of extortion. A few officers were also
charged with perjury, which would become an increasingly important and controversial
prosecutorial weapon in subsequent scandals. Manhattan District Attorney Charles A. Whitman
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would soon be elected governor, setting a standard for ambitious prosecutors who took on
corruption cases.5
In the early 1930s, retired jurist Samuel Seabury received a series of appointments to
investigate New York City corruption. The process exposed the interrelationship between
Prohibition, judicial abuses, organized crime, municipal corruption, and the presidential
ambitions of Franklin Roosevelt. Seabury’s investigation into the sale of judgeships came across
extensive corruption in the NYPD’s Vice Squad, which was taking payoffs for the favorable
disposition of prostitution cases. The police investigation did not expand widely beyond the Vice
Squad, likely because the police were never Seabury’s focus and because implications involving
Mayor Jimmy Walker and other prominent targets cropped up. Over one dozen police were
prosecuted by the Manhattan district attorney while he himself was under investigation. Perjury
became the most frequently charged crime in this scandal, which meant some cases might be
more easily proven by demonstrating the falsity of court or grand jury testimony rather than
having to fully prove underlying corrupt activity. Also, this scandal marked the beginning of
federal prosecutorial involvement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office prosecuting two of the cases (a
tax violation and a Prohibition violation) in federal court.
In the early 1950s, after a Brooklyn newspaper published allegations of police protection
of gambling rackets, an investigation by the district attorney resulted in numerous prosecutions
and dozens of officers were dismissed from the force in what became known as the Harry Gross
scandal.6 The spotlight shifted away from Manhattan for the first time, and gambling returned to
prominence as the corrupting vice. Instead of an appointed investigative body like those
previously headed by Clarence Lexow, Henry Curran, and Samuel Seabury, the new scandal was
investigated by a special grand jury led by the Brooklyn district attorney (Kings County) that
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focused on police payoffs from gambling boss Gross. With the district attorney’s office
investigating and bringing its own cases, prosecutors did not have to deal with referrals of cases
from an appointed committee nor with witnesses who had already testified at public hearings
before criminal trials began. Further, in a strategic decision that prosecutors sometimes see as
advantageous, the Brooklyn D.A. packed a mega-indictment with twenty-one police defendants
built around conspiracy charges. Having greater control over the case did not appear to help the
prosecutors, however, and the mega-trial fell apart with eighteen defendants having charges
dismissed.
The cycle of the 1970s and mayoral appointment of the Knapp Commission in May 1970
brought the zenith of NYPD corruption scandals. Besides bestselling books, major motion
pictures, and political career launches, the scandal saw police prosecutions from all five of the
city’s district attorneys, both U.S. Attorney’s Offices that cover the city, and a new state Office
of the Special Prosecutor created during the scandal. The result of this prosecutorial competition
(some might call it an unprofessional free-for-all) was an unprecedented number of criminal
cases against police. Prostitution and liquor law violations, the mainstays for police payoffs in
early cyclical scandals, took subordinate roles in the Knapp era. Gamblers kept up their
payments to police “on the pad” shortly before the state lottery and other forms of legalized
gambling diminished that vice as a source of corruption, while narcotics-related bribery and
extortion rose in prominence. In the criminal prosecutions, this scandal saw the first significant
numbers of police officers cooperating and giving testimony against their colleagues.
Appointed by the mayor in July 1992, the Mollen Commission found the NYPD’s
corruption to be far different than in the Knapp era. Previously, police might have been accepting
bribes and closing their eyes to illegal activities, but Mollen-era offenses focused on “police
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acting as criminals” themselves.7 The driving force of corruption was now drugs, and allegations
of violent conduct by police became more common. Pockets of corruption were found across the
city, with the worst situation in Harlem’s 30th Precinct. In that precinct alone thirty-four officers
were criminally charged.

Outline of Chapters
Chapter 1 reviews the literature specifically relating to the six cyclical scandals and, more
generally, relating to corruption prosecutions of police officers. Numerous publications have
recited the facts of the cyclical scandals and some works have told extraordinary stories focused
on particular persons involved in the scandals. With a few exceptions that usually involve the
most sensational trials, however, the literature has overlooked the criminal prosecutions of police
related to the scandals.
Chapter 2 sets forth the methodology and research questions for this dissertation.
Information gathered largely through press reports and court records describes the criminal
prosecutions of hundreds of police officers in court cases related to the six cyclical scandals. As
would be expected, the amount of information available about particular prosecutions differs:
entire books describe the most notorious prosecutions while others achieve only brief mention in
a newspaper or court docket entry. The three research questions, along with subquestions, focus
on the examination of those hundreds of cases to allow comparisons among the prosecutions
across the six scandals. Great variation emerges in the volume of prosecutions, nature of the
underlying criminal conduct, participation of particular prosecutorial agencies, and outcomes of
the cases.
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Chapters 3 through 8 focus on the six cyclical scandals in chronological order. The
chapters place each scandal in a social and political context for the city, identify the triggering
event that appeared necessary to set off each scandal, and describe the prevalent police
corruption and the official responses. Review of the prosecutions will focus on outcomes, the
manner of case disposition, agencies involved, and common issues encountered. For illustrative
purposes, a number of the individual prosecutions will be explored in more detail.
Chapter 9 sets forth conclusions from analysis of the prosecutions and suggests historical
lessons for the role of the criminal prosecutions in responding to and deterring police corruption.

NOTES
1

See, e.g., Lotte E. Feinberg, “Integrity and Corruption Control in the NYPD: 1970–2000,” in
Crime and Justice in New York City, ed. Andrew Karmen (Stamford, CT: Thompson Learning,
2000), 20; Marvin Gottlieb, “Like Clockwork, a Police Scandal,” New York Times, June 21,
1992; Lawrence W. Sherman, “Introduction: Toward a Sociological Theory of Police
Corruption,” in Police Corruption: A Sociological Perspective, ed. Lawrence W. Sherman
(Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1974), 33.
2

New York City was then the geographic area of New York County, which consisted of the
island of Manhattan, plus some parts of the Bronx. The political consolidation of Greater New
York occurred in 1898, joining the five counties/boroughs that still comprise the City of New
York.
3

Lexow Committee, Report and Proceedings of the Senate Committee Appointed to Investigate
the Police Department of the City of New York (Albany: State Printer, 1895), 21.
4

Curran Committee, Report of the Special Committee of the Board of Alderman of the City of
New York (New York: City of New York, 1913), 3. Rhinelander Waldo may now be most
favorably remembered as the final role of James Cagney’s film career.
5

For a critical view of how Whitman used his prosecutorial office, see Allen Steinberg, “The
‘Lawman’ in New York: William Travers Jerome and the Origins of the Modern District
Attorney in Turn-of-the-Century New York,” University of Toledo Law Review 34 (2003): 778.

6

6

While the other five cyclical scandals are generally known by the names of the individuals who
led investigative hearings, references to the 1950s scandal commonly use Harry Gross’s name.
An exception is Gabriel Chin, who refers to the “Helfand Investigation.”
7

Mollen Commission, Report of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption
and the Anti-corruption Procedures of the Police Department (New York: City of New York,
1994), 2.
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Chapter 1

Review of the Literature

Where literature can be most closely related to particular cyclical scandals, this review is
presented in the chronological order of the cycles. Then works in other areas are considered.
Individual scandals may be identified by the names most commonly used in the literature, which
is usually the name of the investigating entity, as well by a range of years covering the scandal or
the year of the issuance of a report.1

Lexow Committee
While the 1890s scandal was still hot, Rev. Charles Parkhurst wrote his own account in
which he described some of the prosecutions in detail.2 He was deeply interested in the outcome
of police prosecutions, having done more than anyone to bring them about, and he spreads blame
for prosecutive failures around the police department, the district attorney, and even the grand
juries. His book is a lively, contemporaneous account of the scandal, but the reader must bear in
mind the author’s bias. The book is helpful to check facts from other sources regarding some of
the prosecutions. Another contemporaneous account came from Charles Gardner,3 a private
detective who worked for the Society for the Prevention of Crime and who guided Rev.
Parkhurst’s tour of New York’s underworld. While some of the debauchery seems quaint in
century-old hindsight, such as the seminude game of leapfrog in one establishment, the
pervasiveness of openly operated prostitution is surprising by standards of modern New York.
Unfortunately, Gardner devotes no attention to prosecutions other than when he was personally
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charged with extortion during the scandal. The formal report issued by the Lexow Committee in
1895 describes much of the illegal police conduct, often specifically naming the offending
officers, but without the level of detail provided in some press accounts or by Parkhurst.
Zacks4 describes Parkhurst’s crusade and the vice-related battles of the 1890s in a saucy
portrait of the city of that era. He sets forth the progress of the Lexow Committee in detail, with
focusing on the moves of police commissioner Theodore Roosevelt. Captain William Devery’s
trial on bribery charges is touched on, but not other prosecutions of cops.
Sloat5 provides the most in-depth examination of Parkhurst and the fallout of his crusade.
In remarkable detail, Sloat places Parkhurst and the Lexow Committee crusade in the context of
an evolving city, the rise of yellow journalism, and radical movements at the turn of the century.
The prosecutions of police, however, receive little attention. Sloat describes the trial of Captain
Devery thoroughly and explains the effect of the jury’s verdict of not guilty on the police and
Tammany Hall. Attempting to connect aspects of the scandal to the lives of New York Jews in
the 1890s, Sloat also mentions the bribery trial of a detective, Jeremiah Levy. For Sloat to
produce such a comprehensive work about Parkhurst’s crusade without even a summary of the
related police prosecutions suggests the extent to which those prosecutions have been
overlooked.
Astor6 devotes five short chapters to the 1890s scandal and describes aspects of the
unlawful police conduct revealed in the Lexow Committee hearings. Some of the descriptions
are more explicit than the newspaper accounts, especially for conduct related to prostitution. This
additional information may be helpful in evaluating and comparing the underlying conduct of the
allegations in prosecutions of police.
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Of works with a wider focus than the 1890s police scandal, Lloyd Morris7 allots less than
a chapter to Parkhurst’s crusade, none of which brings up the prosecutions of police. Gilfoyle8
focuses on the antiprostitution angle of Parkhurst’s crusades, paying little attention to the police
corruption that was essential to the world of commercial sex. Walker9 uses the Lexow
investigation to demonstrate the extent of urban police corruption in the late 1800s, and he
describes Theodore Roosevelt’s frustrations in the context of shortcomings of the police
commission system of management. Burroughs and Wallace10 emphasize the role of Parkhurst
and the Lexow Committee in New York’s halting steps toward political reform, and they cast the
police in the same mold as corrupt politicians. The latter two books are fine academic works that
place the 1890s scandal in the important contexts of New York’s evolving society, politics, and
morality. The prosecutions of police in that era do not factor into the analyses. Even Berman,11
writing about New York policing in the 1890s, chooses to ignore the scandal-related
prosecutions.
In writing of the next cyclical scandal, Logan looks back to the Lexow Committee and
the high level of public concern over police corruption in the 1890s. He emphasizes the classbased points of view on vice and corruption, and employs the derisive terms of the time for the
religious men (“Holies”) and good government advocates (“Goo-Goos”) in referring to the forces
behind the Lexow Committee.12 Logan also draws the connection between cycles in pointing out
how some players from the 1890s scandal returned wearing different hats in the next cyclical
scandal.
Political scientist V. O. Key13 ventured into criminal matters to compare the nature of
police corruption in the 1890s scandal with corruption of the 1930s. Key’s work did not address
differences in prosecutorial roles in the scandals, but his observations about the nature of the
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civilian bribe payers might have identified another factor to explore for influence in the outcome
of prosecutions. Key described 1890s bribe payers as independent operators of illegal businesses,
while 1930s bribe payers were members of criminal organizations.

Curran Committee
The scandal that produced the appointment of the Curran Committee in 1912 received
considerable scholarly attention in later decades because of the extraordinary case of NYPD
Lieutenant Charles Becker, who was charged with the murder of gambler Herman Rosenthal
outside the Metropole Hotel in midtown Manhattan.14 Becker was convicted and executed for the
crime, and remains the only police officer in the United States to receive capital punishment.
Whether scholarly or sensational, Becker-related research has benefited from the intense
coverage devoted to the case by newspapers, particularly the New York Sun, and lengthy judicial
opinions about the case.15 Dash16 produced what is likely the definitive book about the Becker
case. To set the context, Dash briefly reviews the 1890s scandal and describes the high levels of
corruption in the NYPD as Becker rose through the ranks. Dash’s focus, though, is Becker’s
arrest and prosecution, so he devotes little attention to the scandal investigated by the Curran
Committee and other police officers who were prosecuted for lesser offenses than Becker.
Beating Dash in what might have been a race to publish a new book about Becker,
Cohen17 weaves a description of the Becker case with the age of modernity in New York and the
rise of a better-organized form of organized crime. The suggested connections to Becker are
tenuous, but the book captures the sense of change in America and New York in the pre-World
War I years quite well. However, Cohen only makes passing mention of the police corruption
investigation triggered by the Becker case.18
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Preceding the work of Dash and Cohen, Logan19 wrote the first serious book about the
Becker case. As indicated by the title, Against the Evidence: The Becker-Rosenthal Affair, Logan
suggests injustice in Becker’s conviction and execution. Logan’s main interest in the work of the
Curran Committee comes in asserting that the committee’s public hearings served the district
attorney’s purposes in prejudicing potential jurors for the Becker trial. Like Dash and Cohen,
Logan does not discuss police who were criminally prosecuted other than Becker.
Although writing a less scholarly work about the Becker case than the three just outlined,
Root20 thoroughly describes Becker’s prosecution and two trials. Prosecutions of other police are
not described.
To mention in passing, Delmar21 writes an unusual mix of personal and family
recollections set in the context of the Becker case. It is not of help to research on police
corruption. Astor22 devotes a chapter to the Becker case and describes some of the revelations of
the Curran Committee, without discussion of police prosecuted other than Becker.

Seabury Investigation
Like the 1890s scandal, the 1930s scandal inspired some writers while the scandal was
on-going or, at least, a fresh memory. In 1932, Walter Chambers wrote a biography of Samuel
Seabury that described Seabury’s role as prosecutor in Becker’s second trial, his ensuing judicial
career, and his appointments to positions that guided the investigations of the early 1930s.23
Chambers outlines the vice squad corruption that dominated the policing side of Seabury’s
investigations, the use of unsavory cooperators, and some of the resulting prosecutions of police.
The book is an excellent resource for information about the prosecutions, although it is
incomplete because it was published while many prosecutions were still active.
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In another book published in 1932, Northrop and Northrop24 mainly focus on how
Seabury’s investigations developed, likely because one of the authors was an assistant counsel
under Seabury. They provide some details of the decision-making process at stages of the
investigations of vice squad police, but they do not delve into the criminal prosecutions that
followed for some of the officers.
Lewis Valentine became police commissioner in the wake of revelations from the
Seabury investigations. Limpus25 and, in an autobiography, Valentine26 describe Valentine’s
long career with the NYPD and corruption problems in the department. Prosecutions of police
receive only passing mention. Also of little help is the memoir of NYPD Captain Cornelius
Willemse,27 although he does expound on the particular problems of the vice squad in the era of
the Seabury investigations.
Mitgang28 provides a serious biography of Seabury that, unsurprisingly, emphasizes the
investigation of corrupt politicians rather than the investigation of corrupt police officers. He
later wrote a more thorough work on the era that does describe the police corruption
investigation, but only in the context of Mayor Walker’s fall and the threat to the ascendancy of
Governor Roosevelt.29 Prosecutions of police are not examined. Similarly, Davis30 describes the
political challenges that the exposure of NYPD corruption posed to Franklin Roosevelt’s career,
but overlooks the prosecutions.
Seabury had his hands full in juggling various corruption investigations. The timing of
prosecutions of police and the release of Seabury’s reports allowed the final report of Seabury’s
Magistrates’ Court investigation to briefly summarize many of the prosecutions.31 The report
lacks details of the cases, but is helpful to crosscheck data about the prosecutions from other
sources.
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Harry Gross Case
The cyclical scandal of the early 1950s produced the most extensively covered police
trial in New York since the Becker case. Arm32 painstakingly describes the investigation of
numerous police officers who took payoffs from bookie Harry Gross, but the book’s narrative
ends with the officers under indictment. Only in the introduction, written by the Kings County
district attorney, does the book progress to the next step of summarizing the dramatic collapse of
the prosecution’s case at trial. More thorough and thoughtful treatment comes from Mockridge
and Prall,33 who take the story through the multi-defendant trial and then through the subsequent
departmental trials. Of all of the prosecutions of police related to the six cyclical scandals, this
book offers the most complete account of a case that faltered at trial.
The exposure of police taking payoffs from a gambler inspired other investigations into
illegal gambling in New York City, most notably resulting in a scandal about point shaving in
college basketball games. The highly publicized revelations shocked college sports programs
across the nation, yielded some books that examined the allegations (e.g., Rosen34), and likely
drew attention away from the police scandal related to Harry Gross.

Knapp Commission
Of the official reports produced in all of the cyclical scandals, the Knapp Commission
report35 of the 1970s scandal devotes the most attention to the criminal prosecution of police
officers. The report reproduces a bare-bones summary chart of the disposition
(conviction/dismissal/acquittal/sentence imposed) of criminal cases against police in New York
City in the previous four and a half years. After noting complaints about the leniency of some
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sentences imposed on convicted officers, the report concludes that for corrupt officers monetary
gains outweigh potential risks of punishment from the criminal justice system (p.253). The report
presents only a partial picture because many cases were brought or resolved after its publication.
Most importantly, the Knapp Commission recommended the establishment of a special
state prosecutor to handle corruption cases in New York City. Feinberg36 (2001) describes the
decision-making process for that recommendation and notes the competing theories of police
corruption: the “rotten apple” theory emphasizing the corruption of individual officers, and the
“rotten barrel” theory suggesting that the department spawns large numbers of officers who are
either corrupt or tolerant of the corruption of others. The strongest promotion of the importance
of prosecuting corrupt police comes, not surprisingly, from the person appointed to be the first
special prosecutor after the Knapp Commission. Nadjari37 strongly attacks the county district
attorneys in New York City for supposed ineffectuality in corruption matters, and touts the
advantages of an independent outside prosecutor. The present research explores the successes
and failures of that prosecutorial office in criminal cases brought against police related to the
1970s scandal.
The 1970s scandal also inspired the two most famous books of all of the cyclical
scandals. The biographical treatment of Frank Serpico by Maas,38 along with its adaptation in the
1973 movie Serpico, cast the public’s image of NYPD corruption and official inaction. The book
briefly describes some of Serpico’s trial testimony, which occurred in cases indicted in the Bronx
before the empanelment of the Knapp Commission. Because Serpico was not going to be used as
a witness in subsequent cases, he did not have extensive dealings with prosecutors other than the
Bronx district attorney. The Knapp Commission held hearings that included Serpico’s dramatic
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testimony in October 1971, and Maas’s narrative ends in the spring of 1972, so post-Knapp
prosecutions are not part of the story.
Another motion picture, Prince of the City (1981), similarly popularized the other famous
book based on the 1970s scandal. Daley39 describes the tortured route of Robert Leuci as a
corrupt NYPD detective turned into a problematic cooperator for prosecutors. In particular, the
reader sees Leuci’s cultivation as a cooperator, the gathering of compelling evidence, and the
competition among prosecutors’ offices to make cases. Research shows a higher conviction rate
in prosecutions of police in the 1970s scandal than in the earlier scandals, at least in part because
of more cooperating cops, so Daley’s close examination of Leuci’s role provides insight.
Although Daley gives an extraordinary view of prosecutorial rivalries and decision making and
describes some of Leuci’s trial testimony in detail, he makes only passing reference to the large
number of police prosecutions in which Leuci was not called as a witness.
A third NYPD member did not receive best-seller treatment, although he played a role
comparable to those of Serpico and Leuci in the 1970s scandal. Lardner40 portrays David Durk as
a whistleblower who guided Serpico to the New York Times after their frustrations with
prompting the NYPD, prosecutors, and other agencies to take action against corruption. Durk’s
trial testimony was even more limited than Serpico’s, and Lardner does not extensively describe
prosecutions brought against police.
Shecter41 tells the story of Detective William Phillips, a corrupt cop and Knapp
Commission witness, and includes some descriptions of a handful of prosecutions, including a
homicide prosecution of Phillips himself.
Armstrong42 provides the most thorough look at the work of the Knapp Commission from
the view of its chief counsel. The book is particularly helpful in understanding the political and
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investigative hurdles encountered by the Knapp Commission and the forces involved in creating
the Office of the Special State Prosecutor. Since the Knapp Commission had no prosecutorial
authority, Armstrong pays little attention to the prosecutions.

Mollen Commission
The official report of the 1990s scandal by the Mollen Commission43 posits that NYPD
corruption had changed from pervasive, lower-level misconduct (the “pad”) to more serious
misconduct by a much smaller number of officers. In fact, much of the misconduct that the report
describes had already been the subject of criminal prosecutions. Feinberg44 points out that the
Mollen Commission rejected the resurrection of the office of the special prosecutor, which had
been a prominent recommendation of the Knapp Commission. McAlary45 focuses on the most
notorious case of the NYPD’s Michael Dowd, whose arrest provoked the appointment of the
Mollen Commission. The book’s tales of investigative omissions and conflict between
prosecutors and the Mollen Commission provide a disturbing picture of the Dowd case.
Levitt46 draws on his long experience as a columnist on police matters. He describes
some circumstances of the Knapp era, but his greater emphasis is on the Mollen era. His
description of the 30th Precinct investigation of the Mollen era is particularly insightful. Much of
his work is driven by the personalities of the characters involved, such as the rivalry between
Milton Mollen and Robert Morgenthau. He does not delve extensively into the cases brought to
court.
In the wake of the Mollen Commission hearings, several public interest foundations
sponsored a conference at New York Law School to discuss police corruption matters. Sandler47
edited a volume of materials assembled at the conference, including some of the major
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documents produced from the cyclical scandals ranging back to the 1890s and an overview of the
Mollen Commission from one of the commissioners and the chief counsel. Prosecutions are
largely ignored.

New York Policing and the Cyclical Scandals
The twenty-year cycle for major NYPD scandals is a widely recognized phenomenon, but
one that defies simple explanation. Grennan does not attempt an explanation, merely observing
that a scandal every twenty years “seems inevitable.”48 Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert see the
NYPD as having a “preexisting climate for corruption,” but do not suggest why the scandals
erupt with such regularity.49 Lardner and Reppetto observe that the three elements of “people,
events, and public opinion” converge in the cyclical scandals, and they wryly conclude that the
scandals invariably result in “hearings featuring rogue cops, ambitious lawyers, and white-haired
eminences.”50
For the NYPD’s cyclical scandals and for other cities as well, Sherman discerns a pattern
of “scandal, reform, relapse, and new scandal.” Applying his analysis to New York of the 1970s,
he suggests that various parties may have a “tolerance quotient” that, if exceeded, contributes to
fueling a scandal.51 A bribe payer might find his tolerance quotient exceeded when corrupt police
demand too much money, or an honest officer might reach limits of tolerating the corruption of
other officers. For the general public, tolerance limits for police corruption might be exceeded
faster if there is a wider discontent over deteriorating conditions in the city. Sherman, though,
does not try to explain why these tolerance quotients seem to be reached every twenty years.
Bracey observes that the cyclical scandals mix sincere reform efforts and “political
opportunism” without producing lasting changes. She sees the cyclical scandals as akin to
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ritualistic floggings, after which the city “goes back to business as usual.”52 The period of twenty
years, according to Feinberg,53 may be the measure of the attention span that the city devotes to
seriously dealing with police corruption. Attention wanes as the next generation does not recall
lessons from the previous scandal.
Bracey54 briefly reviews all of the cyclical scandals, with particular attention to the
1890s. She emphasizes the localized nature of New York City policing along with persistent
political influences in the late nineteenth Century to explain early NYPD corruption. Grennan 55
also reviews all of the cyclical scandals, adding some personal commentary based on his own
experiences with the NYPD. With the exception of mentioning a few notorious cases and the
activities of the post-Knapp special prosecutor, he does not consider the prosecutions of police.
Writing about vice enforcement, Williams56 devotes a chapter to the NYPD, with a
review of the Lexow and Seabury commissions and a focus on the Knapp Commission. He
describes underlying reasons for vice-related police corruption, but does not delve into actual
prosecutions of police.
Lardner and Reppetto57 provide a thorough history of the NYPD with short descriptions
of the scandals. The excellent NYPD history by Astor58 ends before the last two scandals, but
contains detailed accounts of the earlier scandals. More commonly, recent works relating to the
NYPD have tended toward the self-congratulatory in providing explanations of the 1990s drop in
crime59 and showing little interest in the corruption scandals.
Punch60 devotes some attention to the NYPD and the Knapp Commission, but largely
focuses on police misconduct in London and Amsterdam for an in-depth review of police
deviance with several descriptive classifications for the types of police misconduct. Although he
does not consider the prosecutor’s role, Punch does emphasize the reluctance of police to
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investigate themselves. Chevigny61 takes a harsher view in his chapter on the NYPD, but
similarly points out police shortcomings in controlling abuses from within.

Prosecutors and Police
Davis (2007), Goldstein (1983), McDonald (1979), Worrall (2008) and others trace the
history of American prosecutors from colonial times to the present. All describe the 19th Century
transition from the use of private prosecutions by remedy-seeking crime victims to the system of
public prosecutions. Davis62 particularly emphasizes dangers inherent in the increasing power
and discretion ceded to public prosecutors as the public system evolved, and contends that
prosecutors who are directly elected by voters are actually insulated from accountability. The
position of district attorney in New York City was an elected office throughout the time period
covered by this study. The chapters on the cyclical scandals explore political circumstances in
New York surrounding the cyclical scandals. Some of those circumstances reflect on whether
particular prosecutors chose to tread lightly or move aggressively on matters of police
corruption. Covering more than one hundred years, the present research spans most of the
history of the development of the modern prosecutor’s office. The surges in urbanization,
immigration, and crime that spawned the creation and growth of the NYPD in the late 1800s,
according to Astor63 and others, also created more work for New York’s district attorneys.
McDonald64 sees several developments of that era that directed more authority and discretion to
prosecutors, such as professional police forces, warrantless arrests, and more case dispositions by
dismissals and guilty pleas.
Coles65 outlines how most American prosecutorial offices followed the felony case
processor model through much of the twentieth century. Rooted in the Progressive movement
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and reinforced with reports of the Wickersham Commission in 1931 and the President’s Crime
Commission in 1967, the felony case processor model encompasses numerous elements,
including the prosecutor seeking to achieve maximum felony conviction rates and usually
receiving cases passively instead of proactively pursuing them. Coles also notes that the
independence and prestige of prosecutors under this model can create conflicts with police. If
fewer police are prosecuted between the cyclical scandals compared to during the scandals, then
the felony case processor model may suggest that police corruption cases are less likely to be
prosecuted while the prosecutor passively awaits delivery of a potential case (especially if the
usual case delivery route is through the NYPD). Further, police cases that are difficult to prove
might be avoided by the prosecutor who seeks to maximize felony conviction rates under the
same model. With added public and political pressure during a corruption scandal, the prosecutor
may be inspired to prosecute cops despite other concerns.
Worrall points out that prosecutors have been viewed as running “closed shops” that were
isolated from outside scrutiny and that engaged in little cooperative effort with police.66 Jacoby
describes how long-term changes in the criminal justice system separated the functions of police
and prosecutors to the point that the two sides grew distrustful of each other despite a
“theoretically shared interest.”67 She notes, for instance, that arresting officers tend to overcharge
offenders for reasons that may include the lower standard of proof required at arrest and because
officers are administratively rewarded for making arrests for more serious crimes. On the other
hand, prosecutors tend to reduce charges, perhaps because of distrust of the police decision and
awareness of the higher standard of proof required in court. Worrall contends that a lack of
cooperation between prosecutors and police has continued until quite recent developments
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toward community prosecution. Ultimately, Jacoby sees police and prosecutors making
adjustments and working together in a “symbiosis.”68
The underlying common interest between police and prosecutors suggested by Jacoby
can be disrupted in prosecutions of allegedly corrupt cops. In a routine criminal case the police
and the prosecutor essentially want a similar outcome, which is some manner of successful
prosecution of the offender. But in a case of alleged criminal conduct by a police officer, a
successful prosecution may not be the outcome desired by many police officers and, perhaps,
even the police administration. McDonald describes how the police dominate the “front end” of
conducting investigations and effecting arrests in the justice system.69 Many of the scandalrelated prosecutions of police did not begin in that routine manner. Instead, much illegal police
conduct came to light through press reports or disclosure through commission investigations and
hearings, after which prosecutions might occur. So police prosecutions can violate the norms of
the workings between police and prosecutors described by Jacoby and McDonald.
More specifically, the charging decision of a district attorney is an area in which
prosecution of a police officer may fall outside common practice. Jacoby describes four general
policies that are not mutually exclusive that a prosecutor may use in making the charging
decision: (1) the Legal Sufficiency policy, which simply looks at whether the elements of the
crime can be established, (2) the System Efficiency policy, which considers a need to ration the
resources of an overburdened criminal justice system, (3) the Defendant Rehabilitation policy,
which diverts many offenders away from the criminal process, and (4) the Trial Sufficiency
policy, which assesses whether a charge can be proven at trial. Jacoby uses these policies to
anticipate which cases will be prosecuted, with what charges, and to what disposition. Her
policies may help explain the circumstances and outcomes of prosecutive decision making in
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scandal-related police prosecutions. For instance, the lack of courtroom success for prosecutions
brought in the 1890s scandal might suggest that the district attorney used the Legal Sufficiency
policy in order to bring a large number of cases when politically pressed by the burgeoning
scandal, and most of those cases turned out to be too weak to survive the court process.
Similarly, pressures created by a police scandal may change the prosecutor’s determination of
where to devote resources under the System Efficiency policy. This apparently occurred in the
1990s scandal as the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office quickly found the resources to create a
new public corruption unit.
With the possible exception of the Defendant Rehabilitation policy, Jacoby’s policies rely
on the prosecutor’s evaluation of the evidence in any particular case. Research shows that the
nature of evidence available to prosecutors evolved to include recorded conversations, video
cameras, and more cooperating cops in the two most recent scandals of the 1970s and the 1990s.
Adhering to the cautious Trial Sufficiency policy becomes easier as more convincing evidence
becomes available.
With similarities to Jacoby’s four policies, Utz70 analyzes the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion by describing prosecutors’ offices as following an Adversary Model or a Magisterial
Model. Under the Adversary Model, the prosecutor seeks full enforcement of the law and
exercises limited discretion. Under the Magisterial Model, the prosecutor exercises more
discretion in closely scrutinizing the merits of a case and engaging in more negotiation to resolve
cases. Utz applies these models by comparing two county prosecutors’ offices in California.
Bringing cases against police might fall so far outside of the routine workings of a prosecutor’s
office, particularly during the relative frenzy of a scandal, that Utz’s models are difficult to
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apply. The oft-criticized discretion exercised by the appointed special prosecutor in the 1970s,
however, might fit in Utz’s Adversary Model.
Miller,71 in a report for the American Bar Foundation, describes the prosecutorial
charging decision as requiring three determinations: (1) evaluation of the proof of guilt, (2)
consideration of whether prosecution is in the interest of the community, and (3) selecting the
particular crimes to charge. Miller’s criteria for the proof of guilt determination are quite
flexible, so one prosecutor might only require proof of probable cause of a police officer’s
offense while another might insist on proof beyond a reasonable doubt before choosing to
prosecute. As for the interest of the community, a prosecutor might give pause before launching
an aggressive investigation of a police department because of the potential for a deleterious
effect on the community from a disrupted police department.
Albonetti72 focuses on organizational decision making and suggests that prosecutors
make their decisions with a view toward avoiding uncertainty. The exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, according to Albonetti, is an attempt by prosecutors to resolve situations of
uncertainty and achieve low-risk outcomes. This avoidance of uncertainty may explain a
historical reluctance of district attorneys to prosecute NYPD officers because of risks carried in
potential outcomes of public reaction, political ramifications, and police relations, in addition to
the uncertainties of court dispositions. The report of Knapp Commission of the 1970s
emphasized this reluctance by the district attorneys.
Relative to prosecutions of police, a critically important development of fairly recent
history has been the expansion of federal prosecution of criminal offenses, sometimes called the
“federalization” of criminal law. Miller and Eisenstein73 describe how the playing field for
federal prosecutors began changing drastically around 1970. They cite a series of omnibus crime
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bills in Congress that expanded the federal criminal code and increased the jurisdictional overlap
between federal and state prosecutors. Even though the increased authority was given by
Congress only to federal prosecutors, Miller and Eisenstein contend that state prosecutors also
gained power by being able to coordinate enforcement with federal prosecutors and achieve
longer sentences for offenders by threatening federal referral in plea bargaining. Miller and
Eisenstein’s assertions held true in New York in the 1970s and 1990s, as federal prosecutors
stepped boldly into prosecuting city cops and the state prosecutors became more active either by
working with or competing with the feds.

Police and Corruption
Palmiotto74 describes a variety of police misconduct, ranging from sleeping on duty to
improper use of deadly force, under a broad category of “police wrongdoing.” He uses the more
specific category of “wrongdoing for material gain” to cover acts of police corruption.75 Sherman
acknowledges that “corrupt police behavior” might encompass a “multitude of sins,” but states a
preference for limiting a definition of police corruption to acts that serve an officer’s personal
interest.76 Goldstein similarly defines police corruption as “acts involving the misuse of authority
by a police officer in a manner designed to produce personal gain for himself or for others.”77
Virtually all of the cases of police prosecutions related to the cyclical scandals involved conduct
falling within these definitions of police corruption. Certainly, some of the most serious police
behavior that might not be classified as police corruption under these definitions has occasionally
prompted prosecutions and touched off major public scandals in the NYPD outside of the
twenty-year cyclical scandals. The assault on Abner Louima in 1997 and the shooting of
Amadou Diallo in 1999 are examples since the last cyclical scandal in the 1990s.

25

Fogelson78 examines in detail the history of urban police in the United States. He sees the
Lexow Committee hearings, along with numerous corruption investigations in other cities, as
contributing to the Progressive movement’s backing of police reform. That initial wave of reform
lasted until approximately 1930 and focused on centralization of authority in police departments,
but was largely undermined by entrenched interests that kept real control of policing at the level
of the local captain or political leader. After 1930, according to Fogelson, reform efforts
developed more from within police departments according to the evolving professional model,
although forms of corruption remained undisturbed while public confidence in the police eroded
into the 1970s.
Chapters about the cyclical scandals note the linkage between the nature of NYPD
corruption, as revealed in the scandals and prosecutions, and the social and political
circumstances of the time in New York City. Walker79 describes the urbanization-social control
theory, whereby American policing evolved in the nineteenth century in reaction to social
disorder resulting from urbanization and industrialization. Walker, though, criticizes that theory
for overlooking conflicting views of what sort of social order was desired and for suggesting that
the police assumed their task in a neutral manner. To fashion a hybrid alternative theory, Walker
borrows from a Marxist view of conflict between a working class gaining expression through
political machines and an elite class seeking police reforms. Much of the motivation for
reformers, according to Walker, arose from police undermining the intentions of laws by lack of
enforcement. This conflict between the interests of the elites and of the working class was
particularly apparent in the cyclical scandal of the 1890s.
Kappeler, Sluder, and Albert80 present a history of American police deviance that
suggests a division in a timeline at approximately 1920. In the pre-1920 era, according to the
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authors, individual officers had broad discretion, and corruption focused on collections from
overlooking enforcement of vice laws. For post-1920, they note the growth of the professional
model of policing while describing excessive force used by police across the decades, and also
recognizing eruptions of corruption scandals in many cities. The authors devote more attention to
attempting to explain underlying reasons for police deviance. They see misconduct stemming
from the opportunities for deviance inherent in police work compounded by social structural
factors that impose laws and enforcement requirements. They explicitly reject the “rotten apple”
explanation that police deviance arises from the character of a few individual officers.
Techniques of neutralization as posited by Sykes and Matza81 are applied by Kappeler, Sluder,
and Albert to police officers as ways for the officers to justify deviant conduct. They mainly
focus on police violence, but they cite neutralization techniques of denying that the deviant
conduct caused injury and denying the legitimacy of the victim, which seem particularly
applicable to corrupt officers receiving payoffs. Deviant cops stretched neutralization techniques
as far as possible in the 1990s era when, as noted by the Mollen Commission, aggressive police
misconduct was justified by some to show they were “in control” of high-crime neighborhoods
and as “vigilante justice” to impose extralegal penalties on drug dealers and others.82
Sherman83 dismisses the suggestion that police careers attract individuals who are
somehow predisposed toward corruption. Rather than a corrupt officer being a rotten apple,
Sherman contends, an officer’s affiliation with other officers leads to a process of involvement
with increasingly serious forms of misconduct. In a hypothetical set of six stages of misconduct,
Sherman places minor “perks” (free meals, for example) at one end of the spectrum and
accepting narcotics-related bribes at the other end. Of significance to the cyclical scandals,
Sherman states that a police officer’s conduct may stop at a middle step by drawing moral
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distinctions between degrees of illegal conduct. That is, a corrupt officer might decide to take
gambling-based bribes but not narcotics-based bribes.
In another work Sherman84 presents an insightful analysis by breaking down police
corruption into three types. His description of Type I corruption uses the rotten-apple metaphor,
with corrupt individual officers being the rotten apples and corrupt groups of police described as
rotten pockets. This is the minimal level of corruption that can exist in any department, and
police administrators are most willing to admit to having rotten apples because that sort of
corruption reflects less on the whole department. Type II corruption involves widespread, but
unorganized, corruption. Sherman finds this corruption most common in developing countries,
and describes much of the conduct as “nondistortive” because police receive payments for
legitimate functions that would have occurred anyway.85 Type III corruption is pervasive and
organized in the department. Sherman describes how a new police officer will learn that Type II
corruption lets the officer keep illicit payments, while Type III corruption requires that the
officer distribute illicit payments to other officers and superiors.
Griffin and Ruiz86 work with the common usages of the terms “rotten apple” and “rotten
barrel,” with the rotten apple being the police officer predisposed toward misconduct and the
rotten barrel describing the occupational conditions that encourage misconduct. Feinberg87 takes
a slightly different approach to fit the rotten apple/barrel metaphor with the findings of the
Knapp Commission. She likens the rotten apple to the Knapp Commission’s “meat eater”—an
inherently corrupt person who should have been kept out of the NYPD. The rotten barrel,
according to Feinberg, contains both the inherently corrupt and the “grass eaters” who join the
misconduct because of their moral weakness and susceptibility to peer pressure.
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Wilson calls the rotten apple theory a “plausible half-truth” that becomes less plausible in
the structurally corrupt “barrels” of urban police departments.88 Examination of the cyclical
scandals and the related prosecutions shows entrenched rotten barrel problems in the NYPD
through the 1970s scandal. Indeed, Sherman contended in the wake of Knapp reforms that the
NYPD had become “organizationally honest” and “corruption no longer appears to be
widespread.”89 The 1990s scandal, however, may have suggested a revived rotten apple theory to
explain the police misconduct.
Sherman90 explains that some constant aspects of police work contribute to corruption.
For instance, police officers can exercise extensive discretion in their work, which usually occurs
with low visibility to the public. Of variable factors that affect corruption, Sherman sets forth
fourteen propositions. For example—and of particular applicability to New York City—Sherman
proposes that there is less corruption in places with lower levels of racial, ethnic, and class
conflict. Such conflict between police and residents of higher-crime neighborhoods became most
apparent in the 1990s cyclical scandal. In two of his propositions, Sherman touts the corruptionfighting benefits of police departments having internal affairs units. The NYPD’s internal affairs
unit took heavy criticism for its ineffectiveness leading up to the 1990s scandal.
Gardner91 sees police corruption as a result of supply and demand for illicit goods or
services in which payoffs allow the activity to continue, and he posits that corruption can be
reduced but never eliminated. Lundman 92 describes how frequent police wrongdoing is more
likely to assume a pattern in that a police department administratively tolerates the conduct and
new officers become socialized in the operating norms that accommodate the misconduct.
Burnham believes that NYPD officers are gradually subverted by a work environment that
progresses from opportunities to save money (accepting free services) to opportunities to make
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money (conducting shakedowns). He even describes an extorting police officer as a “victim”
because civilians treat police in a way that pushes the officer toward accepting payments.93
Vice-based offenses such as prostitution, gambling, drugs, and alcohol violations present
abundant corruption problems. Many, but not all, observers refer to these types of offenses as
victimless crimes. The cyclical scandals and related prosecutions focused on police corruption
arising from civilians participating in these sorts of offenses. In Sherman’s six stages of the
moral descent of a police officer into corruption,94 the last five stages all involve accepting
money or benefits in exchange for permitting victimless crimes to continue. Since these stages
are gradual, thus encouraging a steady decline, Sherman proposes legalization of gambling and
prostitution in order to remove steps from the moral descent and make the drop more abrupt and
less inviting. Police who take money from persons engaged in illegal vices might take comfort in
believing that taking money from a (to some degree) consenting victim is not an immoral offense
and might gain confidence knowing that the victim is unlikely to report the offense. Abrams95
points out that crimes having consenting victims and crimes involving conduct that some find
morally ambiguous are most likely to be declined for prosecution. The 1890s scandal, for
instance, featured a district attorney who might have preferred to decline charging some police
cases, but public pressures demanded the prosecutions and trial juries returned many acquittals.
Bracey96 uses the linkage of vice enforcement with urban police corruption as an example
of how police corruption is a natural phenomenon that may actually fulfill some societal needs.
The police officer who takes a bribe from an offender has imposed a penalty on that person that
the legitimate justice system might not have been able to impose, while the officer’s conduct also
allows the offender to continue to provide desired (if illegal) goods and services to the public. In
a similar manner, Sisk97 presents an economist’s view that vice-based police bribes amount to
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illegal activity taxes that are earmarked for police salaries; that is, collected bribes count as part
of an officer’s overall compensation. Much of Bracey’s analysis involves offenses that might be
a step below the serious criminal vices, such as motor vehicle ordinances, parking violations, and
business regulations. Bracey further sees police corruption as promoting solidarity among
officers and providing training to new officers. These functions of corruption, according to
Bracey, contributes to its resistance to controls.
Kappeler, Sluder, and Albert98 note that the effectiveness of a police department’s
internal affairs unit can vary greatly depending on how the personnel in the unit respond to
allegations of wrongdoing. They contend that Los Angeles maintained a failed internal affairs
unit, while Grennan99 praises the post-Mollen Commission work of the NYPD’s internal affairs
bureau. An internal affairs unit’s functions can be enhanced by use of particular investigative
techniques. Kappeler, Sluder, and Albert tout early-warning systems that can keep track of all
types of complaints made against officers with the possibility of interventions by the department
before situations become more serious. Fyfe and Kane100 describe the NYPD’s internal affairs
bureau’s extensive use of integrity tests that may employ investigative sting techniques to test
officers’ responses in particular situations. These techniques became more important in
prosecutions in the 1990s scandal, but only after the Mollen Commission chastised the internal
affairs unit for years of ineffectiveness.
The cyclical scandals occurred both before and after civil service reforms that lessened
the influence of corrupt politicians who had previously controlled police appointments and
promotions. One revelation of the 1890s scandals was the price list of what it cost to be
appointed to the NYPD and then to be promoted. Goldstein101 suggests that some police actually
increase their illicit activities because civil service reforms loosened restraints by local
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politicians. Walker cautions that police reforms often carry the “pitfalls of unintended
consequences.”102
Regarding external controls of police corruption, Anderson, Dyson, and Burns103 note
that independent civilian review boards oversee only a handful of police departments. Such
boards vary in their mandates and composition, with most lacking subpoena power and
empowered only to make recommendations. Still, Kappeler, Sluder, and Albert see value in the
greater openness of the civilian process compared to complaints handled within police
departments. Leading up to the cyclical scandals of the 1970s and 1990s, Mayor Lindsay and
Mayor Dinkins promoted civilian review boards for the NYPD and received hostile reactions
from many cops.

Prosecutions of Police
While administrative proceedings as part of a police department’s internal corruption
controls might move faster and with greater assurance of success compared to the external
control of criminal prosecutions, only criminal prosecutions can bring criminal sanctions.
Criminal sanctions become more appropriate as retribution for police misconduct when the
conduct becomes more serious, which was the case for the scandal of the 1990s. In addition, the
public nature of criminal proceedings may have value to more fully expose corruption to the
press and public, while departmental proceeding are generally conducted behind closed doors.
An open question is whether the prosecutions (or the threat of prosecutions) have a deterrent
effect to discourage police corruption.
Walker104 explains four underlying assumptions for deterrence theory: (1) potential
criminals must be aware of the criminal penalties, (2) offenders must feel that the penalties
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should be avoided, (3) offenders must believe there is a real risk of the penalties being imposed,
and (4) the offenders act rationally in deciding whether to offend. To apply these assumptions to
police officers, and to compare police officers with other potential criminal violators, police
officers would seem particularly aware of criminal penalties and would want to avoid them. A
police officer has a desirable job and, in modern times, has to pass some level of screening to
obtain that job, so a police officer might be a stronger candidate to be a rational actor than
another potential criminal. The major sticking point in these deterrence assumptions is the
perception by the police officer about whether criminal penalties are a genuine risk. Throughout
the cyclical scandals, much of the police wrongdoing was conducted quite openly and without
apparent concern for facing penalties. That brazenness could be attributed to victims who did not
tend to report the misconduct and fellow cops who maintained the loyalty of the blue wall of
silence.
Goldstein105 is skeptical that prosecutions of police are an effective deterrent against
corruption. If a corrupt officer perceives a low likelihood of apprehension or that penalties upon
apprehension are minor, then deterrent value drops. Goldstein, though, sees ways to adjust the
deterrence calculation. He recommends aggressive investigative tactics such as undercover
operations and “turning” another corrupt officer to cooperate to increase the likelihood of
apprehension. He acknowledges that corrupt officers will vary in how they respond to the fear
that their wrongdoing will be detected. One possibility, according to Goldstein, is that fear of
apprehension can be generated from a single highly publicized investigation to bolster the
deterrent effect. He admits that criminal prosecutions of police tend to have high acquittal rates.
Further, he asserts that there is particular reluctance to aggressively prosecute and punish corrupt
police when there are corruption issues among prosecutors, judges, and other players in the
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criminal justice system. Research shows aspects of Goldstein’s positions on deterrence in the
cyclical scandals: the investigative commissions worked hard to maximize publicity for their
hearings and findings, and criminal cases used more cooperating cops and modern investigative
techniques in the scandals of the 1970s and 1990s. Concerns about corruption elsewhere in the
justice system encouraged the decision to establish the position of a special prosecutor in the
1970s, but the special prosecutor’s efforts in nonpolice cases ran into difficulties that contributed
to the decline of that office.
In a nuts-and-bolts manner, Beigel106 describes challenges faced by prosecutors in police
corruption cases. Although his article does not address the NYPD cyclical scandals, his
observations of prosecutorial problems with uncooperative police officers and weak evidence fit
cases in all of the cyclical scandals.
Sherman107 recognizes the prosecution of police as an external control against corruption,
and particularly cites the role of federal prosecution of local police. Still, he concludes that
internal control (i.e., addressing corruption by administrative and investigative steps from within
a police department) is more critical than the external control of prosecution. In later work,108
Sherman emphasizes the shortcomings of local prosecutors (district attorneys) in the prosecution
of police corruption, although he still sees prosecution as one of the essential stages of a police
scandal. Research shows federal prosecutions becoming increasingly important as the cyclical
scandals moved into the 1970s and 1990s, and the question of whether district attorneys could
adequately prosecute police produced opposite answers from the investigative commissions of
the those years.
Sherman does look briefly at reasons for variations in the extent of prosecutions in police
scandals. Examining four scandals that occurred in four cities across the United States, including
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the 1970s New York scandal, he concludes that prosecutions vary according to differences in the
“victim or non-victim nature of the offense.”109 He points out that criminal prosecutions did not
touch on a large portion of the misconduct revealed by the Knapp Commission, which was
consistent with the “non-victim nature” of the offenses. Sherman’s analysis blurs the distinction
between the common notion of a victimless crime, such as prostitution, and a crime for which
there is simply no available witness/victim. Clearly, a limit on the reach of prosecutions comes
from the need for witnesses and other evidence that can be presented in court. An extreme
example occurred in the 1950s cyclical scandal when the prosecution’s star witness began his
testimony in court, but then refused to continue.
Kutnjak Ivcović110 largely relies on the findings of the Knapp Commission, Mollen
Commission, and the 1974 Pennsylvania Crime Commission to describe the ineffectiveness of
using a complex web of multiple entities to attempt to control police corruption. Prosecutions are
hampered, she notes, by their reactive nature and focus on individual cases, and she points out
inadequacies of data sources about state and federal prosecutions of police. Kutnjak Ivcović
ultimately proposes creation of an independent integrity agency that could provide constant
oversight of a police department rather than scrutiny of a sporadic nature prompted by scandals
or publicity. The debate over the formation and the format of such an agency was intense in the
cyclical scandals of the 1970s and 1980s.
To summarize the review of literature, numerous publications have recited the facts of the
cyclical scandals, and some works have told stories focused on particular persons involved in the
scandals. With a few exceptions that usually involve the most sensational trials, however, the
literature has largely overlooked the criminal prosecutions of police related to the scandals.
Literature dealing more generally with police corruption devotes some attention to the role of
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prosecutions, but there appears to have been no thorough evaluation with analysis and
comparison over time of prosecutions brought against police, as undertaken in the present
research.
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Chapter 2

Methodology and Research Questions

Methodology
The cyclical scandals from the 1890s to the 1990s are approached as six case studies. A
case study approach accommodates research necessary for appreciation of the historical contexts
of the scandals, as well as gathering data regarding the prosecuted police officers and addressing
the research questions.

Case Study Design
Zimring laments that criminal justice research includes “much less attention than is
needed to the political and governmental dimensions of criminal justice.”1 The case study design
of this research produces the sort of information that accommodates the broader perspective that
Zimring suggests. King, Keohane, and Verba advise, “Case studies are essential for description,
and are, therefore, fundamental to social science. It is pointless to seek to explain what we have
not described with a reasonable degree of precision.”2
Descriptions of the underlying political and social circumstances of the scandals add
perspective to the scandal-related prosecutions. For instance, the political aspirations of
Governor Franklin Roosevelt loomed over the New York City corruption scandal of the early
1930s and provide context to the prosecutions of members of the NYPD’s vice squad. More
generally, a corrupt officer’s crime might be better understood if seen as a product of its
historical era. In turn, perhaps in cumulative effect with similar crimes, the crime itself can leave
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an imprint on the era.3 The case-study approach can capture both sides of the interplay between
the prosecutions and historical contexts of the scandals.
Yin4 states a preference for multiple- over single-case designs partly because of the
enhanced potential for external generalizability. While each of the NYPD scandals presents
circumstances worthy of separate study, examination of all six scandals allows comparisons. On
the other hand, Stake writes less favorably than Yin about comparisons in case studies,
contending that comparison glosses over the “uniquenesses and complexities” of the individual
cases. Stake does, however, describe the “collective” case study in which a number of cases are
studied in the hope of gaining greater insight into a phenomenon, and he acknowledges that
“multiple cases of intrinsic interest” can yield useful comparisons.5 Ragin notes that most
research designs use multiple cases because “ideas and efforts may be linked in many different
ways.”6
George7 suggests that appropriate cases for study be selected after consideration of the
research problem and the elements, and Ragin goes even further in advising that the researcher
will not know the cases until the research is finished. In contrast, cases in the present research are
selected according to the nature of the inquiry. The remarkable phenomenon of the twenty-year
cycle for NYPD scandals has been widely recognized,8 perhaps elevating the cyclical scandals to
the level of intrinsic interest that Stake describes for fruitful comparisons. George’s essential
requirement that all of the cases be the same class of event is certainly met. The six cyclical
scandals are sufficiently different from other NYPD scandals to warrant their separate
consideration, but they are sufficiently similar to each other to accommodate helpful
comparisons.
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Peters9 advises that focus on the central elements of cases, rather than the smaller details
of each case, may facilitate the formulation of generalizations from the comparisons. The central
elements of the scandals, for purposes of this study, are the circumstances and dispositions of the
prosecutions. Scrutiny of the prosecutions will produce the observations of the research design.
King, Keohane, and Verba10 point out that the observations in case study research drive the
information produced by the research, so η normally refers to the number of observations rather
than the number of cases studied. In the present research, η consists of the number of prosecuted
police officers.
Finding patterns and making comparisons are enhanced because there are consistencies in
factual and procedural elements of prosecutions of police even over the period of one hundred
years. More importantly, all of the defendants in the scandal-related prosecutions were members
of various ranks in the NYPD.11 Most of the corrupt activity related to the cyclical scandals
involved police officers misusing their positions to collect money from persons involved in
illegal activities. In every case, the prosecutor evaluated evidence. Almost all of the charges
brought in state and federal court resulted from grand jury action. For cases that went the
distance at trial, petit juries made decisions based on the constitutional standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. In all, the prosecuted police officers were sufficiently similar as units of
analysis to merit comparison despite the century-long time frame. Regarding case comparisons,
George cautions that “the cases must all be instances of the same class or universe; one must not
mix apples, oranges, and pears.”12 Comparing the prosecuted NYPD officers of the cyclical
scandals should be a comparison of apples to apples, albeit (rotten) apples of different eras.

Data Collection and Research
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The selection of the six cyclical scandals as cases provides two benefits for data
collection. First, the scandals spurred prosecutions of police. As the investigative commissions
uncovered corruption, with the public and media demanding action and prosecutors responding,
the number of prosecuted police officers (η) grew. The Knapp Commission Report pointed out
the relatively small number of cops prosecuted before the scandal, and then an unprecedented
number of cops were prosecuted after the scandal broke. Second, scandal-related prosecutions
tended to receive more public attention than police prosecutions at other times. For instance,
low-level bribery prosecutions of police that were part of the 1890s scandal and covered
extensively in the press probably would not have garnered such coverage absent the association
with the greater scandal (if, indeed, the officers were prosecuted at all).
The public nature of a criminal prosecution facilitated the collection of data. Many
aspects of prosecutorial functions transpire outside of public scrutiny. For example, a decision by
a prosecutor not to pursue charges in an investigation occurs routinely as an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. The reasons for that decision may include a belief that the evidence is
weak, that a jury will find the case unappealing, or that conduct in the investigation raises
troublesome legal issues. Worse, the prosecutor may act out of bias or other improper
motivation. Those sorts of factors are difficult to uncover and examine because prosecutors
usually make such decisions in private. When a case is brought to court, on the other hand, the
actions of a prosecutor move into public view. The defendant has been named, the charges have
been specified, and the court proceeding will eventually reach a resolution. The public
proceeding is available for scrutiny and data collection.
Each of the scandals produced at least one formal report, and all are readily available.13
The searchable online historical files of the New York Times provided the most extensive and
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accessible information about the police prosecutions. It carried contemporaneous accounts of the
majority of the scandal-related police prosecutions. Then, as now, police prosecutions were
highly newsworthy. Gaps in coverage still arose, however. A story about a multi-defendant
indictment might mention the names of all charged police officers, but subsequent stories might
not report on the dispositions as to all of the defendants.
While the New York Times is the only New York newspaper to have such an extensive
searchable database, other periodicals often provided information missing from the New York
Times about prosecutions. The Chronicling America database of the Library of Congress gives
access to some other New York newspapers, such as the New York Sun, the New York World, and
the New York Tribune. Those bygone papers added interesting perspectives when they were
active players rather than detached observers as the corruption scandals unfolded. Unfortunately,
the Chronicling America database only covers to 1922, and it has more limited searching
capabilities than the New York Times historical files. The Brooklyn Public Library offers online
access to the Brooklyn Eagle newspaper with some search capabilities. Although the Brooklyn
Eagle only published until 1955, it played a major role in the cyclical scandal of the 1950s, so
access to the paper’s coverage of the scandal was important. For the 1970s and 1990s scandals,
conventional internet search engines often yielded stories from the New York Post and the New
York Daily News tabloids. On a few occasions, newspaper-based research needed resources that
were not available online. For instance, issues of the Staten Island Advance newspaper available
on microfilm from the New York Public Library carried informative stories about the
prosecutions of several Staten Island-based cops charged in the 1970s scandal.
Conventional legal research yielded published judicial opinions, available online or in
aging bound volumes. These opinions arose most often from appellate courts, and only
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occasionally from trial courts. If a police officer was convicted after trial, an appellate court
usually considered the case and sometimes published an opinion. Such published opinions often
recited the procedural and factual histories of the cases, so the information from newspapers and
other sources could be checked and supplemented.
As for trial court records, docket entries for the Court of General Sessions and the Court
of Oyez and Terminer preserved on microfilm at the New York City Department of Records
were not helpful because they could not be searched and those examined were largely illegible.
In seeking information on case dispositions from state and federal courts, the levels of assistance
from the respective clerk’s offices varied considerably. Commonly, a clerk’s office responded
that no records of the disposition of a particular case could be found. Sealing or expungement of
records, lost or destroyed files, record keeping deficiencies, or even past improper handling of
records to assist a cop-defendant might explain a present lack of records for old cases.
Concededly, old filing systems might be confusing to a modern-day employee of a clerk’s office.
Records might be found under a docket number, a defendant’s name, a lead defendant’s name,
the judge’s name, or the court “part” (in the terminology of the New York State system) that
handled the case. The clerk’s office of New York County seemed most helpful and adept at
finding case dispositions. Only one county clerk’s office flat-out refused to look for case
dispositions, claiming an unconvincing legal reason for that response. Research located
information about the cases elsewhere.

Methodological Issues
The research questions and subquestions require defining a number of terms and
concepts. First, and most simply, a “criminal prosecution of police” is a court case14 alleging
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criminal charges against one or more police officers or former police officers.15 A “police
officer” is a law enforcement officer who is a noncivilian employee of the NYPD. This includes
individuals holding titles of officer, patrolman, sergeant, detective, lieutenant, captain, and
inspector, as well those holding an outmoded title such as watchman.
Whether a prosecution was “related” to a cyclical police scandal was determined on a
case-by-case basis. With one exception, the various authorities tasked with investigating the
cyclical scandals did not have prosecutorial powers. Some allegations of misconduct were
directly referred to prosecutors by the investigating authorities, so it was simple to classify those
matters as scandal related. Other prosecutions arose in the general atmosphere and publicity of a
particular scandal, perhaps by prosecutors prodded or motivated by the scandal. The examination
considered circumstances such as timing, public announcements, media coverage, evidence used,
and the nature of charges to reach a reasonable conclusion as to whether a prosecution was
related to a particular scandal. Reaching the conclusion was not difficult in most instances.
For many of the subquestions proposed below, the important unit of analysis is the
individual police officer who is criminally prosecuted. An alternative method of counting
prosecutions would be by indictment, rather than by defendant. Police officers were often
charged in multi-defendant cases. Counting by defendant may carry more validity than counting
by indictment because, for instance, a twelve-defendant case would seem undercounted if it
amounted to only a single unit (one indictment) instead of twelve units (twelve charged officers).
In addition, the outcome of a multi-defendant indictment could include a mix of dismissals,
acquittals, and convictions, so counting by defendant is easier for tracking purposes.
The “outcome” of a prosecution focuses on whether it resulted in a conviction. A
conviction could be by trial verdict (by jury or judge) or a guilty plea, and a nonconviction could
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be by a not guilty verdict or dismissal. A dismissal could be prompted by action of the
prosecutor, the judge, or an appellate court. Complications in some prosecutions were inevitable.
Two indictments of a single officer might be resolved by a guilty plea to one and a dismissal for
the other. A jury verdict could include a conviction on a minor offense, but an acquittal on the
major offense. Despite some twists and turns in the dispositions of prosecutions, examination of
individual cases allowed conclusions as to outcomes. For instance, a single police officer found
guilty in one indictment and not guilty in another would be counted collectively as a conviction.
Some of the subquestions look into the nature of the illegal police conduct. The process
of comparing criminal conduct seems simpler if charged offenses are compared rather than the
underlying criminal conduct. For instance, a prosecution of Officer Smith for the crime of
bribery would seem equally as serious as the prosecution of Officer Jones for the crime of
bribery. Even this straightforward approach of comparing the charged offenses can produce
some complications because New York’s criminal code changed through numerous revisions
over the course of a century, and federal law (under which some officers were charged) had
different statutory provisions than state law.
More importantly, the underlying conduct of Smith and Jones could have been quite
different. Smith might have accepted payoffs from gamblers eagerly seeking police protection,
while Jones aggressively shook down gamblers for payoffs. Historical research into the
underlying facts of misconduct almost always produced sufficient information to distinguish the
conduct of two officers. Specifically, the examination of prosecutions related to each scandal
looked at whether there was underlying civilian conduct (usually an illegal vice) associated with
the alleged police misconduct.
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For the approximately four hundred scandal-related prosecutions, the compilation of
information followed three steps. First, a prosecution was determined to be scandal related, as
described above, in order to become part of the data set. The unit of analysis for a prosecution
was each charged officer-defendant. Second, available information for each prosecution was
compiled. As available, information included the underlying facts of the offense, rank or other
status of the defendant, and other information sought in the research questions and subquestions.
Third, the outcome of each prosecution was determined. The simplest description was the
dichotomous measure of “conviction” or “no conviction” as an indicator of the success of the
prosecution from the prosecutor’s point of view. Convictions could be by plea or trial, and trials
could be by jury or nonjury. Nonconvictions could be by dismissal, trial verdict, or reversal on
appeal.

Research Questions
Research suggests areas of comparison between the cyclical scandals that explore why
the scandals happened, the role of criminal prosecutions in the scandals, and perspectives for
future scandals and prosecutorial responses. The following three research questions essentially
track the chronological progression of the prosecutions related to each scandal—the inception of
the scandal, the prosecutorial responses, and the outcomes of those responses. Each research
question contains more specific subquestions.

Research Question #1: How did social and political contexts surrounding the six cyclical
scandals of the New York City Police Department contribute to the inception of the scandals and
the subsequent responses?
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(a) Did police misconduct reflect city demographics or social divisions of the time?
(b) How did political circumstances affect the nature of the responses to police
misconduct?
(c) Does history explain the phenomenon of the twenty-year cycles or suggest prospects
for another cyclical scandal?

Research Question #2: How did the prosecutorial responses vary in the six cyclical scandals of
the New York City Police Department?
(a) How many police officers, and of what rank, were criminally prosecuted?
(b) What types of illegal police conduct were alleged in the prosecutions?
(c) Was there a prevalent type of illegal conduct by others underlying the alleged police
conduct? For instance, if the alleged police conduct was bribery, were the bribe
payers gamblers or drug dealers?
(d) What prosecutorial agencies brought charges?

Research Question #3: How did outcomes vary in the criminal prosecutions of police related to
the six cyclical scandals of the New York City Police Department?
(a) Did the prosecutions raise common issues, such as witness recalcitrance or
credibility?
(b) Were charges brought in state or federal court?
(c) Was disposition by dismissal, plea, or trial?
(d) What was the disposition? (including dismissal, acquittal, conviction, sentencing, and
appeal).
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(e) What do the outcomes suggest for the role of prosecutions in addressing police
corruption?
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Chapter 3

The Lexow Committee–Era Scandal

They are a lying, perjured, rum-soaked, and libidinous lot.
—Rev. Charles Parkhurst preaching to his congregation about public
officials, February 14, 1892.1

New Yorkers experienced milestones as the city approached the first cyclical scandal.
The opening of the Statue of Liberty (1886) displayed the city’s role in the world; a new building
at 50 Broadway (1890) was later recognized as the first skyscraper and showed Manhattan’s
vertical future; the construction of the last Polo Grounds (1890) helped establish the city as a
sports center and survived to welcome the Mets and the Jets in the 1960s; and the introduction of
bottled beer by the F&M Schaefer Company (1892) would change the city’s drinking practices. 2
New York’s population of 1.5 million according to the 1890 census was approximately 50
percent greater than the populations of closest rivals Chicago and Philadelphia. Brooklyn, prior
to the 1898 consolidation of Greater New York, was America's fourth largest city.3
New York seemed uncomfortable with its growing pains. Over 40 percent of the city’s
population was foreign born in 1890.4 Although the ethnic-based mob violence of the Draft Riot
(1863) and the Orange Riots (1870 and 1871) had subsided, the city did not adjust smoothly to
newcomers and changes in city life. The legendary William “Boss” Tweed of the Tammany Hall
machine of the Democratic Party lost his job after the second Orange Riot because influential
New Yorkers concluded that “Tweed could not keep the Irish in line,” according to Burrows and
Wallace.5 By that time, Tammany Hall derived much of its political strength at the polls from the
Irish themselves, so the bosses had to both accommodate and control their constituents. For
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political bosses to maintain their money-making corrupt apparatus while still managing the city
in a manner satisfactory to a sufficient number of voters was a difficult balance. The political
battles between Tammany Hall and its rivals would become a more prominent cause of the first
cyclical corruption scandal than the corruption itself.
The horrific poverty of New York’s lower classes caused both concern and distress
among the middle and upper classes as “the wealthiest and the poorest crammed into about a
dozen square miles” in New York.6 Using advances in technology that allowed unposed indoor
photographs, former police reporter Jacob Riis documented the deprivation in the lives of many
New Yorkers. Riis’s How the Other Half Lives, published in 1890, raised the consciousness of
New Yorkers and contributed to the nascent Progressive movement, although his descriptions of
overcrowded tenements, homeless children, drugs, and street violence were filtered through
characterizations of racial and ethnic groups that are unnerving by today’s standards. The
underlying assumption was that those persons were not really Americans or, at least, they were
decidedly different from the commonly accepted images of Americans. “The one thing you shall
vainly ask for in the chief city of America,” according to the empathetic observer Riis, “is a
distinctively American community. There is none.” Instead, he concluded, the city had turned
into “this queer conglomerate mass of heterogeneous elements.”7
Concern about the poverty of the lower classes combined with public action against signs
of moral decay in the city. As historical novelist Caleb Carr commented about the era, “Every
conceivable vice, it seemed, had a society in New York dedicated to its prevention.”8 Burrows
and Wallace summarized, “In New York itself, the comfortable middle classes were finding the
final decades of the nineteenth century a strange and perplexing time. They knew they lived amid
unprecedented progress. Yet everywhere they beheld portents of danger: poverty, corruption,
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licentiousness, militant unionism, political radicalism, open strife between capital and labor, and
a surge of immigrants so vast and alien that it was hard to imagine what would become of the old
Anglo-Saxon republic.”9 Those feelings of unease about the direction of the city fueled support
for the antivice crusade of a prominent minister who took advantage of the various sources of
anti-Tammany political sentiment and brilliantly targeted police corruption.

The Triggering Event
On February 14, 1892, Rev. Charles Parkhurst of the Madison Square Presbyterian
Church delivered a scathing sermon attacking politicians and police. Parkhurst accused police of
aiding illegal gambling, prostitution, and saloons because “your average policeman or your
average police captain is not going to disturb a criminal” due to bribes paid according to “a scale
of police taxation” that was “carefully graded” and “thoroughly systematized.”10 Eager
newspaper reporters extensively covered Parkhurst’s accusations the next day. Charles Gardner,
who became the chief investigator to uncover corruption and immorality for Parkhurst, described
the wildly contrasting public opinions about Parkhurst: to opponents “he seems a monstrous
phantom, half snake, half divinity,” while supporters “call him the Apostle of Reform and deify
him.”11
Parkhurst’s sermon touched off a series of events and political maneuvers. The district
attorney tried to call Parkhurst’s bluff by promptly summoning him before a grand jury.
Parkhurst admitted that he had no personal knowledge of his sermon’s allegations, and the grand
jury voted a public presentment that chastised Parkhurst. The minister fired back by personally
participating in sensational nighttime tours of saloons, opium dens, and prostitution houses
guided by investigator Gardner. On March 13, 1892, less than a month after his original sermon,
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Parkhurst delivered another sermon revealing the “so course, so beastly, so consummately filthy”
evidence that he had gathered.12

The Response
Parkhurst continued his efforts through 1892 and 1893, during which he received more
respectful receptions from other grand juries and further publicity. In addition to his church
duties, Parkhurst was the president of the Society for the Prevention of Crime, one of a number
of organizations supporting civic reform backed financially by the city’s Protestant elite, but
Parkhurst needed more help to take his crusade to the next level.13 Thomas Platt was one of
Parkhurst’s congregants and boss of the state Republican Party, which controlled the state
legislature. Motivated by politics rather than religion, Platt grew disgruntled as his party lost
ground to Democrats in city elections and, more particularly, slipped in the valuable patronage
control of the NYPD.14 In early 1894, the state legislature followed Platt’s prodding and
appointed a seven-member committee (five Republicans and two Democrats) chaired by Senator
Clarence Lexow to investigate the NYPD. Parkhurst, who freely used his influence outside of his
pulpit, insisted on the appointment of aggressive Irish-born attorney John Goff as chief counsel
to the Lexow Committee.15 In March 1894, the committee commenced highly publicized
hearings held, appropriately, in the building known as the Tweed Courthouse in Manhattan.
Although the Lexow Committee first looked into Tammany-connected police misconduct
relating to supervision of polling places and other election abuses, far greater attention and
resources were devoted to the “second branch” inquiry of the day-to-day corruption in the
NYPD. Nearly three thousand subpoenas and six hundred witnesses between March and
December 1894 produced evidence of the payoffs needed to advance within the department and,
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of greater concern to Parkhurst, the manner by which police facilitated locations that catered to
the three vices of prostitution, gambling, and liquor.
The workings of the criminal justice system at the time accommodated Parkhurst’s
efforts. In his position as Parkhurst’s investigator, Charles Gardner gave ideas for the sensational
vice tour, dressed the straightlaced Parkhurst in disguise, provided necessary security, and
accommodated Parkhurst’s instructions of “I want to see worse” by showing him one unsavory
location after another.16 The crusade honed Parkhurst’s political skills. He called New York
County District Attorney DeLancey Nicoll “guileless” and “callow” in the February 1892
sermon,17 and then he badly embarrassed Nicoll in the second grand jury appearance. Later,
perhaps sensing that he would not be in office much longer, Nicoll referred individuals who
complained about prostitution locations directly to Parkhurst’s Society for the Prevention of
Crime for further investigation. The society used its own aggressive investigative techniques.
Undercover investigators from the society focused attention in particular precincts, obtained
evidence of vice activities, and then appeared before selected judges to obtain search warrants,
which were executed with reluctant assistance from the police.18 Before Gardner delivered a
signed warrant to the police for execution, he placed the society’s own investigators at the search
location to be sure that the police did not tip off the occupants. Gardner claimed that in just five
months his efforts led the society to gather strong evidence in over five hundred cases of
“disorderly house keepers, pool room runners, policy dealers, gambling house proprietors, liquor
dealers, and other violators of decency.” He claimed that the society’s cases against the vice
purveyors held up well in court while the smaller number of cases brought by the police resulted
in a high percentage of dismissals due to intentionally insufficient evidence presented by the
police—what Gardner derisively called “elastic testimony.”19
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Even while the Lexow Committee conducted its hearings in late 1894, Parkhurst pushed
hard for indictments of police. While it is not possible to exactly reconstruct the roles of
Parkhurst, the district attorney, the grand jurors, and other decision makers in the indictment
process, Parkhurst’s own version of events suggested that he wielded extraordinary influence.
Indeed, Parkhurst cast himself or, at least his Society for the Prevention of Crime, as the driving
force behind police indictments. For example, he described his “War on the Captains” and
asserted that “we went before the Grand Jury and secured four indictments against Captain
Devery.”20 Only weeks later, according to Parkhurst, “we undertook . . . to secure an indictment
against Inspector Williams and Captain Schmittberger,” and he complained about the charges
being heard before a different grand jury.21 Newspaper reporter Lincoln Steffens, reflecting in
his autobiography from a perspective over three decades later, asserted that the effectiveness of
Parkhurst’s anti-vice crusade “led up to the whole period of muckraking and the development of
the Progressive party.”22
That the State Senate Republicans created the Lexow Committee in a mayoral election
year was certainly no coincidence, and the committee’s exposure of police corruption fueled
anti-Tammany sentiment. The November 6, 1894, election gave an overwhelming victory to
William Strong to become the first Republican mayor since the Civil War. Lexow Committee
counsel John Goff became Strong’s running mate, and he won election to the prestigious position
of Recorder by even more votes than Strong received. Clarence Lexow, who was still preparing
the committee’s report, gave credit to the committee’s work for the election results in his
analysis in Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World, a strongly anti-Tammany newspaper: “The
boundless corruption exhibited in the testimony taken before the Senate committee opened the
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eyes of the people to the peril confronting them from an extension of machine politics to densely
populated municipalities.”23
Sounding more than a bit haughty, Charles Parkhurst also gave his opinion about the
election: “It shows that however apathetic men they may be, and however ignorant certain
classes of men may be, there is a belief in the possibility of better things. Now having attained to
these great results, and having dealt a blow to the agents of corruption in municipal government,
we want not only to maintain this new position gained, but to go on to still stronger and larger
attainments next year, and in the years to come.”24 Subsequent events would show that Parkhurst
was too optimistic or, at least, he underestimated the voter turnout of the apathetic and the
ignorant. The Democrats rode the Tammany tiger back into the mayor’s office in the next
election.
The Lexow Committee’s report in January 1895 (signed only by its Republican members)
praised Parkhurst’s evidence gathering and found “an extraordinary disinclination on the part of
the police, so efficient in other respects, to display any desire or activity in the suppression of
certain descriptions of vice and crime.”25
From a national perspective, the most significant response to the police corruption
scandal was the appointment of Theodore Roosevelt as a police commissioner. Roosevelt had
been elected to the New York State assembly and ran for mayor of New York in 1886, both
before the age of thirty. He lost convincingly in the mayoral election, so he took a position with
the United States Civil Service Commission in Washington for several years. William Strong’s
election as mayor gave Roosevelt his opportunity to return to New York. Strong appointed
Roosevelt to the four-member board of police commissioners in May 1895, and the other three
commissioners promptly voted Roosevelt to be their president.26 Roosevelt used the position as a
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showcase for his personality and ideas. He promoted anticorruption measures in hiring and
promotion of police and other reforms, but he garnered the greatest attention for his efforts to
enforce Sunday closing laws in saloons. New York voters did not react well to Roosevelt’s
efforts. The nonmayoral elections in November 1895 swung back toward Tammany.
Interestingly, Roosevelt’s national stature grew while his popularity in the city sank during his
tenure as police commissioner.27 Roosevelt stayed the course as police commissioner until the
presidential election of William McKinley in 1896 gave him a proper exit from the tangle of city
policing and politics. In the next years the ascent of his career was like a rocket launch—
appointed as assistant secretary of the Navy in April 1897, charging up San Juan Hill with his
Rough Riders in July 1898, election as governor of New York in November 1898, election as
vice president under McKinley in November 1900, and rising to the presidency after McKinley’s
assassination in September 1901. His tenure as police commissioner might have launched his
ascent, or it almost kept the rocket on the ground.

The Prosecutors
DeLancey Nicoll, the New York County district attorney when the scandal broke, seemed
a man divided. Even before the turn of the twentieth century, Nicoll’s pedigree added up to over
two hundred years of prominence in New York. He was among the bluest of New York’s blue
bloods, with his ancestry tracing back to a colonial governor of New York and the earliest
English settlers. A short profile of Nicoll in 1898 noted that he was educated at an elite New
England prep school, followed by an ivy league college and law school, and emphasized that he
belonged to “the best known social organizations in the city.”28
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Nicoll’s route to becoming the district attorney showed how political realities might have
overwhelmed his personal inclinations. District Attorney Randolph Martine, an anti-Tammany
Democrat, appointed Nicoll as an assistant district attorney in 1885. His reputation grew with
success in a major prosecution of New York City aldermen who accepted bribes. Then Nicoll
himself ran for the office in 1887 as an Independent and Republican, but was defeated by John
R. Fellows, the Tammany candidate. Nicoll was raised as a Democrat, “but he maintained his
independence, breaking from Tammany when he saw fit.”29 He returned to the Tammany fold
and was elected district attorney in 1890.30
In response to Parkhurst’s scathing sermon on February 14, 1892, Nicoll seemed guided
more by his Tammany allegiance than his anticorruption credentials. He immediately described
the sermon as “the coarsest and most vindictive utterances from the pulpit” that he had ever
heard and accused Parkhurst of spreading “falsehoods and misrepresentations.”31 Of course,
regardless of his ivory tower upbringing, Nicoll must have known that at least some of
Parkhurst’s allegations were true. With extraordinary swiftness, Nicoll’s demand that Parkhurst
appear before the grand jury came just nine days after the sermon. One week later, the grand jury
delivered its conclusion about Parkhurst’s allegations: “We desire, further, to express our
disapproval and condemnation of unfounded charges of this character, which, whatever may be
the motive in uttering them, can only serve to create a feeling of unwarranted distrust in the
minds of the community with regard to the integrity of public officials, and tends only to hinder
the prompt administration of justice.”32 Nicoll appeared to have won a decisive victory that
assisted Tammany’s desire to avoid serious action against vice-related corruption in the city,
leaving open the question of whether that was Nicoll’s conscious objective. Chief investigator
Gardner contended in his memoirs that Parkhurst believed Nicoll took the aggressive grand jury

63

action on orders from Tammany Hall.33 For his part, Parkhurst simply vowed “that I would never
again be caught in the presence of the enemy without powder and shot in my gun-barrel.”34
The success from Nicoll's pro-Tammany efforts faded quickly. In just March 1892, the
month following Parkhurst’s scolding by the grand jury, the following occurred: Parkhurst and
Gardner gathered evidence in their nighttime undercover vice tours, Parkhurst delivered another
blistering sermon about vice and corruption at his church, and a different grand jury heard
evidence about police actions in vice matters. That grand jury issued its presentment on March
31, 1892 and concluded that the police department failed in its duty to enforce vice laws and that
the failure was due to “reasons and motives . . . which are illegal and corrupt.”35 In a telling
headline, the New York Times trumpeted: “DR. PARKHURST PLEASED. THE GRAND JURY
DID JUST WHAT HE WANTED IT TO DO.” Although Parkhurst would later aggressively
demand that individual police officers be criminally prosecuted, at this time he proclaimed that
“my objective has not been to secure an indictment in these specific cases, but to secure, in the
general mind of the public, an indictment of the entire Police Department.”36
Out-maneuvered by Parkhurst and likely burned by his Tammany ties, Nicoll kept a
relatively low profile. His term as district attorney expired at the end of 1893, just weeks before
the New York Senate authorized the formation of the Lexow Committee. Only three police
officers were indicted under his watch in the scandal-related prosecutions described below, and
none of those cases was resolved while he was still in office. As a private attorney representing
some police officials, he appeared before the Lexow Committee and complained, “You have
summoned before you, upon your subpoenas, witnesses of various sorts and conditions; you have
received the testimony of prostitutes, brothel keepers, perjurers, forgers, and self-confessed
criminals and bribe-givers; you have listened to their evidence, giving them protection, eagerly
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receiving their vengeful stories against members of the police department, high or low . . . and
not only have you done that, but you have thrown aside the rules of evidence, and the ordinary
safeguards which protect the citizen, private or public, and admitted hearsay rumor, and
notoriety, as the basis of an attack upon the public officials.”37
Nicoll’s remarks went beyond the protests of a defense attorney on behalf of his clients—
his own reputation based on his tenure as district attorney was at stake in the committee’s
hearings. Further, his remarks anticipated difficulties at criminal trials that Parkhurst and others
might not have appreciated. The committee held hearings that included questionable witnesses
giving testimony without full cross-examination and received other evidence that might not be
admissible at a criminal trial, all of which would produce powerful headlines, public outrage,
much-needed exposure of corruption, and a strong final report. But those successes were not
necessarily transferable to criminal prosecutions. In any event, Nicoll later withdrew from any
participation in the hearings. Even his nemesis Parkhurst wrote, “we were all sorry to bid him
good-by,”38perhaps in deference to Nicoll’s social standing, which was comparable to some of
Parkhurst’s prominent congregants and financial backers. Nicoll never again sought elective
office.
Nicoll’s predecessor John R. Fellows also became his successor, returning to be elected
on the Tammany ticket as district attorney in late 1893 after serving in the United States
Congress. Fellows had worked with Nicoll as an assistant district attorney on major corruption
cases, but his personal background was starkly different from the privileged Nicoll’s. Fellows
grew up in upstate New York and then moved to Arkansas to study and practice law. At the
onset of the Civil War, he joined the Confederate army, fought in key battles, and was held as a
prisoner of war by the Union until the end of the conflict. He attended the 1868 Democratic Party
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convention in New York as part of the Arkansas delegation and met Boss Tweed, who convinced
him to move back to New York.39 Fellows served as district attorney until his death in December
1896. He used the title of Colonel, his highest rank in the Confederate army, throughout his
career in New York.
Parkhurst called the district attorney’s office under Fellows “an obdurate obstacle and a
biting exasperation” to efforts to bring charges against police.40 In contrast, Fellows received
lavish praise from the Lexow Committee in its report: “[F]rom the very inception of the
investigation down to its close the district attorney acted in entire harmony with your committee,
voluntarily placing at its disposal his own services and those of his assistants, together with the
facilities and authority of his office, while the higher criminal courts aided in every proper way
to facilitate our work.”41 After the committee finished its work, and Fellows was left with
difficult decisions about prosecutions of police ensnared in the scandal, his record became less
sterling. To criticize those difficult decisions as Monday-morning quarterbacking might seem
unfair, especially when “Monday” comes more than a century later. But the record of scandalrelated prosecutions as set forth below was so unfavorable that criticism is justified. Fellows
seemed buffeted by trying to accommodate the Lexow Republicans while appeasing his
Tammany sponsors and responding to the demands of Parkhurst and other reformers. The result
was a combination of insufficient cases that should not have been prosecuted and meritorious
cases that were pursued inadequately. Fellows complained about his situation when he felt
compelled to move to dismiss thirty-five indictments against twelve police defendants (several
defendants faced multiple indictments). At that point, in late December 1895, a few cases against
police had gone to trial. Fellows asserted that “some of the trials had occupied seven or eight
weeks each” so to proceed with the remaining cases “would have blocked the business of the
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courts.”42 The governor offered to convene a special court to assist, but Fellows claimed that it
was impossible to find a courtroom.43 Mixed in with Fellows’s excuses was likely the real reason
for the dismissals: the evidence was weak, with many of the cases relying on the questionable
testimony of brothel proprietor Augusta Thurow. The New York Sun went one step further and
blamed former Lexow Committee counsel John Goff for his “rakings from the slums” that could
not stand up in court and also blamed “the Parkhurst society and itinerant reformers, crooks, and
stool pigeons” for gathering the “so-called” evidence that led to the indictment of the dismissed
cases.44 Parkhurst’s exhortations and the Lexow Committee’s recommendations must have
weighed heavily in prosecutorial decision making. Nevertheless, Fellows was the district
attorney at the time of indictment of all of the dismissed cases, so he bore more responsibility
than anyone for the outcomes.

Overview of the Prosecutions
Information obtained regarding the prosecutions of the Lexow-era scandal yielded a total
of forty-seven police officers from all ranks who were criminally charged.45 Some of the officers
were subject to more than one indictment, usually because the district attorney chose a route of
multiple indictments due to separate criminal incidents or sometimes because officers were
reindicted after dismissal of earlier charges. Table 3.1 shows that the ranks of the police charged
were quite widely distributed.
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TABLE 3.1. Ranks of police charged in Lexow-era prosecutions46
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Rank
No. charged
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Inspector
1
2
Captain
10
21
Detective (incl. wardman)
13
28
Sergeant
6
13
Patrolman (incl. roundsman) 17
36
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
47
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

A wardman, also known as a “precinct detective,” operated under a precinct command rather
than the central detective squad. The position was particularly subject to corrupt activity, with
the wardmen often collecting payoffs for the precinct captains.47 In the middle of the Lexow
Committee hearings in 1894, the board of police commissioners abolished the position of
wardman.48 A roundsman held a rank between sergeant and patrolman. Only one defendant in
these prosecutions was clearly identified in reports as a roundsman, and he is counted above with
the patrolmen. Not surprisingly, all of the defendants were men. Also not surprisingly, many
appeared to be of Irish heritage, with twenty-six (55 percent) having surnames commonly
associated with Irish heritage (Doherty, Donohue, Gannon, Meehan, O’Toole, etc.). At least
three of the defendants (detectives Burns, Gannon, and Kelly) fled to Ireland in the midst of their
legal troubles. It is certain that all of the defendants were white. Newspaper accounts did not
state otherwise (such matters of race were often bluntly reported in press accounts at the time),
and there were no blacks on the NYPD until a few years later (although a handful served earlier
in the separate city of Brooklyn).49
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For this study, examination of the press accounts and other sources of information about
the prosecutions helped to determine the types of wrongdoing that were prosecuted. Where
police were charged with multiple offenses or in multiple indictments, the primary charged
criminal conduct was identified where possible. For a defendant charged with different types of
criminal conduct in different indictments, the indictment that went to trial or otherwise became
most prominent provided the primary charged criminal conduct. Also, conduct charged in a
single indictment might include legally distinct offenses. For instance, Patrolman William Dwyer
was convicted of assault and oppression (abuse of authority) in the arrest of a saloon keeper.50
Based on the circumstances of the case, assault was selected as the primary charged conduct.
The wrongdoing by police charged in the criminal cases was largely in the nature of
bribery and extortion, which are not separated for reasons explained in chapter 2. Table 3.2
shows the breakdown of the primary charged conducts.

TABLE 3.2. Primary charged conduct in Lexow-era prosecutions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Conduct
No. of cases % of total
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Bribery/extortion
38
81
Assault
9
19
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
47
100
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The illegal conduct by the police in these cases usually arose from some activity by
civilians that can be called the “primary underlying activity.” Since the primary charged conduct
in the prosecutions involved payoffs to police (whether called bribery or extortion), those payoffs
would be expected to have some basis in civilian activity, legal or otherwise. For summarizing
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these police prosecutions, the civilians can be fairly described as victims, although a person
engaged in illegal activity who made arrangements with corrupt police in order to be able to
continue the illegal activity might not have fit traditional notions of a crime victim. In the most
common situation, a person engaged in prostitution activity would give payoffs to police in order
to be allowed to continue that activity. When police were charged with offenses arising from
separate criminal incidents (such as taking payoffs from different parties), then available
information was examined to determine either the most serious of the charged conduct or the
charged conduct that was most prominently pursued in court. For instance, Captain William
Devery was charged in separate indictments with taking bribes related to prostitution activity and
bribes related to demolition of a building, and separate trials focused on the respective activities.
The prostitution-related bribery case went to trial first, so that became the primary underlying
activity for the breakdown below. The primary underlying activity (table 3.3) could be
determined from press and other sources for almost all of the bribery/extortion cases, but
available information for the assault cases was much more limited.
TABLE 3.3. Primary underlying civilian activity in Lexow-era prosecutions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Activity
No. of cases
Approx. %
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Prostitution
14
30
Liquor
7
15
Construction
3
6
Concert hall
2
4
Steamship
2
4
51
Medical
2
4
Sports event
1
2
Other business
4
9
No Information
12
26
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
47
100
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Of the twelve “no information” cases for underlying activity, the primary charged criminal
conducts were assault (seven cases) and bribery/extortion (five cases). Since there were only nine
assault cases in total, just two assault cases had the underlying activity reported in examined
sources. Press accounts usually did not report the underlying activity in assault cases when
reporting that an officer was indicted or a case was dismissed, and none of the seven “no
information” assault cases went to trial. In addition, as will be described below, a higher
proportion of the assault prosecutions had no known final dispositions compared to the
bribery/extortion cases. The reasons for this apparently less thorough reporting on assault cases
by the press are uncertain. Perhaps the description of an assault case against an individual cop
(the assault cases tended to be lodged against patrolmen rather than higher-ranking officers) was
not considered as newsworthy as the description of a bribery/extortion case that more often
contained salacious details and ties to other prosecutions related to the same vice-involved
victim.
The underlying activity in the prosecuted cases may have shown a shift away from the
emphasis of the Parkhurst sermons and the Lexow Committee hearings. The sermons and the
hearings emphasized police payoffs from the vices of prostitution, gambling, and liquor. Those
vices certainly provided steady corrupt income to police— the same “pad” that the Knapp
Commission would focus on almost eight decades later. Such an emphasis on the vices would be
expected from the religious underpinnings of Parkhurst’s work, while the politically inspired
Lexow Committee hearings would exploit the publicity value of vice-based disclosures.
Prostitution, as the underlying activity of 30 percent of the prosecuted cases, was consistent with
that emphasis. After prostitution, however, emphasis on the vices seemed to drop off. Liquor is
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significant (15 percent), but gambling is not on the list and the other underlying activity tended
toward more legitimate, nonvice sources.
Prosecutorial decision making may have prompted the shift away from the underlying
vice-based activities that Parkhurst and the Lexow Committee so strongly emphasized. A
prosecution in criminal court needed witnesses who would show up and testify and, even better,
would be believed by a jury. As will be noted in some manner repeatedly herein, vice-based
police payoffs usually involved payments made by persons involved in illegal activity. To the
prosecutor considering which cases to push into criminal court, prospective witnesses who had
been criminals were generally seen as less credible, if they could be convinced to testify at all.
Putting other case-specific factors aside, the prosecutor would likely consider the business
person who was shaken down by police to be the more desirable prospective witness than the
brothel operator who made payoffs to stay in business. That sort of decision making seems to be
reflected in the breakdown of underlying activity in the reported prosecutions. Further, it appears
that the district attorney tried to slow the grand jury’s return of additional vice-based indictments
of police. A hung jury in the criminal trial of Captain Michael Doherty and an adverse court
decision in a departmental trial of another captain—both cases had relied on the testimony of
prostitutes—caused the grand jury to hold back on filing police indictments that had already been
voted because the cases lacked corroborative evidence that would make them stronger in
criminal court.52 District Attorney Fellows already had his hands full with weak cases.
The most striking conclusion about the Lexow-era prosecutions comes from examining
the dispositions of the reported cases (table 3.4). The prosecutions were stunningly unsuccessful,
taking the measure of success for a prosecution as a favorable outcome for the prosecutor. The
basic favorable outcome for the prosecutor is a conviction, whether by guilty plea or trial
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conviction. The basic unfavorable outcome for the prosecutor is a lack of a conviction, whether
by dismissal or not guilty verdict or appellate reversal of a conviction. An additional measure of
prosecutorial success could be the sentence imposed on a conviction, but the Lexow-era
prosecutions had so few convictions that this additional measure is not helpful here.

TABLE 3.4. Dispositions of Lexow-era prosecutions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Disposition
Number
%
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Convicted
Guilty at trial
1
2
Guilty plea
1
2
Total
2
4
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Not convicted
Dismissed
30
64
Fugitive
2
4
Conviction reversed
2
Not guilty at trial
2
Total
36
77
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Unknown dispositions
9
19
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
47
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

To complete the picture of the only two convictions, Captain Edward Carpenter stopped
his trial to plead guilty to receiving a $1000 bribe from an association of liquor retailers relating
to the avoidance of Sunday closure laws. District Attorney Fellows personally recommended
leniency in the form of a sentence of probation, but the judge refused to go along with the
recommendation and sentenced Carpenter to three months in jail.53 This case concluded in May
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1896, by which time D.A. Fellows already had a large number of unsuccessful prosecutions in
police cases, so his recommendation for leniency might have been a result of his eagerness to
avoid another loss. In the other case that resulted in a conviction, Patrolman William Dwyer was
found guilty by a trial jury of oppression (abuse of authority) in a peculiar scenario in which
Dwyer falsely arrested a saloon keeper. The jury “united in a strong recommendation for
mercy.”54 Under the state’s first use of the oppression law, Dwyer received a sentence of two
months in jail, and the conviction survived challenges on appeal.55 For D.A. Fellows to
recommend leniency in a midtrial guilty plea and for the Dwyer jury to recommend mercy seems
consistent with the notion that members of the public (as reflected in the citizens on those juries)
may have taken police corruption less seriously than Parkhurst and his followers, particularly as
time passed after Parkhurst’s sermons and Lexow’s hearings. Indeed, Carr suggests that after the
publication of the Lexow Committee’s report, police corruption was “waiting until the public
wearied of the passing fashion of reform and sank back into business as usual.”56

Selected Prosecutions
By the time allegations of corrupt police activity are narrowed by screening by a
prosecutor, fitting proofs into an indictment, and decisions by the judge and jury, the misconduct
can appear quite minor. The prosecution of Captain Thomas Killilea showed the prosecutor’s
challenges in dealing with a de minimis violation.
The prosecutions related to payoffs from Augusta Thurow collectively provided the most
prominent example of what can happen to cases that rely on a problematic witness. Prosecutions
of police officers can put extraordinary pressure on a testifying witness, particularly if that
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witness’s illegal activity prompted the interaction with police. Prosecutors miscalculated her
strength as a witness by relying on her to carry multiple cases through trials.

Captain Thomas Killilea
The organization of police corruption of the 1890s was hierarchical, with the routine
vice-based payoffs flowing up to the captains after collection by the wardmen (precinct
detectives). Parkhurst knew that attention to the captain-level corruption was critical to the moral
aims of his crusade to reduce vice in the city. The Lexow Committee’s report contended that
corrupt activities “at work in the police department are such that operate from the higher officials
down, rather than from the patrolmen up,” and that “little corruption has been traced into the
pockets of the ordinary policeman.”57 The focus on captains continued in the criminal
prosecutions, as might have been expected as a result of Parkhurst prodding the district attorney
to bring charges. Research obtained information about criminal prosecutions of a total ten
captains, a very high number considering that there were only thirty-three captains in the
department at the time, according to testimony before the Lexow Committee.58 None of the cases
with unknown dispositions involved captains, probably because the prosecution of a captain
would have been subject to extensive press coverage. Table 3.5 shows the outcomes of the ten
criminal cases involving captains.
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TABLE 3.5. Outcomes of 10 Lexow-era prosecutions of captains
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Outcome
No. of cases
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Plea of guilty
1
Not guilty at trial
2
Dismissed—hung jury at trial
1
Dismissed—trial conviction reversed
1
Dismissed—died before trial
1
Dismissed—no trial
4
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The unusual guilty plea of Captain Carpenter, noted above, was the only conviction of a
captain. The most notorious case of a not guilty verdict at trial was the prosecution of Tammanyfavored Captain William (“Big Bill”) Devery, who not only received an acquittal in his criminal
trial, but also had his dismissal from the police department reversed on appeal, after which he
returned to become chief of the entire department after the consolidation of Greater New York in
1898. The other case of a not guilty verdict at trial was the prosecution of Captain Thomas
Killilea.
In an example of how times have changed, the football game between Yale and Princeton
was a major annual event in New York in the 1890s. The game drew huge crowds and was held
on Thanksgiving Day, beginning the national tradition of football on that holiday. In 1892, the
game drew an estimated sixty thousand fans to Manhattan Field, which was next door to the new
Polo Grounds in upper Manhattan. The event was so grand that the New York Sun claimed that
no other American city could match it “except when a President is inaugurated or a World’s Fair
is dedicated.”59 Captain Killilea supervised approximately one hundred police officers to provide
security at the game.
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Killilea came to New York from Ireland as a child, became a police officer in 1864, and
at fifty-seven was one of the oldest members of the police department when he was indicted in
April 1895. The indictment charged that he received a bribe of one hundred dollars relating to his
services at the 1892 football game. Even at the indictment stage, the charge seemed minor: there
was no underlying illegal activity that Killilea was protecting or overlooking. One reason for a
prosecutor to bring a minor charge might be that the defendant engaged in more serious
misconduct but only the minor charge was provable. The classic example of such a situation was
the tax evasion case against Al Capone. While that scenario was possible in Killilea’s case, it
does not seem likely. The Lexow Committee only heard briefly about a single complaint from
years earlier regarding Killilea and a disorderly house in the context of how the police board
failed to take action against any police captains before feeling pressure from the committee.60
When Killilea was indicted, the New York Times published a letter from the person who made
that earlier complaint, but there were no other suggestions of wrongdoing by Killilea. When
Parkhurst declared his “War on the Captains,” Killilea was not on the target list.61 As an
entrenched captain in a thoroughly corrupt system, Killilea was probably not an honest cop. But
he was not the Al Capone of police captains.
It would be difficult to overstate the misguided nature of the Killilea prosecution. Fellows
had been the district attorney for over one year at the time of Killilea’s indictment, so Fellows
was not left burdened with a bad decision by the previous district attorney. Difficulties at trials of
police were already apparent (the Doherty case is described below). Further, over one year
passed between indictment and trial for Killilea, and Fellows ordered mass dismissals of police
indictments during that time (also described below). Perhaps Fellows brought and continued the
case against Killilea because the legitimate nature of the enterprise (a renowned college football
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game) and the law-abiding nature of the bribe payers (sponsors of the game) made the case a
refreshing change from so many of the other prosecutions of police.
The facts of the case against Killilea were quite simple. A representative of the athletic
association that sponsored the football game wrote a check for one hundred dollars payable to
Killilea, which Killilea cashed. The prosecution contended that the payment was a bribe to get
Killilea to do the security job that he was supposed to do anyway. The defense claimed that the
payment was for Killilea to buy lunch for officers working the game. The fact that the payment
was by check made receipt of the payment easy to prove, but it also supported the defense
position that Killilea was not trying to do anything illegal. Seeing its position weakening, the
prosecution moved to dismiss bribery counts on the eve of trial and proceed only on a charge of
unlawful receipt of a gratuity.62 The trial lasted one day. The prosecution witnesses told how the
payment was made and the check was cashed. For the defense, Killilea testified and explained
that he actually spent a total of $109 for lunches for the working officers, and some of the
officers testified that they had received money from Killilea to buy lunches.
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty in eight minutes. All of the jurors shook hands
with Killilea.63
A few days later, a New York Times editorial mercilessly criticized the district attorney:

Perhaps the most ridiculous and discreditable of all the efforts, real or pretended, to
follow up the Lexow investigations is that which the District Attorney’s office . . . has
just made in the case of Capt. Killilea. . . . It was so conclusively shown that there was
nothing in the case which it had taken the District Attorney’s office three years and a half
to prepare that it took the jury but eight minutes to acquit the prisoner.
The circumstances point, like many other circumstances, to a most discreditable
laxity and inefficiency in the District Attorney’s office. . . . Inquiry would have shown
what was brought out at the trial and would have shown that a prosecution would be alike
futile and unjust.
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Of course, such a fiasco as this has an unfavorable effect upon more substantial
cases.
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The Killilea case showed the weaknesses of using the criminal justice system to address
very low-level wrongdoing by police. Valuable resources may be expended on prosecutions that
juries will not take seriously. Perhaps worst of all—and pointed out in the New York Times
editorial—more important cases may be adversely affected.

Mrs. Augusta Thurow
Augusta Thurow (always called “Mrs. Thurow” in transcripts and press accounts)
operated a small brothel. She was a dressmaker who came into her other business gradually.
Initially, she rented rooms to women who used the rooms as they saw fit. By the end, she was
paying off many cops, pursuing politicians to help her stay in business, and frequently bailing
out her girls. New York of the 1890s was infamous for its brothels, both grand and tawdry,
which provided entertainment and catered to the particular preferences of customers. Mrs.
Thurow’s house seemed like a mom-and-pop store competing with major businesses. She was, in
fact, helped by her German-speaking, often unemployed husband. The half dozen or so women
who worked for Mrs. Thurow found customers on the street and brought them back to the rooms.
Sometimes the women solicited from the stoop of the building on lower Second Avenue, but the
police at times discouraged that.65
Her testimony before the Lexow Committee on June 4, 1894, was sensational. She
originally came into contact with the Society for the Prevention of Crime (routinely called
“Parkhurst’s Society” at the hearings) when her “disorderly house” was raided and she faced
charges based on the Society’s complaint. Disgruntled by the lack of protection that her
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protection payments to police seemed to be providing, she spoke with Parkhurst and then
appeared by subpoena before the Lexow Committee. She implicated over a dozen police of ranks
from patrolman to captain and described in straightforward terms how she put cash in their hands
to keep her business going. On the same day as her testimony, evening newspapers blasted
headlines about the disclosures.66 One account said that she had given her testimony “frankly,
fully and freely,” and flatteringly observed, “She did not have bleached hair, like many of her
class.”67 Senator Lexow seemed so at ease with the favorable evidence about the Thurow brothel
that he volunteered his own translations of some of the testimony from Mrs. Thurow’s husband
when the witness lapsed into German. Although ex-D.A. Nicoll was permitted to conduct some
cross-examination of Mrs. Thurow, her committee testimony was essentially unchallenged. The
prostitution section of the Lexow Committee’s final report focused on the value of Mrs.
Thurow’s “convincing” testimony and how it led to successful departmental charges before the
board of police commissioners.68 Her testimony also continued to be effective in grand jury
appearances that resulted in numerous police indictments.
Mrs. Thurow’s only trial testimony came in the case against Capt. Michael Doherty in
February 1895. The previous June, Mrs. Thurow told the Lexow Committee that she made
regular payoffs to Capt. Doherty’s wardman, and once she paid Doherty directly.69 Next came
the turn for the police board to hear the same allegations in addition to evidence of the
unexplained wealth that that Doherty and his wife had accumulated.70 Doherty was dismissed
from the police department and then indicted for bribery based on the same allegations.71 The
outlook was so negative for Doherty that even his attempt to buy a legitimate saloon in Brooklyn
led to protests by ministers and hundreds of signatures on a petition in opposition.72 There were,
however, some indications that matters might turn more favorably for Doherty. Most
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dramatically, Mrs. Thurow mysteriously vanished in November 1894 shortly before she would
be needed in multiple court cases and amid rumors that she had been paid off to become
unavailable to testify in the criminal trials.73 In addition, Doherty’s lawyer argued an appeal of
his dismissal from the police force before a New York court.74
Mrs. Thurow, as it turned out, had fled to Europe, but she returned and was held in
custody to assure that she would appear at Doherty’s trial. Much of the prosecution’s case was
presented by D.A. Fellows personally, an indication that at that point he was not trying to
distance himself from cases dependant on Mrs. Thurow. Her testimony seemed to proceed as
expected with her description of the payoffs to Doherty and other police. In considering all of the
police that she had to pay to keep her house operating, she commented that it was “very hard to
find an honest man on that beat.”75 Other witnesses testified, including her husband, who
appeared to provide reasonable corroboration for her testimony.
The defense case was extensive and aggressive. Numerous police witnesses with ranks
from patrolman to inspector testified and refuted particular points of Mrs. Thurow’s testimony,
such as whether a particular meeting took place or the extent of police efforts to close Mrs.
Thurow’s house. Some of the police witnesses were under indictment themselves and may have
had a particular incentive to undermine Mrs. Thurow’s testimony. Defendant Doherty did not
testify.76 The jury deliberated for eighteen hours before the judge dismissed the jury on March 2,
1895, when it was deadlocked at nine to three in favor of acquittal.77
While the hung jury in the Doherty case was certainly detrimental to Mrs. Thurow’s
value as a prosecution witness, greater damage was done by a case that directly involved neither
Doherty nor Thurow. Captain Adam Cross presided over the Fifth Street and Eldridge Street
precincts, and the Lexow Committee heard testimony of his routinely receiving payoffs. Under
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pressure after the Lexow disclosures, in late August 1894 the police board of commissioners (not
yet with Roosevelt) took bold action. Captain Cross and others were fired from the police
department following administrative trials.78 However, Cross appealed to the General Term of
the New York Supreme Court where the decision of the Police Board was reversed on March 15,
1895, and his reinstatement was ordered. As in the criminal case against Doherty, the testimony
of brothel operators was critical in the administrative case against Cross. The New York World
reported about the court decision, “The repudiation by the Court of the evidence given by crooks
and the keepers of disorderly houses against the accused officers is regarded as the vital point in
the decision.”79
After the decision in the Cross case, which came less than two weeks after the hung jury
in the Doherty case, D.A. Fellows decided not only to not retry Doherty case, but also to dismiss
all pending indictments of police based on the testimony of Mrs. Thurow or other prostitutionrelated witnesses. The Cross decision was not binding on any of the criminal cases and did not
require the drastic steps taken by the district attorney. Rather, it appeared that Fellows decided
that prosecuting cases based on Thurow’s testimony was simply not worth the effort. Her flight
to Europe and the necessity of holding her in custody created problems, and the Doherty hung
jury leaning toward acquittal suggested that trial convictions might never come in Mrs. Thurow’s
cases. Even if a jury were to convict, the Cross decision suggested that reviewing courts might
not be inclined to let a conviction stand.
It would be reasonable to conclude that Mrs. Thurow was, indeed, a truthful witness. Her
testimony before the Lexow Committee was strong and the police board decided to rely on it.
Even at the Doherty trial, she seemed to provide effective testimony because the defense saw the
need to mount an extensive case to counter it. Within the dynamics of the Doherty trial was the
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heart of the prosecutor’s dilemma in bringing a criminal case with a witness like Mrs. Thurow.
The witness could be entirely truthful, but the testimony still might not meet the prosecutor’s
burden of proof for a criminal case in light of a lack of strong corroborative evidence, the
aggressive defense often presented in police cases, and jury indifference about the underlying
conduct (here, prostitution) of the offense. As he handled the Doherty case personally, D.A.
Fellows fully understood that his office was saddled with more than a dozen police defendants in
similar cases that would be difficult to win at trial and challenging to defend on appeal. One of
Fellows’s prosecutors told that court that the Cross decision had “wiped out the chance for
conviction of any of the indicted police officials on evidence of like general character.”80 Using
the Cross decision as the reason, or perhaps simply as the excuse that he needed, Fellows moved
for dismissal of all of the cases.81
Prosecutors have to deal with witness problems: a witness may die, or fail to appear, or
recant testimony. Mrs. Thurow certainly presented problems, but the bigger issues arose in how
cases based on her testimony were mishandled by prosecutors. Likely responding to political and
other pressures, prosecutors brought too many cases that relied on Mrs. Thurow’s testimony.
Then, in her single trial appearance, prosecutors appeared not to appreciate the extent to which
her testimony needed corroboration to overcome both her weaknesses as a witness and the
reluctance of juries to convict in such cases. Finally, although the problems with Mrs. Thurow’s
cases had become apparent and grew with potential appellate issues, the district attorney may
have acted in too much haste in dropping all of the Thurow-related cases.

Conclusions
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The May 1896 New York Times editorial quoted above about the prosecution of Killilea
also spoke generally about criminal trials of police in the Lexow era scandal: “There could not be
a more lame and impotent conclusion to the sensational investigation of the police years ago than
has been furnished by the trials of policemen in consequence of that investigation. The only
Police Captain who has been convicted of blackmail by a jury is now out on bail, having secured
a new trial, and now the only one in confinement has been sentenced on his own plea of
guilty.”82 This commentary about a “lame and impotent conclusion” came near the end of the
dispositions of the cases against police who were criminally prosecuted. Only a handful of cases
remained, and those were eventually dismissed like almost all of the others.
The Lexow-era scandal anticipated circumstances that arose in later scandals.
Problematic civilian witnesses like Mrs. Thurow became common in police prosecutions, such as
gambler Harry Gross of the 1950s who also took flight and had to be placed under arrest. Teddy
Roosevelt most dramatically showed how addressing police corruption can attract public
attention, and the later scandals often made or broke political careers. Election results moved
with the ebbs and flows of the 1890s scandal, as did future city elections in later scandals. Later
prosecutors certainly saw failures in cases against cops, but the utter lack of prosecutorial
success in the 1890s may have signaled to future prosecutors that cases needed to be screened
more carefully.
In other ways, later scandals differed from the Lexow era. Subsequent scandals would not
include prosecutions of such a high percentage of defendants holding ranks above patrolman.
Private investigations of the scale like those conducted by the Society for the Prevention of
Crime would not occur again, although journalists carried on some of that function. That a
private citizen like Rev. Parkhurst would never again hold such influence over the mechanisms
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of investigating and charging cops was a positive development. But a lack of outside oversight
and indications that the NYPD avoided policing itself would fuel later debates over civilian
review boards and special prosecutors.
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Chapter 4

The Curran Committee–Era Scandal

There is nothing wrong with the police department except public clamor.
—Police Commissioner Rhinelander Waldo, September 20, 19121

Coincident with the passing of one scandal and setting the stage for the next, the Madison
Square Presbyterian Church where Rev. Parkhurst preached against police corruption was
demolished in 1909 and replaced by the tallest building in the world.2 The 1898 consolidation of
Brooklyn into Greater New York gave New York a population of more than 3.4 million, twice
the population of second city Chicago in the 1900 United States Census. By 1910, immigrationfueled population growth had given New York another million residents.3 Despite the expansion
of city borders, residents became even more centralized in Manhattan, where the 1910
population hit an all-time high of 2.4 million, compared to only 1.6 million today.4 The waves of
newcomers from Ireland and Germany in the nineteenth century had subsided, replaced mainly
by Catholic immigrants from Italy and largely Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe and
Russia.5 Most of the young women killed in the horrific Triangle Shirtwaist fire in 1911 were
Italian or Jewish. When the city opened its first major subway line in 1904, stations that were not
identified by numbered streets had pictorial mosaics designed to aid riders who could not read
English.6
Whatever ethnic or religious prejudices might have been involved, many New Yorkers
thought the new immigrant populations caused particular crime problems by adding more ethnic
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gangs to the city’s mix. The Italian gangsters of the Black Hand largely preyed on their own
community (even opera star Enrico Caruso paid for protection), and the group provided a model
for later organized crime syndicates in the United States.7 One of the NYPD’s most honored
detectives, Joseph Petrosino, was assassinated in 1910 when he investigated the Black Hand in
Sicily. As for the perception of a Jewish crime problem, the city’s police commissioner wrote an
article in 1908 asserting that Jews committed half of the city’s crime, although he later explained
that he had been provided with faulty statistics.8 Faulty statistics or not, the commissioner’s overthe-top assertion likely had considerable public sentiment behind it. The Jewish-dominated
Eastman Gang protected brothels and gambling houses while forging close ties with Tammany
Hall politicians.9 Prominent members of the Eastman Gang would be central players in the
Herman Rosenthal murder that was the triggering event of the new police scandal in 1912.
Mayor William Gaynor reflected public concerns about New York’s immigrants when he wrote
an open letter to the police commissioner soon after the murder: “We have in this city the largest
foreign population of any city, and a large number of them are degenerates and criminals. The
gambling of the city is almost all in their hands, not to mention other vices and crimes. The
published names of everyone connected nearly or remotely with Rosenthal and his murder show
them to be of this same class of lawless foreigners to which he belonged.”10 The “published
names” to which the mayor referred were mostly Jewish, with at least one Italian.
The social and political influence of the Progressive Era affected the city. Theodore
Roosevelt managed to rise from the morass of policing matters in New York to the governorship
and presidency and to form the Progressive Party. Although New York did not participate as
much as some other cities in the so-called city beautiful movement, public buildings such as
Pennsylvania Station (1910), the New York Public Library (1911), and Grand Central Terminal

91

(rebuilt 1904–1913) provided the grand public spaces promoted by the movement. Progressive
legislation important for the city came in the state’s Tenement House Act of 1901 with
requirements for ventilation, plumbing, and fire safety for apartment building construction.
In politics, Tammany Hall’s dominance seemed to weaken. Enjoying the backlash against
extremes of Parkhurst’s moral crusade and Roosevelt’s Sunday saloon closings, Tammany won
the first mayoral election for Greater New York in 1897 with Robert Van Wyck. Asa Bird
Gardiner, the chairman of the Tammany Hall Legal Committee, deserved credit for plain talking
when he made famous the slogan “To Hell with Reform” as he ran for New York County district
attorney on Van Wyck’s ticket. Bird won, although he was removed from office three years later
by Governor Roosevelt for giving favored treatment to the (yet again) indicted police chief “Big
Bill” Devery.11 Devery avoided conviction, finally lost his job with the police department,
continued to amass wealth, and became the co-owner of a professional baseball team when he
moved a team from Baltimore to New York in 1903. That team became the New York
Yankees.12
The whims of voters swung back again in 1901 with the election of Columbia University
president Seth Low as mayor on a Republican fusion ticket that included William Travers
Jerome as district attorney for New York County. Jerome had served as one of the attorneys for
the Lexow Committee, and as district attorney he would pioneer the creation of a modern and
professional prosecutor’s office.13 Low only served one term before Democrats returned for
nearly a decade, but even Democrats George McClellan, Jr. (1904–1909) and William Gaynor
(1910–1913) operated with considerable independence from Tammany Hall.14

The Triggering Event
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Of all of the cyclical police scandals, the triggering event for the scandal that broke in
1912 was the most distinct. The appointed investigative commission even acknowledged the
murder of gambler Herman Rosenthal in the opening paragraph of its final report.15 Describing
the effect of the event on the city, the chairman of the commission later wrote that “the town
boiled over.”16
The four-member board of police commissioners, such as the one on which Theodore
Roosevelt served, had been replaced in 1901 by the position of a single police commissioner. In
1911, commissioner Rhinelander Waldo decided to create three new squads run out of
headquarters that would handle vice enforcement. He appointed Lt. Charles Becker to head one
of the squads, which became commonly called the “strong-arm squad.” Becker had already been
involved in two police matters that received public attention. In 1896, author Stephen Crane
testified against Becker in a hearing before the police commissioners about alleged false
statements by Becker in the arrest of a street prostitute. The commissioners declined to convict
Becker. In 1906, Becker conducted a series of raids intended to support departmental charges
that Inspector Max Schmittberger had been derelict in his duty to enforce laws.17 Schmittberger
became a target for many in the department after he had criminal charges against him dismissed
by the district attorney because of his cooperation and testimony before the Lexow Committee.
Schmittberger was cleared of the departmental charges and, remarkably, became chief inspector
of the NYPD in 1909.18
Becker soon took advantage of his new position heading the strong-arm squad to upgrade
his wardrobe, hobnob with Broadway celebrities like Bat Masterson, and garner press coverage
for his squad’s apparent enforcement actions, all while taking huge payoffs from gambling
establishments. One of his corrupt relationships was with gambling operator Herman Rosenthal.
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Although Henry Curran, chairman of the soon-to-be-formed investigative commission, later
called Rosenthal the “greatest gambling house man of them all,”19 Lardner and Reppetto
described him as “one of the second tier members of the Lower East Side gambling fraternity.”20
Whatever his status as a gambler, Rosenthal funneled substantial money to Becker. Difficulties
arose because Rosenthal was not a tolerant participant in the game in which police conducted
showy raids to appear that they were enforcing the law while the gamblers were shortly
permitted to reopen or operate elsewhere.
A disgruntled Rosenthal very publicly complained about Becker by providing a detailed
statement to the Evening World newspaper that was published on July 14, 1912.21 Perhaps even
more surprising, Manhattan D.A. Charles Whitman announced on July 15 that he had already
met with Rosenthal and had “decided to give him an opportunity to repeat his story before the
Grand Jury.”22 Later that same day, Rosenthal bought several copies of the Evening World and
had drinks at the Metropole Hotel on West 43rd Street. When he left the hotel at about two
o’clock in the morning with his newspapers in hand, he was shot dead on the sidewalk by several
gunmen who escaped in a getaway car.23
The license plate of the getaway car quickly led to arrests of the alleged shooters, and
their confessions identified the two men who hired them. Those two men, in turn, identified Lt.
Becker as having arranged the killing. Becker was arrested just two weeks after the murder.24
New Yorkers soon became familiar with thugs known as Gyp the Blood, Lefty Louie, and Dago
Frank. In fairness to Mayor Gaynor and his offensive remarks about the foreign population of the
city, most of the persons involved with the murder were, indeed, born outside of the United
States.
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The Response
At a special session on August 5, 1912, the board of aldermen (forerunner of the city
council) appointed a nine-member committee from its ranks to investigate the police department.
The Evening World’s front page headline declared, “Aldermen Name Lexowers.”25 The New
York Times promptly anticipated “a complete Lexowing” of the police department.26 The
newspapers essentially advised readers that the new committee would serve the same function as
the Lexow Committee in the earlier corruption scandal—a sort of here-we-go-again warning for
New Yorkers.
The committee became known as the Curran Committee after its chairman, Alderman
Henry Curran.27 Although their missions and procedures were quite similar, the Lexow
Committee was created by the state legislature while city officials formed the Curran Committee.
In addition, the Curran Committee seemed less a creature of partisan politics than the
Republican-favored Lexow Committee. The Curran Committee membership did lean Republican
by 6 to 3, but the board of aldermen voted unanimously to create the committee with the support
of even the Tammany Democrats.28 Initially, the most significant overt political opposition came
from Mayor Gaynor, and he was rewarded by being called as the first witness before the
committee. By the time the hearings were finished and the committee’s highly critical report was
ready to be issued, the Tammany Democrats voted against the report, and the whole board of
aldermen also declined to support it.29
Chairman Curran attempted to guide the committee to focus on administrative
deficiencies in the police department and avoid “excitement” because, according to Curran’s
memoirs, “There was plenty of that up in the criminal courts building.”30 The interplay between
committee and prosecutor for the Curran Committee was quite different than it was for the
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Lexow Committee. The Lexow Committee (aided by the relentless Rev. Parkhurst) made
headline-grabbing disclosures that prodded reluctant district attorneys to bring criminal charges.
The resulting criminal cases, as described in chapter 3, were extremely unsuccessful. In contrast,
criminal prosecutions by an eager district attorney for the Rosenthal murder gave support to the
creation of the Curran Committee. Some of this contrast, of course, was driven by the nature of
the respective triggering events. The Lexow-era triggering event (Parkhurst’s sermon) was a call
for reluctant or dishonest authorities to take action. The Curran-era triggering event (Rosenthal’s
murder) demanded a vigorous investigative response that quickly led to the prosecution of Lt.
Becker. Curran acknowledged that the police involvement in the murder, along with a lack of
action by the mayor, caused him to look for an obscure section of the city charter that allowed
oversight by the aldermen in matters of enforcement of laws, thereby giving some legal authority
for the formation of the committee.31
The committee conducted eighty public hearings that examined more than two hundred
witnesses at City Hall from September 1912 through March 1913. With the prosecution of Lt.
Becker drawing more attention than any police case in New York history, Curran was correct
that the initial excitement was in the criminal courts. After brothel operators Mary Goode and
George Sipp appeared before the committee, though, the combination of sex and corruption
brought more excitement to the committee’s work.
The final report of the Curran Committee was the most thoughtful, thorough, and
practical of the scandal-related investigative reports until, perhaps, the Knapp Commission report
in 1972. Issued on June 10, 1913, less than one year after the triggering event of the Rosenthal
murder, the report methodically set forth descriptions of administrative deficiencies in the police
department (for example, captains received some complaints directly from civilians and pursued,
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ignored, or even destroyed the complaints solely as they desired) and made recommendations
(for example, to establish uniform procedures for handling civilian complaints).32 In the
corruption area, the report contended that the hearings had disclosed “only a small fraction of the
corruption existing in the department.” More specifically, gambling and prostitution were “fertile
sources of graft” resulting in the corruption of a “large percentage” of police dealing with those
areas.33 The report described a common practice called a “turn out” in which police made a
“friendly collar” (arrest) and then intentionally provided insufficient testimony in court in order
to cause a dismissal of the charges. The police received a cash payoff, superior officers could
point to the apparent effort to enforce laws as shown by the arrest, and the offender was not
convicted.34 The report urged changes to streamline departmental procedures to discipline or
dismiss delinquent officers and criticized the loose practice by which the police commissioner
reinstated previously dismissed officers. The report’s harshest words were directed at police
commissioner Waldo. After listing point-by-point criticisms, including Waldo’s failure to control
wrongdoing by officers, his weakness in disciplining subordinates, and his lack of control over
police pensions, the report concluded, “Public interest requires the immediate removal of
Commissioner Waldo.”35
Concerning criminal prosecutions, the committee’s report indicated that there was a much
tighter connection between the work of the committee and the work of the district attorney than
had been present in the Lexow era. The report noted that D.A. Charles Whitman’s assignment of
an assistant to aid the committee “facilitated prompt prosecution and conviction of police
officials accused before us.”36 The district attorneys of the Lexow era were pushed more by Rev.
Parkhurst toward indicting police than by the Lexow Committee. After the Rosenthal murder, on
the other hand, D.A. Whitman proceeded quickly with the Becker indictment even before the
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Curran Committee was created. By the time the committee filed its report, Becker already had
been tried, convicted, and sentenced to be executed. The report described Becker’s situation and
also noted the prosecutions of fourteen other police “as a result of the prompt action taken by the
District Attorney after the exposures made before us.”37 Many of those cases, the report noted,
were awaiting trial and some had resulted in convictions.
In politics, the Rosenthal murder and the ensuing police scandal carried ramifications.
Mayor Gaynor’s national political profile was enhanced by a dramatic photograph taken at the
moment he was struck by a bullet in a 1910 assassination attempt, but then his prospects dimmed
with the revelations of corruption in his police department. Although the Curran Committee was
not as politically motivated as the Lexow Committee, the June 1913 final committee report came
out in a mayoral election year and influenced the election. Gaynor wanted to run for reelection as
mayor, but damage to his reputation by the police scandal and lingering strained relations with
Tammany Hall caused Tammany Democrats to nominate a loyalist named Edward McCall.
Gaynor prepared to run anyway as the candidate of a reform coalition until he died suddenly on a
preelection cruise to Europe. The cause of death was a kidney ailment that might have been
aggravated by the bullet still lodged in his neck from the 1910 assassination attempt.38
After the savage criticism of the Curran Committee’s report and without Mayor Gaynor
to support him, police commissioner Rhinelander Waldo submitted his resignation to the acting
mayor, Ardolph Kline.39 In a “you-can’t-quit—you’re-fired” sort of scenario, Kline dismissed
Waldo for insubordination.40 In the meantime, the mayoral election was won with surprising ease
by William Purroy Mitchel as a fusion reform candidate. So, just as happened in the 1890s, the
police scandal was a major factor in a mayoral election that defeated Tammany Hall. Mitchel,
known as the Boy Mayor after he took office at an especially youthful looking age thirty-four,
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moved aggressively in reforms of the police department.41 But, as happened with Mayor Strong
after his post-Lexow victory in 1894, Mitchel would serve only one term, and Tammany Hall
took back the mayor’s office in the next election. Among the political effects from the
prosecutorial side of the police scandal, the most dramatic was District Attorney Charles
Whitman riding his record of success to election as New York State governor in 1914. Referring
to Whitman, future Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter called a “politically minded” district
attorney “one of the great curses of America.”42 Curse or not, Whitman’s political moves up the
ladder placed him in the extraordinary position of being both the prosecutor who brought the
case against Lt. Becker and the governor who signed Becker’s death warrant.

The Prosecutors
Although he prosecuted none of the cases against police officers in the Curran-era
scandal, William Travers Jerome participated in the Lexow investigation, brought enforcement
actions that were central to issues about police corruption, and professionalized the district
attorney’s office. Perhaps most importantly, if less tangibly, he promoted the process that
encouraged more separation between the district attorneys and the tawdrier aspects of urban
machine politics. This was of particular importance when much police corruption was still
interwoven with corruption of the larger political picture.
Jerome grew up in Manhattan. His cousin from Brooklyn, Jennie Jerome, would become
Lady Randolph Churchill and give birth to Winston Churchill. After education that included the
same New England boarding school that Rev. Parkhurst attended, Amherst College, and
Columbia Law School, Jerome became an assistant district attorney in D.A. John Fellows’s first
term in the late 1880s. Jerome left prosecutorial work for private practice when DeLancey Nicoll
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became D.A., then returned to the public sector when asked by John Goff to join the legal team
of the Lexow Committee. Before the election of 1895, the state legislature created the Court of
General Sessions, a judicial body that could exercise unusual investigative powers. Mayor
Strong, elected on the anti-Tammany ticket in 1895, appointed Jerome to that court. Jerome used
his position to conduct highly publicized raids on gambling and other vice locations, continuing
those actions even through the return of Tammany candidates as mayor and district attorney.
When the city swung back to electing an anti-Tammany mayor in 1901, Jerome was elected
district attorney for New York County. He hired well-qualified attorneys to work as prosecutors
and continued aggressive actions against vice locations, including the seizure of furniture and
gambling devices to discourage the reopening of locations.43
An important aspect of Jerome’s tenure was shown when he ran for reelection as district
attorney in 1905, and he won quite easily as an independent despite broad Tammany victories in
the election.44 Voters appeared to want the delivery of city services and, generally, the protection
of the interests of common New Yorkers that Tammany promised, but they also wanted an antiTammany district attorney to fight crime and corruption. The district attorney who could succeed
politically (that is, get elected) without the political machine might be less beholden to it.
Jerome, who lived modestly on the Lower East Side when he was district attorney, retired from
politics after that second term. In the 1920s, he gained great personal wealth through investing in
and becoming chairman of the company that provided the Technicolor film process to
Hollywood studios after sound came to movies.45
Jerome’s successor, Charles S. Whitman, would continue Jerome’s standard in seeking a
professional, aggressive district attorney’s office, and Whitman himself would become a modern
model for a politically ambitious prosecutor. He was a preacher’s son from Connecticut,
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educated at Amherst (like Jerome), and he moved to New York to attend law school at New
York University. As an attorney, he gained a reputation for honesty and service to the
underprivileged, which caught the attention of anti-Tammany mayor Seth Low. Mayor Low first
appointed Whitman to the city’s legal department and subsequently, just before Low left office,
as a magistrate. Whitman remained in the judiciary for several years and took note of the
corruption and other abuses that appeared to take place. In 1909, Whitman ran as a Republican
and anti-Tammany candidate for New York County district attorney. In a statement about
government waste and corruption on the eve of the election, Whitman cautioned voters, “A
Tammany District Attorney, however honest he may be, cannot be expected to improve the
situation.”46 Similar to Jerome’s accomplishment a few years earlier, Whitman won by a wide
margin despite an easy victory by the Tammany candidate for mayor, again bolstering the notion
of voters wanting separation between the functions of the prosecutor and the workings of the
political machine.47
Whitman moved quickly after the Rosenthal homicide. He raced to the murder scene in
the middle of the night, purportedly urged to do so by his friend Herbert Swope of the Evening
World newspaper. He arranged for businessmen to assist in funding the investigation and for the
use of private investigators to build the case against Becker under the reasonable belief that the
police department could not be trusted to conduct a fair and thorough investigation.48 The case
against Becker came to trial with extraordinary speed in October 1912, less than three months
after the Rosenthal murder. The trial judge was John Goff, previously shown to be a staunch
opponent of police corruption in his capacity as lead counsel to the Lexow Committee. Whitman
drew extensive press coverage by personally conducting the trial for the district attorney’s office.
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The jury convicted Becker after deliberations of less than eight hours, he was sentenced to be
executed, and the case moved on to the appellate courts for review.49
After the Becker conviction, Whitman quickly turned his attention to prosecutions based
on disclosures before the ongoing Curran Committee hearings.50 Most of the scandal-related
cases brought to indictment by the district attorney’s office were indicted in the four month
period when the Becker case was on appeal and the committee continued hearings. While this
may indicate swiftness and focus by Whitman’s office, it may also suggest a disinclination to
look for more corrupt activity than what was already disclosed by the Curran Committee.
The New York State Court of Appeals reversed Becker’s conviction on February 24,
1914, and ordered a new trial.51 The court’s opinion spoke critically of Whitman’s case for
relying so heavily on testimony from criminals, some of whom had received immunity, but the
grounds for reversal centered on particular rulings made by Justice Goff at trial that favored the
prosecution. The retrial of the case was assigned to Justice Samuel Seabury. Just as Justice Goff
was a prominent figure from the earlier scandal era who returned in a different role in the
subsequent scandal, Justice Seabury would return (and even provide the name) for the next
scandal.
While waiting for the Becker appeal, Whitman also conducted the trial and obtained
convictions in what was known as the Inspectors case (described further below) in May 1913.52
The Inspectors case was extraordinary in itself, although overshadowed by the Becker trials. Just
before the Inspectors trial, in March 1913 Whitman conducted the perjury trial against Ptl. John
Hartigan and obtained a jury conviction. Immediately after the Inspectors trial, Whitman stepped
in to conduct the retrial and obtain a jury conviction against Sgt. Peter Duffy, who collected
payoffs for one of the convicted inspectors. The sergeant’s earlier trial, which was not conducted

102

by Whitman, ended with a hung jury.53 Whitman easily gained reelection as district attorney in
November 1913, and then he personally handled the Becker retrial in May 1914. Using
essentially the same evidence that the Court of Appeals had frowned upon after the first trial,
Whitman obtained a quick conviction. The jury returned its verdict in less than two hours, and
they reportedly had reached their decision in just a few minutes but decided to chat about the
case for a while so they would not appear to have been too hasty.54
In less than two years following the Rosenthal murder, Whitman personally tried and
obtained jury convictions in the cases of Becker I, Becker II, and the inspectors, in addition to
successes in the less heralded trials against Sgt. Duffy and Ptl. Hartigan. Whitman and his office
cracked the Rosenthal murder case, brought all of the killers to justice, and earned praise from
the Curran Committee. These and other police prosecutions brought by Whitman’s office turned
out to be much more successful than the prosecutions brought in the Lexow era, although the
Lexow-era prosecutions had a poor record that was not hard to top. During the second Becker
trial, Whitman was already seeking support to obtain the Republican nomination for governor of
New York.55 After the trial, he campaigned from headquarters in the same skyscraper that
replaced Rev. Parkhurst’s church, and he was announced at political appearances as “the
Fighting District Attorney.”56 Whitman won an easy victory in the Republican primary and then
won the governorship by a wide margin in November 1914.57
Even compared to some who followed, like Thomas Dewey and Rudolph Giuliani,
Whitman might still be without equal in New York for having gone so far in politics based to
such a degree on his success as a prosecutor. After taking office as governor, Whitman began
serious exploration of a presidential run. He faced criticism for excessive self-promotion, but
considerable support started to line up for him.58 The biggest impediment to his presidential
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hopes was the decision by ex-New York governor Charles Evan Hughes to resign from the U.S.
Supreme Court to seek the Republican nomination. Whitman joined the Hughes bandwagon and
delivered the nominating speech for Hughes at the Republican convention in Chicago in June
1916.59 Hughes gained the nomination after fending off a comeback attempt from another
veteran of a New York police scandal, Theodore Roosevelt, and then Hughes lost a close general
election to Woodrow Wilson.
As Whitman became governor, Becker’s second trial conviction worked through the
appellate process. In May 1915, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.60
Despite efforts by Becker’s lawyers, his wife, prison reformer and ex-warden Thomas Mott
Osborne, and many others, Becker’s execution remained on schedule, all while Becker continued
bitter denunciations of Whitman.61 On the eve of Becker’s execution, Whitman declared, “There
was not a more clearly proved case of murder in the history of criminal jurisprudence,” although
some modern commentators disagree on the strength of the case against Becker.62 It is clear that
the Becker case was the most extraordinary prosecution of any New York City police officer in
history. Further, there might not have been any police case more closely connected in the
public’s mind to a single prosecutor. Whitman was reelected to another term as governor in
1916, but was defeated by Al Smith in 1918. In recent years, any mention of Whitman most
commonly occurs to note that he was the grandfather-in-law of former New Jersey governor
Christine Todd Whitman.

The Prosecutions
A total of seventeen police officers of all ranks were charged in criminal prosecutions
found to be related to the Curran-era scandal. As mentioned, most of the prosecutions involved
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wrongdoing specifically disclosed in the hearings of the Curran Committee. In that way, the
prosecutions reflected a district attorney’s office that worked closely with or, at least, took its
cues from the committee. Press accounts did not suggest that the district attorney sought a wider
investigation or more indictments beyond the committee’s scope. The total number of police
officers prosecuted (17) dropped sharply from the number found in the Lexow era (47). The
Curran era did not have a strong public voice like that of Rev. Parkhurst in the Lexow era
demanding more criminal charges against police. Research did not disclose specific indications
that the negative outcomes (almost no convictions) of the Lexow era prosecutions led to
prosecutorial caution in the Curran era, but it seems likely that was what happened. In addition,
the timing of events in the Curran era may have led to more focused and limited prosecutorial
actions that left less room for criticism. From the Rosenthal murder in July 1912 to the second
Becker trial in July 1914, D.A. Whitman and his office were heavily engaged in high-profile
prosecutions related to the murder and other matters of police corruption. Critics would have had
little basis to complain that prosecutors were derelict in duty, as Parkhurst had contended in the
1890s.
All of the seventeen police cases were prosecuted by the New York County District
Attorney’s Office. Although the post-1898 consolidated New York City included other county
district attorney’s offices, most notably the Kings County D.A. in Brooklyn, the offices outside
of Manhattan do not appear to have brought any scandal-related police prosecutions. The Curran
Committee report mentioned no other prosecutorial agencies besides the New York County
District Attorney. The Rosenthal murder, of course, took place in Manhattan, as did the other
prosecutable police conduct revealed in Curran Committee hearings.
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As in the Lexow era, there were no federal prosecutions of any of the defendants. This
would be the last of the cyclical scandals that did not include federal prosecutions. Legal debate
at the time noted advantages for the prosecution side in cases charged in federal court. In
particular, according to a state court judge in 1913, federal courts were more likely to allow
multiple instances of wrongdoing to be handled in one trial instead of separate trials, thereby
saving resources and increasing the likelihood of conviction.63
The ranks of the prosecuted police were spread quite widely, with the Inspectors case
adding an unusually large number of very highly ranked officers. There were no detectives
prosecuted, and the antiquated positions of wardman and roundsman no longer existed.

TABLE 4.1. Ranks of police charged in Curran–era prosecutions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Rank
No. charged
% of total
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Inspector
4
23
Captain
2
12
Lieutenant
1
6
Sergeant
1
6
Patrolman
9
53
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
17
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The prosecuted officers were all male. It is quite certain that they were all white because the
number of nonwhites in the police department was miniscule at that time, and press accounts
would surely have mentioned if any of the department’s nonwhites had been charged. Eleven of
the defendants (65%) had surnames usually associated with Irish descent (Duffy, Hartigan,
Skelly, Sweeney, etc.). The imprecision of this sort of observation, however, was shown in the
106

example of convicted Inspector James Thompson. He is not included in the count of eleven
because the name “Thompson” is not commonly identified as an Irish surname, but Inspector
Thompson advised the court that he was of Irish heritage (like his three codefendants) when
answering pedigree questions after being convicted.64 Even with imprecision, though, the name
count does give support to the accuracy of the stereotype of the Irish cop in New York in the
Lexow and Curran eras. Over time, the surnames of prosecuted cops will be some indication of
the changing demographics of the department.
As in the Lexow era, the most common primary charged conduct for the defendants was
bribery or extortion. In addition, the four defendants of the Inspectors case were charged with
obstruction of justice and the investigation they were trying to obstruct involved bribery or
extortion.

TABLE 4.2. Primary charged conduct in Curran-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Conduct
No. of cases
% of total
—––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Bribery/extortion
9
53
Consp. to obstruct justice
4
23
Perjury
3
18
Murder
1
6
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
17
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The single murder case was, of course, that of Lt. Becker. Of the three perjury cases, one (against
Ptl. Charles Foye) involved an unusual scenario described further below, and another (against
Ptl. William Ferrick) involved having a civilian falsely swear to an affidavit.
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The third perjury case (Ptl. John Hartigan) was distinctive as the first scandal-related
police prosecution that appeared to use perjury as a modern prosecutorial tool. As part of a
scheme to silence a witness who would testify against police about payoffs from “disorderly
resorts,” Hartigan delivered an envelope to a police captain. The district attorney called Hartigan
before the grand jury, where he denied delivering the envelope. The criminal trial against
Hartigan alleged perjury with respect to the envelope, not participation in the overall scheme.
The trial jury quickly convicted Hartigan. He was sentenced to one of the longest terms imposed
in any of the Curran-era prosecutions (two and a half to three and a half years) and the conviction
was upheld on appeal.65 Perjury would become increasingly important in subsequent police
prosecutions as a way that prosecutors might proactively maneuver investigative steps to give an
opportunity for an individual to commit the crime of perjury, which might be easier to prove than
the substance of any underlying crimes. The use of perjury would be controversial, with critics
contending that the prosecutor has manufactured a criminal offense and entrapped the offender.
The Curran Committee, as recounted later by Henry Curran, focused largely on
administrative reforms to improve the police department until Mary Goode told the committee
about operating a disorderly house in midtown and frequently paying off police. Curran’s
memoir described Goode very favorably, saying that her name was “perfect” for the “heroine of
a Sunday School story,” that she spoke “perfect English . . . without sign of coarseness,” that she
brought a “religious fervor” to her testimony, and that she had acted completely on her own to
tell her story before the committee.66 Curran’s recollections might have been influenced by
extraordinary charity work that Goode (under her real name of Mary Bell) performed after she
gained fame before the committee.67 At the time of the hearings and prosecutions, however, she
seemed to be another example of how the effectiveness of a witness at a committee hearing may
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not transfer to criminal court. Goode did not fare well under sharp cross-examination when she
testified at a police department hearing, faced charges for violations of the “white slave law,”
and endured police scrutiny that bordered on harassment.68 In the end, the district attorney did
not even call her as a witness at the trial of the main police officer whom she accused. The
prosecution called a different brothel operator to testify at trial against Ptl. John Skelly, and he
was found not guilty after less than seven hours of deliberation by the jury.69 Skelly’s case was
the only jury verdict of not guilty in all of the scandal-related cases brought by D.A. Whitman.
The other star witness before the Curran Committee at first seemed to present greater
difficulties than Mary Goode. According to Henry Curran’s recollections, George Sipp was the
operator of a brothel in Harlem who paid off police and was pleased to read about Goode’s
testimony before the committee. Although Sipp was hard to locate and reluctant to testify, he
testified effectively before the committee about making payoffs that were more extensive than
what had been described by Goode.70 Then Sipp allegedly accepted money from police through
an attorney in exchange for staying out of state to avoid giving further testimony in New York.
D.A. Whitman was fortunate that Sipp’s initial cooperation led to more important cooperation
from police witnesses, as described below about the Inspectors case, and Sipp’s trial testimony
turned out to be uneventful because he was no longer a primary target for the defense attorneys. 71
Post-scandal, in contrast with Mary Goode’s devotion to charitable work, Sipp was arrested
repeatedly. Charges against him included such tawdry offenses as offering to sell overcoats lined
with “genuine” seal skin (in fact, the lining was made of noses and paws and other seal parts not
used in genuine pelts) and being “too friendly” with an actress (adultery was a crime then, and
Sipp’s own son filed the complaint).72
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The committee was not looking for civilian witnesses to testify about prostitution
payoffs, but after Goode and Sipp fell into the committee’s hands and turned out to be headlinegrabbing witnesses, the committee’s attention turned more toward prostitution. So, because the
district attorney essentially pursued what had been revealed by the committee, the prosecutions
were skewed toward police corruption based on prostitution as the vice behind the payoffs.
Table 4.3 classifies the prosecutions according to the primary underlying activity by the
civilians who interacted with the police.

TABLE 4.3. Primary underlying civilian activity in Curran-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Activity
No. of cases
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Prostitution
12
70
Gambling
3
18
Con game
1
6
Not applicable
1
6
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
17
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The “not applicable” case was the prosecution of Ptl. Foye for perjury, described below, which
did not involve underlying unlawful civilian activity. The underling activity of the “con game”
involved alleged payoffs to Capt. Dominick Riley from criminals who wanted to buy police
noninterference with a variety of confidence games that swindled victims out of money. In
particular, Riley allegedly received $1000 from the Gondorf Gang, which used schemes that
included a phony horserace betting parlor that took a large wager from a wealthy victim, which
was then “lost” when phony police “raided” the parlor.73 The scheme inspired the plot of the
1973 Academy Award–winning movie The Sting, in which the main character, played by Paul
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Newman, even used the name “Gondorf.” The case against Riley was dismissed for lack of
corroboration, although the real-life swindler Gondorf was convicted.74
One of the top findings of the Curran Committee’s report (coming right after its call for
the removal of police commissioner Waldo) was that gambling and prostitution were at the root
of a variety of police wrongdoing. The criminal prosecutions were consistent with those findings,
albeit weighed in favor of prostitution-based charges over gambling because of the civilian
witnesses before the committee who happened to be in the business of prostitution. Farther down
the list of findings by the committee was the category of “excise,” which essentially meant the
enforcement of Sunday and nighttime restrictions for liquor sales. The committee’s
recommendation was a vague call for legislative changes if “the public does not desire the
enforcement of certain laws.”75 With none of the seventeen cases related to liquor as the primary
underlying civilian activity, the criminal prosecutions were consistent with the committee’s near
indifference to liquor-based corruption. Prosecutions of the Lexow era had been quite different:
liquor ran a strong second to prostitution as the primary underlying civilian activity. New York
authorities might have grown weary in the battles waged in the previous twenty years over
Sunday saloon closings. The legal status of the vices also contributed to the lower priority for
liquor offenses. Gambling and prostitution were illegal vices while liquor was a legal vice, at
least until Prohibition arrived a few years later.
Looking at the final dispositions, D.A. Whitman’s prosecutions fared much better than
the Lexow-era prosecutions. Of the nine police defendants who went to trial, seven were
convicted, one had a conviction reversed on appeal, and one was found not guilty. All trials were
by jury.
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TABLE 4.4. Dispositions of Curran-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Disposition
No. of cases % of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Guilty at trial
7
41
Guilty plea
2
12
Total convicted
9
53
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Dismissed
5
29
Conviction reversed
1
6
Not guilty at trial
1
6
Total not convicted
7
41
—––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Unknown disposition
1
6
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
17
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

For the “unknown disposition” in the case against Ptl. William Smith, it seems likely that the
case was dismissed because other cases relying on the same cooperating brothel operator were
dismissed, but no report of the disposition of Smith’s case could be located.76 The only reversed
conviction was for one of the inspectors, described below. The single not guilty verdict at trial
was for Ptl. John Skelly in a case connected to Mary Goode, as mentioned.
The cases for four of the five defendants who received dismissals involved some lack of
evidence. The con game related to bribes allegedly received by Capt. Riley lacked corroboration,
according to the district attorney.77 Patrolmen Thomas Heaney and William Smith were charged
together with taking bribes from brothel operator Rosie Hertz, but charges were dismissed after
corroborating witnesses reportedly disappeared.78 Ptl. William Ferrick, a member of Becker’s
strong-arm squad, was charged with perjury related to a civilian signing a false affidavit. Charges
were dismissed after the civilian’s credibility was damaged when he testified in the first Becker
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trial.79 Ferrick, still on the police force, would go on to serve as a pallbearer at Becker’s
funeral.80 The fifth dismissal was Ptl. Charles Foye’s perjury charge, described below.
Two of the charged officers, Ptl. Eugene Fox and Capt. Thomas Walsh, pleaded guilty
and cooperated, described further below regarding the Inspectors case. As in the Lexow-era
prosecutions, for a police officer to be willing to testify against other officers was unusual, but it
did happen. Walsh died before sentencing; Fox received a suspended sentence. Table 4.5 shows
the sentences for all of the convicted defendants.

TABLE 4.5. Sentences of convicted Curran-era defendants
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Sentence
No. of cases
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 year
3
2½–3½ years
1
3–4 years
1
6–10 years
1
Executed
1
Suspended sentence
1
(1 died before sentencing)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total sentenced
8
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Some of the sentences were quite harsh. The three convicted inspectors were only charged with
misdemeanors, so their one-year sentences were the maximum allowed. Ptl. John Hartigan
received the sentence of two and a half to three and a half years for his conviction for perjury;
Sgt. Peter Duffy was sentenced to three to four years for bribery; and Ptl. Thomas Robinson
received the longest sentence, six to ten years for bribery.81 Lt. Becker was executed.
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Samuel Seabury was the sentencing judge for every defendant upon whom a sentence
was imposed (Justice Goff presided over the suspended sentence for Ptl. Fox).82 Seabury
presided over the trials for the nine defendants who chose to go to trial in a total of six trials (he
handled the retrials for Lt. Becker and Sgt. Duffy after Goff handled their first trials). D.A.
Whitman personally handled the prosecution of four of those six trials. He missed the trial of Ptl.
Thomas Robinson, which took place very close in time to the Inspectors case. Whitman also
missed the trial of Ptl. John Skelly (and its not guilty verdict). The aggressive prosecutor and the
no-nonsense judge appeared to get along well during the court cases arising from the police
scandal. Not long after, however, they waged a bitter campaign against each other as Seabury ran
for governor as a Democrat against the incumbent Whitman in November 1916. Seabury lost a
close race, perhaps due to indifferent support from Tammany Hall.83

Selected Prosecutions
Although the arrest, trials, and execution of Lt. Becker amounted to the most
extraordinary prosecution of any New York City police officer in history (it is well chronicled
elsewhere, as noted in chapter 1), the prosecution of the Inspectors case may have had a greater
influence on police corruption at the time. At no other time in any of the corruption scandals
were so many members of the upper ranks of the police department dragged into criminal court.
On a smaller scale, and largely overlooked in the history of prosecuted cops in New
York, was the case against Ptl. Charles Foye. The case presented a highly unusual set of facts,
and played out in the interaction between the investigative committee, the police department, and
the district attorney.
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The Inspectors
The Inspectors case was an example of how a prosecutor could pursue information from a
questionable witness to a degree that caused targets of an investigation to take unwise steps.
Watergate-like, the cover-up would surpass the underlying crime. Ultimately, though, the
prosecutor needs a dependable witness, and D.A. Whitman found one through another person’s
misfortune.
Police corruption at the time was commonly known simply as the “System,” a reference
to the understanding that much of the conduct of business in the city required payoffs to police
that would be passed to higher-ups in the department. Illicit businesses most often had to pay
into the System. Supporters of the police department claimed that corruption was on the wane
and, in a twist of logic, that the corruption scandal was confirmation of diminished wrongdoing
by police. For instance, at a dinner in February 1913, Commissioner Waldo rose from the table
he shared with former president Howard Taft and spoke:

If you read the headlines in the New York Press and nothing else it would be quite
impossible to attempt to defend the New York Police Department, but if you read
the actual facts, the Police Department doesn’t need very much defense in the
minds of thinking people. As long as the grafter and the scamp was allowed to sell
police protection and deliver the protection which he had sold, everything went
along peacefully and quietly: nothing was said of the wrongdoing. It was only
when a condition was produced where, when the grafter sold protection, he could
not deliver it, that we had a police scandal.84

That is, rising integrity in the police department prevented bribe payers from receiving the
accommodations they expected from the dwindling number of corrupt police. From Herman
Rosenthal to Mary Goode, there was certainly truth to the claim that disgruntled purveyors of
vice made reports that fueled the corruption scandal. D.A. Whitman and others, though, fully
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believed in the ongoing corrupt System. Whitman repeatedly suggested that his investigation
would lead to the highest echelons of the police department and then follow the money to jump
away from the police to the highest levels of politics.85 But his corruption investigation would
advance no further than the Inspectors case, while Whitman himself would advance to the
governor’s office.
George Sipp’s testimony before the Curran Committee focused on monthly payments he
made to Ptl. Eugene Fox. Fox collected on behalf of Capt. Thomas Walsh, and Walsh passed
money up the ranks to the level of the inspectors. Only sixteen police in the department held the
rank of inspector. Each presided over an inspection district with a complement of plainclothes
officers and responsibilities that included enforcement of vice laws.86 After Sipp testified before
the Curran Committee, he received a subpoena to testify before a grand jury. His attorney
advised him to “Go South” to avoid testifying. Sipp went to Newark, New Jersey.87
With much to lose from Sipp’s cooperation, Inspectors John Murtha, Dennis Sweeney,
James Thompson, and James Hussey plotted to keep Sipp quiet. The scheme followed two paths
that seemed inconsistent: funds were gathered to pay off Sipp while two women were induced to
file affidavits accusing him of serious crimes. Sipp viewed the money, which was paid to him
through his attorney, as inadequate, and he was angered when he was expected to have his son
sign a false affidavit favorable to the police. Sipp traveled farther south, to Atlantic City, where
he was arrested on the trumped-up charges. Not trusting the police and, perhaps, mindful of what
happened to Herman Rosenthal, Sipp agreed to return to New York and accepted Whitman’s
promise to protect him. Sipp testified before a grand jury, which returned an indictment against
Ptl. Fox. Capt. Walsh feared what his former bagman might say and tried to convince Fox to
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keep quiet. Similar to Sipp, however, Fox was dissatisfied with the amounts offered to buy his
silence, so he agreed to cooperate with the district attorney.88
Capt. Walsh was a thoroughly corrupt cop. As captain of a precinct in Harlem, he grew
wealthy taking payoffs. After Sipp testified, Walsh became the point man in the conspiracy to
keep Fox quiet. When those efforts failed, however, and Fox agreed to cooperate with the D.A., a
more important circumstance came to influence Walsh: he was dying of a kidney ailment then
known as Bright’s disease. Walsh summoned the D.A. to his home in Harlem late in the evening.
From his bed, and believing he was dying at that time, Walsh confessed to his crimes. He told
Whitman, “I have been taking this graft for years, and I have always worried over it. It was
always a terrible load on my mind. Now it is off my mind and I rejoice.”89 The four inspectors
(Murtha, Sweeney, Thompson, and Hussey) were indicted a few weeks later on a variety of
bribery and extortion charges.90 Whitman’s good fortune continued. First, Justice Seabury
presided over all of the cases in court and he could be expected to push cases to trial quickly.
Second, perhaps feeling the benefits of his confession, Walsh temporarily left his death bed and
seemed possibly able to testify in court.
Most importantly, Whitman made a strategic decision to bring a separate indictment that
charged all four inspectors together in a conspiracy to obstruct justice focused on the attempts to
silence Sipp. Whitman’s use of a conspiracy charge anticipated prosecutorial decisions in future
scandals, when alleged conspiracies would become central in prosecuting police officers.
Although conspiracy was only a misdemeanor-level offense in Whitman’s time, the trade-off
was acceptable as it was likely the only way to hold a single trial against all four inspectors. The
other charges against the inspectors were contained in the tangle of multiple indictments as was
the common practice of the time. Inspector Sweeney, for instance, had fifteen indictments
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pending against him.91 Walsh might be able to rally to testify at one trial, but not more than one.
In addition, as he prepared to run for governor, Whitman would have a high profile mega-trial as
a springboard.
The grand jury returned the conspiracy indictment on April 14, 1913.92 Just two weeks
later, the case went to trial. After completion of jury selection, Justice Seabury took the unusual
step of ordering that all four defendants be held in the Tombs (the jail for Manhattan courts) to
reduce chances of flight or jury tampering.93 Seen in hindsight, Whitman’s evidence was
extraordinarily strong. Ptl. Fox testified effectively, and corroborative testimony came from
Sipp’s son and Walsh’s wife. Sipp’s own attorney testified about communicating the payoff
offers to his client. Even D.A. Whitman himself testified (a practice not as unusual as it would be
considered today) about the circumstances of meeting with one of the defendants.94 Walsh, who
was called as the prosecution’s first witness for reasons both strategic and medical, testified
aided by injection of a heart stimulant and with a doctor at the ready. He withstood four hours of
cross-examination, providing explicit details of the defendants’ crimes.95 One newspaper noted
that the gravely ill Walsh still “leaned out of his chair” and “gazed straight at the man he was
testifying against” when questioned about the conduct of individual defendants.96 George Sipp,
who seemed to be the sort of cooperating criminal who might be problematic as a witness for the
prosecution, testified uneventfully and was hardly cross-examined.97
Whitman delivered the summation for the prosecution, and the strength of the evidence
led to a swift verdict. The jury convicted all four defendants after just 38 minutes of
deliberation.98 Walsh, known as “the Squealer” in the last months of his life, died six weeks after
he testified.99
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To no one’s surprise, Justice Seabury sentenced all four defendants to the maximum for
a misdemeanor conviction of one year incarceration at the penitentiary on Blackwell’s Island
(now Roosevelt Island). One newspaper noted almost gleefully that the “one time highest
uniformed officials of the New York Police Department” were assigned to prison labor that
included making mattresses and brooms.100 The convictions of three defendants were upheld on
appeal.101
The fourth defendant, former inspector James Hussey, obtained a reversal from the
Appellate Division based on an analysis of the evidence, which found that the conspiracy proofs
against him lacked required corroborative evidence from a nonaccomplice source.102 Hussey had
already served most of his sentence by the time the reversal was handed down. The suggestion
that he might apply for reinstatement to the police department was met by the suggestion that
such an application might cause prosecutors to pursue other charges against him.103

Patrolman Charles Foye
As a member of Lt. Becker’s strong-arm squad, Ptl. Foye was expected to be familiar
with the police practice of “turning out” or intentionally “throwing” a case in court by falsifying
or minimizing evidence to result in a dismissal. The Curran Committee summoned him as a
routine matter to testify on January 15, 1913. Foye was not cooperating with the committee, and
his appearance was expected to be uneventful, with the usual denials of knowledge of
wrongdoing that the committee commonly received from police witnesses.
Instead, as described in a press account, Foye’s testimony “exploded a bomb” at the
hearing.104 He responded to initial questioning from committee counsel Emory Buckner with
specific denials that he had made false statements in a liquor-related case and a blanket denial
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that he had ever heard of any police officer throwing a case. He added, however, that on one
occasion he was approached by an individual who asked him to throw a case. Buckner asked him
to name the person who made the illicit request, and Foye calmly responded, “Mr. Curran,”
referring to Henry Curran, who presided over the committee.105 Foye testified, with assurance
and specificity, that Curran approached him on April 4, 1912, in the Criminal Courts Building
and asked Foye to “go easy” on a friend by causing a dismissal of charges relating to violations
at Smith’s Saloon. Curran offered no money, but threatened to “fix” Foye like he had “fixed Lt.
Becker” if Foye did not comply. Foye recalled the exact date of the incident because he had a
court appearance on that day.106
As would be expected, Curran immediately denied Foye’s accusations. Curran claimed
that he had never seen Foye until that day before the committee. Further, Curran asserted that
police detectives had recently tried to convince a newsstand operator to say that he paid a
kickback to Curran, seeming to suggest that Foye’s testimony was part of a police conspiracy to
make false accusations against him.107 At the committee hearing the next day, attempts to refute
Foye continued. The proprietor of Smith’s Saloon testified that he did not know Foye and never
asked for any case to be fixed, and several witnesses contradicted Foye’s claim of no
wrongdoing in the liquor-related case. Foye was in a “savage and bitter mood” when he took the
stand again and stuck to his story.108
A few weeks later, Foye was indicted for perjury based on his testimony before the
committee.109 Foye’s specificity about the date of the incident allowed Curran to check his
calendar, see that the day was Holy Thursday, and establish that he could not have seen Foye at
the time alleged. The case seemed headed for trial until Foye’s wife, who was pregnant, went to
see Curran’s wife to claim that Foye might have been approached by someone else. The next
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day, Curran received an anonymous letter that read, “Don’t be too hard on Foye. It was
Alderman John F. McCourt went to see him, not you. Look into this.” In fact, McCourt did bear
a strong resemblance to Curran. After three hours of questioning by an attorney for the district
attorney, McCourt remembered that he did have a conversation with Foye on behalf of one of his
constituents about Smith’s Saloon.110
Alderman McCourt, who was a Tammany Democrat, wrote a long, self-serving letter to
the district attorney. He claimed that he had known the bartender at Smith’s Saloon for twenty
years, knew him to be of good character, became convinced of his innocence, and spoke with
Foye only to be sure that the charges were correct. The perjury charge against Foye was
dismissed. As for the possibility of an inquiry into McCourt’s silence, McCourt scoffed, “Well,
let them investigate the Sphinx.”111
McCourt continued his career in Tammany politics with no significant fallout from his
months of standing by while an apparently honest colleague was falsely accused and a cop who
was more honest than most was unjustly indicted.112 McCourt and Curran remained great friends.
Foye was promptly reinstated to the police department. A news story the following year noted
that Foye, as a Fordham man, was part of the trend that Theodore Roosevelt had encouraged
toward more police officers having college educations.113 Foye’s family exchanged Christmas
cards with the Currans.114

Conclusions
A number of factors likely contributed to the greater success of the Curran-era
prosecutions compared to those of the Lexow era. D.A. Jerome’s reforms, continued by D.A.
Whitman, made the office better prepared to competently select, investigate, and prepare cases
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than the politically dominated office of the 1890s. Beyond the professionalism of the district
attorney’s office, though, two personalities dominated the prosecutions. Justice Seabury presided
over the dispositions of almost all of the cases, and the courtroom managed by him usually
produced trial convictions, stiff sentences, and rare reversals. The most important personality
belonged to D.A. Whitman. Whitman conducted most of the trials himself, and press accounts
praised his trial skills, but more important might have been his selection and preparation of
cases. Trial skills notwithstanding, a prosecutor would need strong evidence to produce the
speedy jury convictions that Whitman obtained in major cases. Clearly, the cases brought by
Whitman were more fit for presentation to juries than had been the Lexow-era cases.
Whitman managed to draw the focus of evidence away from the vice peddlers who
tended to become problematic witnesses. His use of what critics might call a perjury trap in the
Hartigan case and the conspiracy charge in the Inspectors case allowed evidence at those trials
that did not rely on having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the police accepted payoffs
to protect vice. When Whitman did have a vice-involved witness he took steps to minimize
adverse effects at trial: he chose to use a different brothel proprietor instead of Mary Goode, and
he managed to insulate George Sipp’s testimony with stronger evidence from other witnesses.
Despite his successes, Whitman’s handling of prosecutions raised issues. The
prosecutions were limited almost exclusively to the wrongdoing disclosed before the Curran
Committee, perhaps showing a failure to pursue other meritorious police cases. Whitman’s
strong public suggestions that his investigation would lead to persons higher up in the “System”
than the inspectors never produced results, perhaps because Whitman left office to become
governor or perhaps because those predictions were inflated to help his political aspirations.115
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Whitman’s use of a conspiracy charge in the Inspectors case was brilliant in some ways.
It brought all four defendants into the same courtroom, the broad nature of a conspiracy charge
allowed a wider scope of evidence, and the deathly ill Capt. Walsh was able to testify against all
four at a single trial. On the negative side, though, the outcome raised questions about whether
the prosecutor might have some duty to seek more evenhanded dispositions in cases. The
defendants were high-ranking officers who committed grave acts of corruption in their charged
conduct at trial, not to mention the charged conduct that did not go to trial as indicated by, for
instance, the fifteen indictments against Inspector Sweeney. The conspiracy charge might have
enhanced the probability of convictions at trial, but the misdemeanor level of the offenses limited
the sentences that Justice Seabury could impose. The result was that lower-ranking officers
convicted of what could be considered less serious wrongdoing received much harsher sentences
after their trials. Ptl. Robinson was sentenced to six to ten years for taking payoffs. Ptl. Hartigan,
who was on Inspector Sweeney’s staff and delivered payoff envelopes to Capt. Walsh, was
sentenced to two and a half to three and a half years for his perjury conviction. In perhaps the
clearest example of inequitable dispositions, Sgt. Duffy was convicted of making collections for
his boss, Inspector Sweeney, but Duffy was sentenced to three to four years while Sweeney was
sentenced to one year.116
The Curran-era “System” of organized payoffs to cops would be called the “Pad” years
later in the Knapp era of the 1970s. Prosecutors in later scandals would continue to struggle with
predictions about which witnesses would be effective at trial, and the difficulty in making those
predictions was certainly shown in the Curran era with the contrast between Mary Goode and
George Sipp as witnesses. D.A. Whitman’s successful strategy of charging as many cops as
possible in a single indictment would backfire badly for prosecutors in the 1950s scandal. In
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another contrast, while most Curran-era defendants stood trial by jury, by the 1990s most cops
chose nonjury trials.
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Chapter 5

The Seabury Investigation–Era Scandal

The only difference is that the stealing is more refined.
—Retired D.A. William Travers Jerome commenting on corruption in
1933 compared to his era thirty years earlier1

The tallest building in the world, built on the site of Rev. Parkhurst’s church in 1909,
held that title for several years. Twenty years later, at the start of the next cyclical police scandal,
Manhattan hosted a succession of buildings that were the tallest in the world. The Woolworth
Building, 40 Wall Street, and the Chrysler Building all held the title in quick succession until
surpassed in 1931 by the Empire State Building. New York appeared to stake its claim of
prominence in the world by using the skyscrapers as ever-longer stakes.
The stream of immigrants that dramatically changed the city in the times of the earlier
scandals slowed in the 1920s and 1930s. Several federal laws restricted immigration, including
the Immigration Act of 1924, which based immigration quotas on the national origins of foreignborn persons in the United States according to the 1890 census. By using the 1890 census as the
demographic baseline, fewer immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe would be eligible
because their numbers had greatly increased post-1890. The restriction seemed to address, for
instance, the concerns expressed by Mayor Gaynor in 1912 about New York’s “class of lawless
foreigners”2 (quite clearly referring to Italians and Jews). The foreign-born population of New
York City stabilized at about two million from 1910 to 1940.3
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Some clichéd superlatives heaped on America of the 1920s applied most decidedly to
New York. The Roaring Twenties roared loudest on Wall Street; the Golden Age of Sports had
no greater jewels than Babe Ruth’s Yankees and their stadium built in 1923; and the Jazz Age
flourished in New York’s clubs and radio broadcasts. To one modern commentator, “New York
entered its greatest time as a city” with the election of Mayor Jimmy Walker in 1925.4 To
another, the 1920s in New York were “that glorious decade.”5 The Wall Street Crash in late
October 1929 would propel New York into the era of the next superlative: the Great Depression.
Unpopular in many areas of the country, Prohibition may have been most unpopular in
New York. The city’s speakeasies, which were conservatively estimated to number twenty-two
thousand, might have contributed to the lively nightlife of the city, but making liquor illegal had
dark side effects.6 Organized crime flourished to control the liquor business, and New York
mobsters formed the “family” structure that continues to the present. The city’s health
commissioner reported that more New Yorkers died from drinking alcohol in 1926 than in any
year since 1910.7 Many of the victims, including dozens over the Christmas holidays, died
because some of the cheapest available drinks were made from industrial alcohol that was
poisoned in the denaturizing process.8 The illegal production of liquor and keeping the thousands
of speakeasies open certainly required corrupt practices on the part of many in the police
department. Amazingly, such corruption would not play a prominent role in the next police
scandal.

The Triggering Event
The triggering event for the police scandal of the early 1930s occurred in 1928. The
impact of the event gathered momentum under circumstances that included the ascendancy of

131

major political figures, the timing of elections, and the stock market crash. The event itself had
extraordinary factual similarities to the prior triggering event in 1912 in that both involved
nighttime gunshot murders of prominent Jewish gambler-gangsters in midtown Manhattan. The
Herman Rosenthal murder in 1912, however, occurred with an ambitious prosecutor already in
place to draw the quick connection between the murder and police corruption. In contrast, the
1928 murder of Arnold Rothstein resulted in an inept prosecution and a winding inquiry that
disclosed other types of public corruption before drawing in the police department.
Arnold Rothstein has become one of the nation’s most storied criminals. F. Scott
Fitzgerald used him as the model for the gambler Meyer Wolfsheim in The Great Gatsby. The
fictional Wolfsheim bragged that he had warned the real-life Herman Rosenthal not to step
outside of the Metropole Hotel, where Rosenthal would encounter his killers.9 In fact, Rothstein
encouraged Rosenthal to make the payoffs that the police demanded, and he offered money to
Rosenthal to leave town after Rosenthal complained to the press. As it turned out, the elimination
of Rosenthal as a competitor in the gambling business helped to clear the way for Rothstein’s
rise. Rothstein accomplished what is still the pinnacle achievement in American gambling when,
by most accounts, he participated in fixing the so-called Black Sox World Series in 1919.
Despite a highly publicized investigation, Rothstein avoided any serious legal consequences. His
opportunities expanded with the start of Prohibition just a few months after the last pitch in that
World Series.10 Spencer Tracy starred as the Rothstein character in a 1934 movie based on the
memoir of Rothstein’s widow. 11 Rothstein’s bootlegging with organized crime figures in the
1920s formed the basis for Rothstein as a major character in the recent television series
Boardwalk Empire.12
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Unlike the more erratically behaved Rosenthal, Rothstein knew how to operate discretely
and fruitfully with the most powerful players in commerce and politics. In a rare profile of
Rothstein published less than a year before his death, Zoe Buckley of the Brooklyn Eagle stated
that there “has not been a big prize-fight, a gold rush, a Wall Street flurry, a great horse race or a
real estate boom in years that Rothstein hasn’t had a hand in somehow.”13 One of Rothstein’s
biographers contends that Rothstein even brokered an arrangement with D.A. Charles Whitman
by which Tammany Hall interests would not interfere with Whitman’s prosecution of Lt. Becker
for the Rosenthal murder if Whitman steered the investigation away from Tammany boss Big
Tim Sullivan. The low-key Rothstein told journalist Buckley in 1927, “My code of life is
absolutely simple: Help a friend, be a friend.” But the journalist cautioned readers that Rothstein
went after those who double-crossed him, and “when he’s finished the ambulance will be coming
for you, clang-a-lang-a-lang.”14
Even as he came to make much more money from bootlegging and other illicit activities,
Rothstein could not keep away from personal involvement in gambling.15 He lost several
hundred thousand dollars in a poker game at an apartment on West 54th Street in late September
1928. On the evening of November 4 of that year, Rothstein took up his usual spot to conduct
business in a booth at Lindy’s restaurant on Broadway. A telephone call summoned him to a
meeting at the Park Central Hotel, a few blocks away on Seventh Avenue between West 55th and
West 56th Streets.16 Perhaps in preparation for paying at least some of the gambling debt,
Rothstein sent his chauffeur (driving Rothstein’s Rolls Royce) to another location to pick up cash
while Rothstein attended the meeting.17
A few minutes later, Rothstein was shot once in the abdomen, and an elevator operator
saw him staggering in a street-level service corridor of the hotel. The gun ended up in the street,
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tossed either from a hotel window or from a fleeing car. Rothstein survived for almost two days
in a hospital. Although in serious condition, he received visitors and even signed a will given to
him by his lawyer. But when asked by a detective to identify his assailant, Rothstein flatly
refused, saying, “You know me better than that, Paddy.”18 Rothstein died on November 7, which
happened to be the election day when Herbert Hoover won an easy victory over New Yorker Al
Smith and Franklin Roosevelt was narrowly elected governor of the State of New York to
succeed Governor Smith. Rothstein had picked Hoover and Roosevelt as the winners and bet
heavily on them with bookmakers across the country.19
Public controversy about the Rothstein murder quickly gathered momentum on two
interrelated questions: first, who killed Rothstein and, second, how to handle a trove of papers
that Rothstein left behind. The police investigation of the homicide, at best, made significant
mistakes. At worst, police intentionally avoided building a case. Attention quickly focused on
room 349 at the Park Central Hotel because that was the room to which Rothstein was
summoned from his hangout at Lindy’s. The room had been rented by George “Hump”
McManus, apparently using a false name. McManus was one of the participants in Rothstein’s
big losing poker game some weeks earlier. A topcoat belonging to McManus (with his name
inside) was still hanging in the closet, but the room appeared to have been vacated quickly,
judging by the food and used glasses left there. A central problem was that police had no
evidence that Rothstein had been in the room. No blood was found in the room or even in the
staircase that Rothstein must have used to get to the ground floor. Police recovered some
fingerprints in the room, although they failed to obtain Rothstein’s fingerprints for comparison
purposes. A close colleague of McManus, Hyman Biller, came by the room, but police shooed
him away from the crime scene instead of questioning him.20
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Perhaps sensing that the Rothstein murder could sow the seeds of his political downfall,
as it eventually did, Mayor Jimmy Walker tried to control the situation. Less than two weeks
after the murder, Walker met with police officials and demanded that they solve the crime in four
days.21 The police did not meet that deadline, and the mayor backed off on his threat.22 Despite
added police resources, the investigation continued to progress poorly. Potential witnesses were
so few that police depended heavily on a twenty-four-year-old woman from Chicago who had
taken a room by herself on the third floor of the hotel. From a photograph of McManus she
tentatively identified him as one of the men in room 349 who invited her there for drinks. A hotel
chambermaid was similarly invited for drinks and made a similar identification, but no witness
could place any suspect with Rothstein. Whether they had a provable case or not, police were
unable to locate suspect McManus.
The New York County district attorney at the time of the Rothstein murder was Joab
Banton. Banton was first elected in 1921, then reelected in 1925 over the hero of the earlier
police scandal, former D.A. Charles Whitman, who was attempting a comeback after losing the
governorship to Al Smith. Although he was a Tammany Democrat, Banton built a reasonable
reputation with administrative reforms and prosecutions of financial frauds. His top assistant
D.A. was the highly regarded Ferdinand Pecora. Pecora would be considered later as Banton’s
possible successor, but his candidacy was nixed by Tammany Hall because, according to one
press report, “he might not be amenable to political demands if he were elected.”23
The Rothstein case dominated what would be D.A. Banton’s last year in office. Pressed
by political demands for action, or at least the appearance of action, Banton quickly presented
over fifty witnesses to a grand jury. Numerous persons were held in custody under materialwitness orders, including three men held in lieu of bail for $100,000 each because they were
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present at Rothstein’s losing poker game.24 The result was a rushed, weak indictment returned
within a month of Rothstein’s death. Four men were charged: George McManus, Hyman Biller
(the earlier object of police disinterest, now at large), plus two completely unidentified men
(indicted as “John Doe” and “Richard Roe”). Banton’s theory was that those four persons met
Rothstein in room 349 of the hotel. Banton publicly proclaimed that he had a strong case.25 Few
believed him.
Political pressure on the police department continued. Mayor Walker had already
replaced the commissioner less than a month after the Rothstein murder.26 Just weeks after the
indictment, an inspector and a deputy inspector “ceased to be members of the police force”
because they made insufficient progress in locating the fugitive Biller and the two unidentified
indicted men.27 Even the detective who managed to locate the elusive McManus on the eve of
the indictment was demoted for not following procedures in processing the arrest.28
Critical to the Rothstein homicide becoming the triggering event for the next cyclical
scandal was the controversy over Rothstein’s papers. As a meticulous businessman engaged in
activities that included gambling, lending, and political fixing, Rothstein was known to have kept
detailed records. His multiple offices, apartments, and safe deposit boxes might have contained
the records. Since Rothstein lingered in the hospital for almost two days after being shot, persons
interested in concealing his papers had a head start on persons with more legitimate intentions.
Attention soon focused on what was in, or what was removed from, two file cabinets in
Rothstein’s Fifth Avenue home. The cabinets were moved to a bank in the custody of attorney
Nathan Burkan, representing Rothstein’s estate. Burkan then gave D.A. Banton access to the
contents, totaling some sixty thousand documents. Banton assigned two assistant district
attorneys and a police detective to examine the papers for evidence that might be either helpful in
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the homicide investigation or indicative of other crimes related to Rothstein.29 The very next day,
Banton abandoned the review—either he was afraid of having to deal with sensitive matters that
might be uncovered or he became convinced that incriminating documents had already been
removed. Banton claimed that the review would take at least three weeks, supposedly an
unacceptable time frame, so Banton accepted a promise from attorney Burkan that prosecutors
would be advised if any papers relevant to their interests turned up.30 Burkan, however, was a
prominent Tammany Hall official so disclosure of any politically sensitive material that
remained in Rothstein’s papers was unlikely.
After the D.A’s hurried indictment at the end of 1928, political concerns shifted in the
mayoral election year of 1929. Mayor Walker had initially pushed for quickly solving the
Rothstein murder, but the prosecution’s weak case and the simmering controversy over
Rothstein’s papers made delaying the trial an appropriate route to avoid a blowup before election
day. D.A. Banton took the position that he would not take the case to trial until, at least, he
secured the presence of fugitive Biller.31 Identifying and locating the indicted “John Doe” and
“Richard Roe” seemed out of the question. Political pressure still grew. By June 1929, Banton
decided to seek a judgeship instead of running for reelection as district attorney.32 Fallout from
the Rothstein murder would become the most contentious topic in the mayoral election, but
Mayor Walker managed to maintain his popularity as the charming rogue. He seemed insulated
from attacks, perhaps because of his early demands for action on the Rothstein case or because
the departing D.A. Banton absorbed the attacks. But the momentum continued to grow for the
Rothstein case to trigger the police scandal and a much wider political scandal.
Congressman Fiorello LaGuardia from East Harlem secured the Republican nomination
for mayor. Socialists were most prominent among minor party candidates. Tammany Hall
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overlooked the solid prosecutorial background and the Italian-American electoral appeal of top
Assistant D.A. Ferdinand Pecora and instead picked Tammany loyalist Thomas C. J. Crain as the
Democratic nominee for Manhattan’s district attorney. Crain would resign from his judgeship to
run for the district attorney position, which seemed to increase the likelihood that the outgoing
Banton could easily pick up a judicial nomination.33 Banton remained a target in the 1929
election even after he declined to run for reelection. In September 1929, the Republican nominee
for district attorney attacked Banton about the Rothstein case: “The Rothstein case is a striking
result of the District Attorney’s policy of willful waiting. Where was the District Attorney while
Rothstein lay for nearly three days in the hospital accessible to friends and his own lawyers?
Why did he not at once go to him? Rothstein was the people’s witness. The District Attorney was
the people’s lawyer. While he waited for [police] Commissioner Warren and the commissioner
waited for him, the murderers waited for neither, and the case remains unsolved.”34 By the end of
that month, while the prosecution against McManus was still awaiting trial, controversy over
handling of the Rothstein case would end Banton’s attempt to become a judge.35
Banton gave up on waiting to locate codefendant Biller and decided to attempt to advance
McManus to trial before election day.36 The trial judge, however, declined to agree and
announced a post-election-day trial date, supposedly to avoid having the outcome of the trial
affect the election.37 Rothstein-related criticism began to shift more toward speculation about
what Rothstein did while he was alive instead of concern about the investigation into his death,
although the two areas were clearly related. Candidate LaGuardia boasted that he would “solve
the Rothstein murder within a very few days after I arrive at City Hall.”38 Crain, the Democratic
candidate for D.A., announced that he would know everything that there was to know about
Rothstein matters within fifteen days after he took office. More specific allegations came from
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Richard Enright, a former police commissioner running for mayor for the so-called Square Deal
Party. Enright asserted that Rothstein extended loans and favors to many public officials,
including judges.39 So many insinuations about the Rothstein case came from campaigning
political candidates that D.A. Banton was called upon to put the candidates before a grand jury to
determine what information they might hold. Banton declined to do so.40 Mayor Walker tried to
avoid the skirmishing about Rothstein by following a Tammany plan that campaign issues would
not be discussed until the completion of the voter registration period on October 15, just three
weeks before election day.41
Two preelection developments that might not have stood out at the time among all of the
other Rothstein allegations would turn out to be the most critical in leading to the police scandal.
First, candidate LaGuardia specifically alleged that Magistrate Albert Vitale of the Bronx
received a large loan from Rothstein. Judge Vitale claimed the loan was appropriate and
threatened to sue LaGuardia for libel, but the story of that loan started a cascade of allegations
about Vitale that would fuel demands for an investigation of the city’s judges.42 Second, the
Republican majority leader of the New York State Senate threatened to introduce a resolution to
begin an investigation of the Rothstein case by the state legislature.43 He made the announcement
after Governor Roosevelt declined to order a state investigation, as had Acting Governor Herbert
Lehman, who often assumed authority while FDR sought health treatments in Hot Springs,
Georgia.44 This scenario of upstate Republicans versus city Democrats and a potential
investigation by a legislative committee echoed the politics of the 1890s and creation of the
Lexow Committee.
Whatever the level of controversy about the Rothstein case, it seemed neither to hurt
Mayor Walker nor aid candidate LaGuardia. Walker won in a landslide. Perhaps voters were
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distracted at the end of the campaign after the stock market plunged in late October 1929. The
stock crash remembered as Black Tuesday was exactly one week before election day.
In the month after election day, the prosecution’s case at trial against McManus was so
weak that the jury never had an opportunity to consider the charges. After some grumbling about
having to deal with hostile witnesses, even the assistant D.A. trying the case consented to the
judge directing the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. The jury foreman followed the judge’s
instruction and announced that the jury found the defendant not guilty, and a smiling McManus
departed the courtroom. D.A. Banton noted that he had “only twenty days more in this office”
and lamented that “every case is subject to the human frailty of people who will lie.”45
Codefendant Biller was still at large. Police commissioner Grover Whelan, who took office just
weeks after the Rothstein murder, wrote years later, “The failure to present incontrovertible
evidence sufficient for a conviction was due entirely to the laxity of the police who had been
assigned to the case originally and the commanding officers of the detective and uniformed
forces at the time of the murder.”46 Self-serving as it was for Whelan, his position of pushing all
of the blame to a time before his arrival as commissioner also removed much blame from D.A.
Banton.

The Response
On December 7, 1929, just two days after the collapse of the case against McManus, a
dramatic incident assured that Rothstein-related matters would not fade from public awareness.
Armed robbers burst into a political dinner honoring Magistrate Vitale (Rothstein’s debtor) and
robbed the guests, including taking a detective’s gun. Vitale showed that he was no ordinary
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crime victim by making a few calls in the middle of the night and arranging the return of the
detective’s gun and the rest of the stolen property.47
Other controversies joined the Vitale affair. Newspapers reported that Magistrate George
Ewald obtained his judicial post by paying $10,000 to a Tammany leader. A Brooklyn judge
faced a federal indictment for receiving a fee in connection with the lease of city-owned piers.
Pressure grew on Governor Roosevelt to take action, so he wrote a letter in August 1930 to the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court requesting an investigation of the
Magistrates’ Courts in the First Judicial Department, which included Manhattan and the Bronx.48
Asking the court system to investigate helped Roosevelt to delay a potentially more politicized
probe by Republican state legislators, and it seemed appropriate because early phases of the
growing scandal focused on the judiciary. The Appellate Division promptly appointed retired
jurist Samuel Seabury as referee to conduct the investigation. The most infamous event of that
month occurred when Judge Joseph Crater left a midtown Manhattan restaurant, stepped into a
taxi, and was never heard from again. His disappearance was generally believed to be connected
to the widening corruption scandal. To “pull a Crater” became a popular expression for a person
who dropped out of sight.49
Samuel Seabury had served as the judge on most of the police corruption cases in the
prior police scandal. Most notably, he presided over in the second trial of Lt. Charles Becker
when Becker was convicted in 1914 for the murder of Herman Rosenthal, the triggering event of
the prior scandal. By a series of appointments in the early 1930s, Seabury dominated
anticorruption efforts in New York City. Less than a year after the judiciary appointed him to
head the Magistrates’ Court investigation, Governor Roosevelt appointed him as commissioner
of an investigation of D.A. Crain for New York County. In April 1931, the New York State

141

Legislature appointed Seabury as counsel to a committee investigating government corruption in
New York City. Although the legislative committee was known as the Hofstadter Committee,
after the state senator who chaired it, Seabury guided its work.
This series of investigative appointments both empowered Seabury and limited him. He
was not a prosecutor; he could not press criminal charges, and he could not simply choose to
look into any conduct by anyone who violated the state criminal code. While the investigations
may have blurred in appearance into one grand Seabury Investigation, they were conducted
separately. Seabury held one of his three titles— referee, commissioner, or counsel—depending
on which investigation he was conducting. Each investigation issued a report or a series of
reports.
At the first public session of the Magistrates’ Court investigation in September 1930,
Seabury’s announcement of the purpose of the inquiry focused on whether magistrates bought
their judicial positions and whether political considerations influenced their decisions on the
bench. Neither the NYPD nor any other matters of policing appeared to be part of Seabury’s
agenda. Circumstances changed by the time of public hearings in November 1930. Seabury came
upon a thread of corruption in the Magistrates’ Courts that did not directly involve the
magistrates themselves. The long-serving prosecutor in the Women’s Court admitted to
Seabury’s investigators that he had accepted tens of thousands of dollars in bribes from defense
attorneys and police officers to influence the dispositions of cases presented in the court. The
Women’s Court was one of the courts in the system of Magistrates’ Courts, and the majority of
cases in the Women’s Court came from the NYPD’s vice squad.50 Intentionally or otherwise,
Seabury’s investigation had come across police corruption.
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Seabury’s investigative techniques were innovative and effective. He examined witnesses
in private hearings before exposing those whom he selected to public hearings. Over one
thousand witnesses were called to the private hearings; fewer than three hundred appeared at the
public hearings.51 This enabled the press-savvy Seabury to keep newspaper coverage lively.
More importantly, Seabury’s staff gathered extensive financial information concerning targets of
the inquiry. The essence of Seabury’s approach was to look for disparity between a person’s
salary and that person’s financial holdings, usually in bank accounts. Where a disparity was
found, the private hearings gave the witness an opportunity to explain the situation, and gave
Seabury an opportunity to gather more information. By the time of a public hearing, Seabury was
well armed to cross-examine the witness, and the press delighted in some of the outlandish
responses.
The Women’s Court prosecutor played a critical part in the police corruption scheme, but
he was not present in the apartments where police arrested the defendants (mostly alleged
prostitutes) who later paid to have their cases fixed. To demonstrate wrongdoing by police,
Seabury needed someone who worked with the police. He found such a person in a disgruntled
informant named “Chile” Mapocha Acuna. Born in Chile, Acuna was a “stool pigeon” for the
police department, to use the vernacular of the time. His relationship with the police started with
simply providing information in exchange for money; then he shifted to a more active role for
the vice squad in 1929.52
A vice squad police officer might work undercover to make a “direct” case against an
alleged prostitute, while an informant (or stool pigeon) was needed to make an “indirect case,” in
which the informant made the contact with the prostitute, and the police would barge into the
transaction at an appropriate time. The informant would feign surprise, give a false name, and
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sometimes be roughed up a bit by the police. In the official reports of an indirect case, the
informant became an “unknown man” who was a customer of the prostitute.53
Acuna gave dramatic testimony for four days at public hearings. He described how he
provided a list of prostitution locations, which vice squad members used to collect extortionate,
or shakedown, payments from which Acuna received a share. More frequently, vice squad
officers gave Acuna the contact information for a supposed prostitute, and Acuna would become
the “unknown man” after setting up the woman for arrest. Acuna was not involved in extorting
payments from the women or in fixing their cases in court. Most impressive was Acuna’s
memory. He identified over two dozen vice squad officers at the hearing, recalling all but one by
name.54
While the police commissioner specially selected six lieutenants to secure Acuna’s
safety,55 members of the vice squad took steps to prevent the appearances of incriminating
witnesses at Seabury’s hearings. The names or nicknames of other stool pigeons were known,
but Seabury could locate only Harry Levey to appear at the hearings. Vice squad officers
attempted to conceal Levey as well by paying him to flee to New Orleans. Levey was eventually
located and testified that he often collected payoffs for the vice squad from operators of
speakeasies.56
Seabury developed more of the picture of vice squad corruption with testimony from
some of the arrested women. While most of the women framed by the vice squad’s use of
informants were indeed prostitutes, Seabury took care to elicit testimony from a handful of
nonprostitutes who had been arrested by the vice squad. One law-abiding woman, Mrs. Olen,
took in boarders and was arrested for maintaining a disorderly (prostitution) house by officers
who had used an informant to entrap one of her female residents. She lost most of her savings to
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the exorbitant fees charged by the bail bondsman and an attorney before the case was dismissed,
after a share of the cash passed to the crooked prosecutor. Another testifying woman, Mrs.
Potocki, was not a prostitute. In a sign of the times for the Prohibition era, she did make extra
money by selling liquor to friends. Two vice squad officers gained entry to her home to have
drinks, badly assaulted her, and arrested her for prostitution.57
Seabury asked Governor Roosevelt to pardon several of the women who had been
convicted of crimes after vice squad abuses. Roosevelt and his presidential aspirations walked a
thin line between needing to take action on public corruption while also needing to distance
himself from it. More specifically, he wanted to build his national appeal while trying to avoid
alienating city political powers before the Democratic convention. He promptly pardoned the
women.58
With vice squad corruption already obvious, Seabury put icing on the cake by calling the
officers themselves for sworn testimony. The financial investigation uncovered that some vice
squad officers had tens of thousands of dollars in unexplained assets. Some officers gave
contrived and transparently false testimony about secret inheritances, gambling winnings, and
thrifty spouses. One vice squad member, Lt. Pfeiffer, claimed that he kept important papers in a
“tin box.” Another, Patrolman Morris, testified that he kept $50,000 in his tin box.59 With “tin
box,” Seabury had a catch phrase that he could use on the political targets whom he would
examine later.60 Without prosecutorial powers, though, Seabury could do little more with the
police corruption he uncovered.
The most prominent person in a law enforcement position to have his career ended by
Seabury was Sheriff Thomas Foley of New York County. Questioned by Seabury, Foley offered
some of the most outlandish testimony about a bountiful tin box. Governor Roosevelt weighed
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the political concerns of dealing with Foley’s strong Tammany support before finally dismissing
Foley on Seabury’s recommendation in February 1932.61 The biggest fish that Seabury would
catch managed to hold on a bit longer. Mayor Jimmy Walker resigned on September 1, 1932.
Governor Roosevelt had been criticized for being too tolerant of Mayor Walker, but with the
Democratic nomination in hand and after evaluating more revelations from Seabury, Roosevelt
pushed hard for Walker’s resignation ahead of the 1932 general election.62

The Prosecutors
Thomas C. T. Crain took office as New York County district attorney on January 1, 1930.
He had won election easily by nearly a two to one margin over Republican Frederick Coudert.63
Crain claimed independence from Tammany Hall during the campaign for D.A., but his
background was Tammany through and through.64 Tammany had its share of support from the
moneyed aristocracy in addition to those who fit the more plebian image of the political club.
Crain’s maternal side included ancestors who arrived on the Mayflower, and his paternal
grandfather served as an American colonel in the Revolutionary War. Crain’s father held
sufficient political influence to gain a diplomatic position in Italy, so the young Crain received
much of his education in Europe. He returned to New York to practice law, joined the local
Tammany Hall committee, and then he began to receive a series of prominent political
appointments and nominations. He was sixty-nine years old and nearing mandatory retirement
from his judgeship when he agreed to run for district attorney in 1929.65
Crain did not keep his campaign promise that he would know everything there was to
know about the Rothstein case within fifteen days of taking office, but he did move quickly. On
January 17, 1930, Crain recommended that the court dismiss charges against the former fugitive
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Hyman Biller (who chose to show up after the prosecution’s failure in the trial of McManus) and
the still-unidentified John Doe and Richard Roe.66 In the hope of a break in the Rothstein case,
Crain kept the same grand jury in session for another two years. He finally asked that the grand
jury be discharged on February 2, 1932.67
Crain found himself under personal and professional attack in March 1932 when the City
Club of New York asserted that he was incompetent in his management of the district attorney’s
office. The City Club was among the most prominent of a number of organizations concerned
with encouraging good government practices (and derided as “goo-goos” by those who disagreed
with their efforts). Press accounts at the time consistently referred to “charges” brought by the
City Club against the district attorney, but the City Club was a private organization that did not
bring any sort of formal action by way of indictment or lawsuit. The organization and the
prominent businessmen that belonged to it did, however, carry such prestige that when it
communicated with Governor Roosevelt (and the press), official public action followed. The
City Club complained that Crain, among other transgressions and omissions, had failed to act on
matters of public corruption. The Democratic National Convention was just a few months away
and Roosevelt did not want to look inattentive on corruption matters, particularly in highly
publicized New York City affairs. In addition, Tammany Hall was supporting Al Smith for the
1932 presidential nomination so FDR might worry less about moving against the Tammanyfavored Crain.
Roosevelt promptly appointed the busy Samuel Seabury to be commissioner of an
investigation of the district attorney’s office. In April and May 1932, Seabury conducted wellpublicized hearings into Crain’s conduct and his office’s actions on over two dozen areas of
investigation or specific cases. Seabury took pains during the investigation and in his final report
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to state that Crain’s honesty was not in question. Seabury’s final report noted, “The proof before
me shows that he was attentive to his office, that he kept long hours and that he busied himself in
a variety of ways in the effort to faithfully discharge his duties. . . . There is no suggestion of any
kind or character which reflects upon his personal integrity. There is not a line of proof that any
failure to act in any of the cases referred to above was induced by any improper influence or by
any unworthy motive.”68 Nevertheless, the report found that Crain “in many instances busied
himself ineffectively and that he did not grasp or act upon opportunities for high public service
which some of the matters referred to above presented to him.”69
One of the few specific areas where Seabury found Crain’s performance to be seriously
deficient was in the investigation related to illegality in the Magistrates’ Courts. Seabury’s first
investigative appointment was the Magistrates’ Courts inquiry for the Appellate Division, and it
was this investigation that opened the door into police corruption in the vice squad. The
interwoven nature of the corruption scandal was particularly apparent here: FDR asked the
Appellate Division to investigate the Magistrates’ Courts; Seabury received the appointment to
investigate; Seabury found police corruption in the Magistrates’ Courts; Seabury referred cases
to Crain for prosecution; the City Club complained to FDR about Crain’s performance; FDR
appointed Seabury to investigate Crain; Seabury found deficiencies in Crain’s investigation of
corruption in the Magistrates’ Courts.
Seabury’s final report on Crain found that he had adequately handled the specific
Magistrates’ Court cases that Seabury (wearing his other investigative hat) had referred to the
D.A.’s office, which included the police cases. Seabury had harsh criticisms, however, for
Crain’s handling of a grand jury that heard evidence since shortly after Crain took office about
abuses in the Magistrates’ Courts. The final report scathingly concluded:
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It is not too much to say that political influences were active in these courts and that
bribery and corruption in some instances polluted the course of justice. All of these
conditions were left substantially untouched by any investigation which was made by the
District Attorney of New York County acting through the grand jury that was convened
for the purpose of making that investigation. . . . A dispassionate review of the minutes of
this Grand Jury, and of the action taken by the District Attorney, compels the conclusion
that the effort on the part of the District Attorney to eradicate these abuses which existed
in the Magistrates’ Courts was almost wholly ineffective. Little good came of it, and no
aggressive steps were taken to eradicate the chief evils inherent in the system that
prevailed there.70

Examination of the prosecutions by the district attorney (described below) supports Seabury’s
conclusions. Crain may have reasonably handled the cases referred by Seabury’s initial
investigation, but did little more. Seabury’s narrow authority and Crain’s reticence to use his
own powers largely explain why the 1930s police scandal was more limited in scope compared
to the other cyclical scandals.
In the middle of Seabury’s hearings about the D.A.’s office, Crain won unanimous
reelection to his position as a Sachem of Tammany Hall.71 Weeks later, after the hearings ended
and Crain’s future as D.A. hung in the balance, Crain received a rousing ovation at a rally at
Tammany’s new meeting hall on East 17th Street.72 Seabury’s final report, although critical of
some of Crain’s job performance, dismissed most of the City Club’s contentions and did not
recommend that Crain be removed from office.
As the district attorney for New York County from 1930 through 1933, Crain handled all
of the scandal-related prosecutions that charged violations of state laws. No other city D.A.
brought cases. Two cases were prosecuted federally—one in the Eastern District of New York
and one in the Southern District of New York. The respective U.S. Attorneys were Howard
Ameli and George Medalie, both appointed by President Herbert Hoover. Although both offices
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were expected to use financial information obtained by Seabury and strategies developed in
Chicago based on individuals living above the means of their legitimate income, only the SDNY
brought a tax case.73 The most important federal prosecutor in the mix was Thomas Dewey, who
was assigned by Medalie to try the tax evasion case against Patrolman James Quinlivan.74
Dewey won the case and became interim U.S. Attorney when Medalie stepped down to support
the 1933 mayoral run by Fiorello LaGuardia.75 Dewey would later become the district attorney
for New York County before his terms as governor of New York and his presidential candidacy.

The Prosecutions
A total of eighteen police officers of all ranks were charged in criminal prosecutions
related to the Seabury-era scandal. That is comparable to the number prosecuted in the Curran
era scandal (17) and much lower than the number prosecuted in the Lexow-era scandal (47). All
of the defendants had been exposed in one way or another in Seabury’s investigation of the
Magistrates’ Courts. As stated, New York County D.A. Crain was severely criticized by Seabury
for not vigorously pursuing an investigation beyond the cases that were specifically referred to
him. Crain certainly had other priorities and distractions—defending himself against accusations
from the City Club was one—but to have a grand jury sitting and to bring no other police
corruption cases was clearly a weak performance. Whether that weak performance was due to
deference to Tammany Hall, ineptitude, bad judgment, advancing age, or some other factor
cannot be determined.76 Overall, the situation was similar to the scandal of the Curran era in that
the district attorney’s office did little beyond the scope of what was done by the outside
investigating entity.
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Also like the Curran era, the dominant prosecutive body was the New York County
District Attorney’s Office. No other district attorney in the city was mentioned as bringing
scandal-related police prosecutions in Seabury’s accounts or in media reports. All of Seabury’s
inquiry focused on the activities of the Manhattan-based vice squad of the NYPD, so if
prosecutions were to be limited to the cases uncovered by Seabury then New York County would
be the jurisdiction. On the other hand, it would appear that the other district attorneys were as
reluctant to search for more police corruption as Crain.
As in the earlier scandals, the defendants were not a diverse group. All were male. About
ten of the eighteen defendants had surnames commonly associated with Irish backgrounds.
Almost certainly all were white because there were no press accounts suggesting otherwise. Just
two of the defendants held ranks above the level of patrolman (one sergeant and one inspector),
in contrast to the earlier scandals, which included a larger proportion of higher-ranking
defendants. Table 5.1 shows the ranks of the defendants.

TABLE 5.1. Ranks of police charged in Seabury-era prosecutions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Rank
No. charged
% of total
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Inspector
1
6
Sergeant
1
6
Patrolman
16
88
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
18
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

By contrast, defendants ranking above patrolman made up almost two-thirds of those charged in
the Lexow era and almost half of those charged in the Curran era. The simple explanation would
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be that the 1930s cases focused on the arrests made by patrolmen in the NYPD’s vice squad. The
more speculative explanation would be that the district attorney and other decision makers did
not want to expand the investigation to possibly include more defendants of higher rank.
Two developments in the Seabury era were most significant in the evolution of the
scandal-related prosecutions. First, federal prosecutors charged defendants for the first time.
These prosecutions for a tax violation and a Prohibition violation reflected the expanding scope
of federal law enforcement authority resulting from changes in federal laws. The prior scandal
was well under way before the Sixteenth Amendment made the modern federal income tax
possible in 1913, and Prohibition did not become the law of the land until after ratification of the
Eighteenth Amendment in 1919. Table 5.2 shows the emergence of federal prosecutions in
territory still dominated by the district attorney for Manhattan:

TABLE 5.2. Prosecuting authorities in Seabury-era cases
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Prosecuting office
No. charged
% of total
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Manhattan D.A.
16
88
77
SDNY U.S. Attorney
1
6
EDNY U.S. Attorney
1
6
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
18
100
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Second, perjury became the most commonly charged offense in the Seabury era. The
skillful examinations by Seabury that maneuvered officers into testimony about tin boxes and
other falsehoods were not used in the perjury prosecutions, likely because of some level of
immunity that testifying before Seabury might have granted. Instead, most of the prosecutions
alleged perjury based on false statements made by arresting officers in complaints or testimony
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provided in the Women’s Court. For example, a vice squad officer might state in a complaint or
in testimony that the alleged prostitute was with an unknown man. The district attorney would
have its prima facie perjury case from testimony by the cooperating “stool pigeon” that he, in
fact, was the supposedly unknown man. Table 5.3 shows the breakdown of the primary charged
conducts.

TABLE 5.3. Primary charged conduct in Seabury-era prosecutions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Conduct
No. of cases
% of total
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Perjury
13
72
Assault
3
16
Prohibition violation 1
6
Tax evasion
1
6
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
18
100
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

An indictment would only contain a perjury allegation from a single arrest by an officer
under charging practices at the time. An officer who had testified falsely on many arrests would
have to be charged separately for each instance. Separate indictments might even be required for
different aspects of the officer’s conduct on a single arrest. For instance, Patrolman O’Connor of
the vice squad was charged in three indictments, two for perjury and one for conspiracy, all
arising from the same arrest and the same victims.78
Just as the prosecutions did not charge the tin box perjuries that Seabury elicited at his
hearings, the prosecutions also did not base charges on the actual financial holdings of cops that
Seabury’s investigation revealed. Seabury’s financial investigations convincingly showed that
some vice squad officers unjustly enriched themselves for years, but that sort of wrongdoing did
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not form the basis of the prosecutions. Presumably, there was insufficient evidence to prove that
the monies disclosed by the financial investigations were the result of extortion or any other
criminal source. Or perhaps that information could not be used because immunity extended from
the officers having been compelled to testify. In any event, the prosecutions pursued the cases
referred by the Seabury investigation but did not use some of the more compelling evidence
produced by Seabury.
With the focus of Seabury’s inquiry on the Women’s Court and the NYPD’s vice squad,
it is unsurprising that the real or falsely alleged civilian activity underlying the police corruption
was prostitution. Table 5.4 shows the dominance of prostitution as the underlying vice in this
cyclical scandal.

TABLE 5.4. Primary underlying civilian activity
or alleged activity in Seabury-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Activity
No. of cases % of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Prostitution
16
89
Liquor
2
11
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
18
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The two liquor-based prosecutions were the two federal cases—one with actual Prohibition law
violations and the other with income tax violations based on payoffs from speakeasies. Those
cases are described further below.
On January 1, 1934, his last day in office, D.A. Crain released statistics about the number
and dispositions of prosecutions in his term compared to the records of his predecessors going
back to almost the turn of the century. Crain’s purpose was to show that he managed a vigorous
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office, in a continuation of the defensiveness he showed when attacked by the City Club and
other critics. Two statistics from all cases in Crain’s entire term (1930 through 1933) put his
prosecutions of the police cases in perspective. Crain obtained guilty pleas on approximately 54
percent of the felony cases brought by his office (9,823 pleas in 18,234 cases). Also, in cases that
went to trial the conviction rate was approximately 46 percent (1,398 convictions and 1,665
acquittals).79
Table 5.5 shows the dispositions of all eighteen of the Seabury-era prosecutions. D.A.
Crain charged sixteen of those cases. The others were the federal cases, and they were evenly
split at trial with one guilty and one not guilty.

TABLE 5.5 Dispositions of Seabury-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Disposition
No. of cases % of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Guilty at trial
6
33
Guilty plea
0
0
Total convicted
6
33
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Dismissed
4
22
Conviction reversed
1
6
Not guilty at trial
5
27
Total not convicted
10
56
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Unknown disposition
2
11
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
18
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Although the police prosecution statistics suffer from a small η and the lack of dispositions on
two cases, comparisons with the other cases of Crain’s years as Manhattan D.A. bring out two
points. First, when cops went to trial they did as well or maybe a bit better compared to non155

police defendants. Some 46 percent of Crain’s overall trials resulted in guilty verdicts, while it
was just over 50 percent for the cops (six guilty and five not guilty at trials). Second, the police
defendants had a far greater tendency to go to trial than other defendants. None of the cops
pleaded guilty, while Crain obtained guilty pleas from more than half (54%) of his other felony
cases. The lack of guilty pleas on police cases stands out, but it might be expected with police
cases tending to have first-time offenders with concerns about keeping their jobs or pensions.
Overall, the dispositions are consistent with Seabury’s assessment that the cases he referred to
Crain were handled competently. The problem was that Crain’s investigation went no further.
The six convicted defendants, all patrolmen, received rather strict sentences. The
sentences were comparable to those imposed in the Curran era, particularly if one disregards the
execution of Lt. Becker. Table 5.6 shows the sentences imposed.

TABLE 5.6. Sentences of convicted Seabury-era defendants
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Sentence
No. of defendants
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
3½ to 7 years
1
3 years
1
2½ to 5 years
2
2 to 4 years
2
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total sentenced
6
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Trials of vice squad officers began with Patrolman Leigh Halpern, charged with perjury
for having sworn in the Women’s Court that the women he arrested were with an unknown male
when, in fact, they were with one of Halpern’s informants (not “Chile” Acuna). The outcome
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was expressed succinctly in the subheadline of the New York Times: “Jury Takes Less Than an
Hour to Clear First Policeman in Stool Pigeon Cases.”80
The next trial was a perjury case based on Acuna’s testimony. The jury convicted
Patrolman Sidney Tait, but the jury’s ambivalence about such a case came through when eleven
of the twelve jurors asked the judge to be lenient with Tait.81 The sentencing judge ignored the
request and sentenced Tait to two and a half to five years in Sing Sing prison. To show the
inconsistency possible in the jury system, Tait’s partner was tried a few months later on similar
charges arising from the same arrest. The jury deadlocked at six to six after only four hours.82
Record of a final disposition for the partner could not be located, although it seems likely that he
was never convicted. In a later trial, Patrolman John Glenn was convicted of perjury and
sentenced to three and a half to seven years from a frame-up that used Acuna. Glenn may have
hurt his case by unconvincingly testifying at trial that he had never used Acuna as an
informant.83 Glenn’s victim in the frame-up contended that she had been paid to leave New York
to avoid testifying against police.84 One of Glenn’s partners died before he could be brought to
trial.85
Other perjury cases that relied on Acuna’s testimony did not go well for the prosecution.
Patrolman Robert Murray was acquitted by his jury, Patrolman William O’Connor received a
directed verdict of not guilty, and Patrolman Christopher Confrey’s charges were dismissed at
the request of the prosecutor.86 The most peculiar outcome for Acuna’s accusations involved
Patrolman John Stiglin. One case against Stiglin was dismissed in the middle of trial after the
“framed” woman and her male partner unexpectedly changed their testimony. 87 A few weeks
later, another Acuna-based case resulted in Stiglin’s conviction, although the jury foreman added
“a strong recommendation for mercy” when announcing the guilty verdict.88 The judge
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sentenced Stiglin to two and a half to five years at Sing Sing, but an appellate court reversed the
conviction.89 Although the court cited erroneous instructions by the trial judge as the reason for
the reversal, the sympathies of the appeals court were apparent. The written opinion’s opening
paragraph emphasized the jury’s plea for mercy, and one justice scathingly called Acuna “an
infamous self-confessed criminal and stool pigeon, who did not claim to have ever done an
honest day’s work and who, in this case, was flatly contradicted by records and testimony which
show that he cannot be relied upon as a truth teller.”90
A clear problem arose in Acuna’s transition from being a witness at Seabury’s hearings to
being a witness at criminal trials. At the hearings, Acuna performed well by displaying his
formidable memory to answer prepared questions from Seabury or a Seabury staff member. If
there were weak aspects to his testimony, the friendly questioning could tread gently. Acuna’s
shortcomings could be overlooked as his testimony covered a broad sweep of misconduct by the
vice squad. By contrast, at the trials the focus would be on a single arrest in which Acuna was
involved, and the questioning included aggressive cross-examination from defense attorneys.
The criminal trials required proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a jury. The Seabury hearings
only required putting on a convincing performance for the press and public.
Prosecutions that did not use Acuna also had mixed results. Patrolman Richard Ganley
was convicted of perjury in arresting a former member of the Russian Ballet who was giving a
dance lesson when Ganley’s informant framed her.91 Patrolman Walter Ambraz was acquitted of
falsely testifying in the Women’s Court about a married woman whom he arrested for
prostitution. He might have helped his own defense when he testified at trial that he could
identify a scar on the woman’s body.92 In what might have been the most serious vice squad case
to emerge from Seabury’s hearings, Patrolmen William Lewis and Edgar McFarland were
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convicted of assault in the beating and frame-up of Mrs. Potocki and received sentences of two
and a half to five years and two to four years, respectively.93
One prosecution of a vice squad member was handled in federal court in the Southern
District of New York. Patrolman James Quinlivan was accused of collecting monthly payments
from some 125 speakeasies in Manhattan and, as would be expected, not reporting the income on
his tax returns. Collections were made by Harry Levey, one of the vice squad’s informants. In
exchange for the payments, speakeasy operators would not be raided by police. On infrequent
occasions when other pressures required that a location making payments still had to be raided,
Quinlivan tipped off the operator and very little liquor would be found in the raid as a result.94
The prosecution built its case using the same tax investigators who had built cases against Al
Capone and others in Chicago.95 Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas E. Dewey won fairly
quick guilty verdicts at trial, although the jury recommended mercy for Quinlivan.96 The judge
sentenced the defendant to incarceration for three years, and he served twenty-eight months in a
federal prison in Atlanta.97
Vice squad officer James Brady had charges dismissed after he was tried to a hung jury
on allegations of assaulting a woman during a raid.98 Another vice squad officer, John Drake,
was indicted for perjury, but record of a final disposition could not be located. His charges
related to a frame-up arrest of a woman involving “Chile” Acuna, so it may have been dismissed.
Finally, vice squad officer Daniel Sullivan had his perjury indictment dismissed after a key
witness died of natural causes.99
In the Eastern District of New York, former police inspector Thomas Mullarkey was
indicted in March 1932 on charges that included Prohibition violations and other charges related
to operating an illegal still. Mullarkey’s activities came to light through Seabury’s investigative
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efforts, but not his Magistrates’ Court investigation of the vice squad. Rather, Seabury led the
Hofstadter Committee of the state legislature to uncover more widespread evidence of municipal
public corruption including some related to Prohibition violations. Testimony before the
committee about Mullarkey led to his federal indictment.100 He managed to remain a fugitive for
almost two years, which allowed enough time for the repeal of Prohibition. As he went to trial,
some charges against him were dismissed due to the repeal. The jury found him not guilty on a
remaining conspiracy charge.101 He was by far the highest-ranking member of the police
department to be prosecuted in the scandal.

Conclusions
The most influential force behind the police prosecutions was a man who prosecuted no
one and for whom police corruption was a low priority. Samuel Seabury uncovered the police
corruption when he was actually searching for other corruption in the justice system, and then he
prodded a reluctant district attorney into action. In public hearings he relentlessly examined
everyone from the street cop to the stool pigeon and the district attorney to the mayor. Moreover,
Seabury played this role after playing a different role of influence in the earlier Curran-era
scandal (albeit sharing the stage with Charles Whitman). Although D.A. Crain managed to stay
in office for his full term, the microscope that Seabury put Crain under might have served as a
warning to future prosecutors that a reasonable level of prosecutorial zeal was necessary
regardless of political concerns.
As with the earlier cyclical scandals, the Seabury-era scandal focused on vice-related
corruption (this time actually arising from the vice squad). Prostitution (real or falsely alleged)
was the primary underlying vice, and prostitution would never again have such prominence in
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later cyclical police scandals. This is not to suggest that liquor and gambling were losing
influence as corruption drivers in the early 1930s. Indeed, Prohibition certainly sent liquorrelated police corruption to new heights. The Seabury-era focus on prostitution was simply a
result of Seabury receiving the assignment to investigate the Magistrates’ Courts and that court
system happened to include the Women’s Courts where the vice squad took prostitution cases.
Then the investigation did not expand because Seabury preferred to pursue other corruption and
D.A. Crain preferred to pursue as little as possible.
Seabury’s hearings seemed of little help to the prosecutions beyond lighting a fire under
the reluctant district attorney. The hearings might have even hurt the prosecutions because jurors
familiar with the sweeping exposé conducted by Seabury might have been disappointed at the
narrow scope and skimpy evidence of the trials. As in earlier scandals, the trials showed the
difficulties that come in calling witnesses at trial who had been involved somehow in the police
wrongdoing. “Chile” Acuna was a professional police informant (or stool pigeon) rather than a
purveyor of one of the vices or a briber of police, as had been common for witnesses in
prosecutions in the earlier scandals. He still had problems when he moved from testimony in a
hearing room to testimony in a courtroom.
As in the Lexow and Curran eras, the police scandal in the Seabury era heralded
Tammany’s loss of the mayor’s office to a Republican fusion candidate. In the Seabury era,
however, the police scandal took a back seat to the wider municipal corruption scandal. The
police scandal fully unfolded during Walker’s last term and certainly contributed to LaGuardia’s
success in the 1933 election. Walker’s other financial and ethical troubles were largely exposed
by Seabury’s relentless investigations, and those troubles led to his resignation, not the
transgressions of his police department’s vice squad.
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Chapter 6

The Harry Gross–Era Scandal

And things being how they are, the back of the police station is out!
—Nathan Detroit singing about the unavailability of one of his usual illegal gambling
locations in the 1950 musical Guys and Dolls1

Postwar New York City seemed greater than ever in many ways. The city’s
manufacturing base appeared strong after surviving the Depression and bulking up for the war.
City developers no longer raced to erect the tallest building in the world (the Empire State
Building held that title securely for decades), but skyscraper construction boomed. Rival cities of
the world—London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Tokyo—were damaged by the war. New York was the
most populous city in the world and, as home to the United Nations, New York could
legitimately claim to be the capital of the world.2
Nevertheless, George Lankevich later described the city’s postwar era as the start of “the
long slide.”3 The U.N. headquarters reflected some of the city’s conflicting directions. John D.
Rockefeller, Jr.’s donated dollars and Robert Moses’s political muscle cleared six city blocks on
the East River for the U.N. complex. Although Moses pushed hard for a location at the former
World’s Fair site in Queens, he wryly observed that U.N. diplomats wanted midtown’s “fleshpots and all the rest of it.”4 The Secretariat Building (under construction from 1947 to 1952) used
the city’s first “curtain wall” construction popular for the International Style buildings that would
modernize the appearance of the city and transform the skyline for both commercial and
residential structures. A retrospective just twenty-five years later lamented that the “cathedrals,
palaces, and temples” of the 1949 skyline had been replaced by “file cabinets.”5
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To accommodate the U.N. project, the city yielded to the growing influence of the
automobile by expanding the East River Drive and access roads over the protests of some local
residents.6 The development demolished working-class housing on the site, dismissed at the time
by the New York Times as “shabby tenements” and part of a pattern that would be increasingly
common in the city, particularly for works associated with Robert Moses.7 Also demolished at
the site were slaughterhouses and breweries—two industries that were major employers in the
city and that later almost disappeared. The U.N. delegate from Iraq was the sole dissenter in the
decision to locate on the East River, citing reasons that included the undesirability of proximity
to “adjoining industrial plants.”8 The Iraqi delegate did not need to worry for long as those
industrial plants would soon be gone, and the city’s diminishing industrial base became a major
factor in “the long slide” according to Lankevich.
New York City’s population reached a peak of nearly eight million in 1950 and declined
for the rest of the decade.9 The Depression and the war had delayed demand for new housing,
Moses and other leaders promoted highway construction that opened the suburbs, and federal
housing programs encouraged veterans to buy homes instead of renting city apartments. Many
New Yorkers seemed to sense the decline of their city, or at least changes in the city that they did
not care to stay for, and they fled to the suburbs. The Veterans Administration processed more
home loans for Nassau County than for all of New York City.10 So-called “white flight” became
a major postwar demographic trend for the city. Ninety percent of the city’s population was
classified as “white” in 1950, already a decline from 1940.11 The cyclical police scandal of the
early 1950s would be the last in which the corrupt police received their illicit payments from
persons who were mostly non-Hispanic whites.
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Whatever sense of unease many New Yorkers had about their city was not assuaged by
the police department. The cyclical scandal would expose rampant police corruption that
appeared to extend high in the ranks, even to the extent of forcing the resignation of the
commissioner. Citizens felt that crime was rising: newspapers screamed reports of crimes and
fear of crime certainly contributed to residents moving out of the city. Yet, the police department
showed low crime figures. It turned out that the department routinely failed to record reports of
crime and failed to respond effectively. Only 2,520 burglary complaints were reported in 1949, a
figure probably lower than 10 percent of the actual total. Cases assigned to “Detective Cann”
were headed to being thrown out. Only 149 arrests were made citywide for drug sales in 1949,
when illicit drug dealing was certainly on the rise.12
On the political side, Fiorello LaGuardia served three full terms as mayor, always
running as a Republican and using other endorsements by minor parties. He was elected in 1933
after Mayor Jimmy Walker’s scandal-induced resignation. Although LaGuardia received only
about 40 percent of the 1933 vote, he benefitted from a strong showing by third-party candidate
Joseph McKee, who had served briefly as acting mayor following Walker’s exit. As in the two
earlier police corruption scandals, voters turned against Tammany Hall by electing nonTammany mayors, but only LaGuardia managed to hold the office for more than one term. His
reelection in 1937 was a near landslide, and then the 1941 election was more competitive against
Tammany Democrat William O’Dwyer. After LaGuardia’s last term, Tammany saw its return to
the mayor’s office with O’Dwyer’s election in 1945. Greater political influence for organized
crime also saw a return with boss Frank Costello understood to be the most powerful figure in
city politics.13 As a Brooklyn native, ex-cop, and ex-D.A., Mayor O’Dwyer would be close to
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many players in the next cyclical scandal, and he would become the scandal’s most prominent
victim.

The Triggering Event
The Brooklyn Eagle newspaper first published in 1841, counted Walt Whitman as one of
its editors, and boasted the largest circulation in the nation for an afternoon newspaper in the
final decades of the nineteenth century.14 The twentieth century, however, was less kind to the
Brooklyn Eagle. The consolidation of Brooklyn into Greater New York had diminished the need
for a distinct Brooklyn publication, highways to Long Island transported readers away from the
borough, and the paper finally shut down in 1955.15 The Eagle’s last hurrah might have been
winning the 1951 Pulitzer Prize for “the most disinterested and meritorious public service
rendered by an American newspaper,” which was a belated recognition for the paper’s role in the
triggering event of the police scandal of the early 1950s.16
Veteran reporter Ed Reid of the Brooklyn Eagle opened a series of articles on December
11, 1949 with a huge headline in the Sunday paper: “Lucrative Borough Rackets Feed Vast
Crime Syndicate.”17 Reid launched his investigation barely two months earlier based simply on a
conversation he overheard in a bar, the gist of which indicated that top police had set up a new
boss (“Mr. G”) to manage bookmaking parlors.18 Reid’s articles referred to organized crime
groups as the “combine” or the “syndicate,” seeming to avoid the term “Mafia,” perhaps in
deference to Brooklyn’s large Italian-American population.19
The Brooklyn Eagle articles emphasized the effect of gambling on school children. Seen
in hindsight, the tone of the articles was consistent with images of the 1950s-era moral panic
about dangers to America’s youth from sources such as comic books and communism.20 Reid’s
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descriptions of the interactions between students and gamblers helped prompt Manhattan D.A.
Frank Hogan’s investigation of point shaving in college basketball games. That scandal brought
down the national-champion basketball program of the City College of New York.
With the current acceptance of gambling in the United States, Reid’s articles might now
seem misdirected because his narratives focused more on the gambling itself and less on the
related dangers of organized crime and police corruption that lived off the proceeds of the
gambling. That might have been a product of Reid having more printable information about
gambling than about the other criminal activity. It also reflected a time and place where illegal
gambling had an importance in day-to-day life almost unimaginable from a modern perspective.
Many city residents went to extraordinary lengths to gamble. The opening article of Reid’s
exposé contended that Thomas Dewey’s successful prosecution of Charles “Lucky” Luciano for
promoting prostitution had turned organized crime away from prostitution to illegal gambling. 21
Reid cited two reasons for this development: first, gambling yielded “clean” money compared to
the “dirty” money from prostitution and other crimes; second, bookmaking (horse and sports
betting) and lotteries (policy or numbers) yielded more money than other vices.22 As a result, the
ensuing police scandal focused almost exclusively on corrupt police activities related to
gambling. The underlying vice activities of liquor and prostitution that were prominent in the
earlier cyclical scandals were not apparent in the 1950s scandal.
Reid particularly focused on lotteries. Most betters were people of modest means, and
small bets could be placed for pennies, so public participation had to be widespread in order to
generate the dollars that attracted organized crime and accommodated police payoffs. Reid
described the Italian lottery, convoluted calculations from daily racetrack handles to determine
daily winning numbers, and “dream books” used to select numbers.23 The acceptance of
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gambling by much of the public, the “clean” nature of the money, and the sheer volume of the
money all led to high police involvement. Some believed that the police were not simply taking
payoffs from gambling operators, but that police themselves actually organized the gambling
network.24
As for police corruption, Reid’s articles were high on sensationalism, if a bit low on
details. The most important allegation came from Reid’s interview with a bookmaker. Reid
described the interview in a theatrical Q&A manner that likely strayed from the actual
conversation (Q: “You mean I gotta pay the cops?” A: “You are darn right!”). Reid’s source
described how police holding the high rank of inspector received the payoffs necessary for a
bookmaker to operate in a particular territory.25 As there were only twenty-two inspectors in the
entire NYPD at that time, this allegation started the scandal aiming at higher targets in the
department than any of the other cyclical scandals.
Part of what assured that Reid’s series in the Brooklyn Eagle would become the
triggering event for the next scandal involved the Brooklyn (Kings County) District Attorney,
Miles McDonald. In 1947, McDonald arranged a meeting with the other county district
attorneys, the police commissioner, and Mayor O’Dwyer. McDonald presented a thoughtful plan
for reforms to reduce the police practice of filing legally insufficient complaints after arresting
bookies and to increase the likelihood of bookies receiving jail sentences instead of fines. Mayor
O’Dwyer voiced agreement with McDonald’s plan, and then did nothing about it. Frustrated by
this and by some of his other efforts against gamblers, McDonald listened intently when reporter
Reid told about his upcoming series on gambling in the Brooklyn Eagle. McDonald encouraged
Reid to pursue the stories and planned how the stories could be used for leverage to obtain the
resources to follow up with an investigation.26
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McDonald acted quickly in the wake of the Brooklyn Eagle stories. On December 22,
1949, just days after Ed Reid’s series concluded, McDonald asked Judge Samuel Leibowitz of
the Kings County Court for a three-month extension of the December term grand jury for the
purpose of the gambling investigation. Notable from the start was the aggressive posture of
Judge Leibowitz. He warned the grand jurors about the “lords of the underworld” and instructed
jurors, “Therefore, you must not only go after the crook, but you must reach out for the man
behind the crook.”27 The grand jury would be extended several more times. Judge Leibowitz
would become a controversial figure as the scandal unfolded.28
Almost eighteen months after the first article, on May 8, 1951, the Brooklyn Eagle
proudly announced on its front page that Ed Reid’s articles had led to the Pulitzer Prize.29 The
next day, the Eagle’s front page announced another important result of Reid’s articles: the grand
jury returned an indictment that charged twenty-one cops and ex-cops and named fifty-six other
cops as unindicted co-conspirators.30 It remains by far the largest single indictment of members
of the NYPD.

The Prosecutors and the Response31
The 1991 New York Times obituary for Miles McDonald began by touting that
McDonald’s “investigation into police corruption as Brooklyn District Attorney led to Mayor
William O’Dwyer’s resignation.”32 By that measure, McDonald’s signature accomplishment as a
prosecutor came against a man he never prosecuted and who had played a key role in aiding
McDonald’s rise to prominence.
McDonald appeared to have a script-worthy background for politics of that era in
Brooklyn: Irish Catholic; raised in Brooklyn; educated at St. John’s Prep, Holy Cross College,
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and Fordham Law School.33 His father had been the chief clerk of the Kings County Surrogate
Court. He lived with his wife and four young children on Carroll Street in South Brooklyn (a
street named after the only Roman Catholic signer of the Declaration of Independence). After
law school McDonald worked in a Brooklyn law firm, and in 1940 he was hired to join the office
of the newly elected Kings County District Attorney, William O’Dwyer.
O’Dwyer had his own pedigree. He was born and educated in Ireland, including studying
for the priesthood. He emigrated to the United States and worked as a stoker on coal-burning
ships, a plasterer at construction sites, and a bartender at a high-end hotel before becoming a
New York City police officer and attending Fordham Law School at night.34 The widowed
O’Dwyer later married model and socialite Sloan Simpson. The press covered their courtship and
honeymoon with nearly as much interest as it covered his politics and scandals.35 He served as a
judge before winning election as Brooklyn D.A. in 1939. O’Dwyer followed Thomas Dewey’s
game plan to use highly publicized prosecutions of organized crime figures to build a reputation.
O’Dwyer quickly focused on the violent organized crime group well known to the public as
Murder, Inc., although some of his efforts were later criticized. O’Dwyer made his losing run for
mayor against LaGuardia in 1941, and then he took a leave of absence while on active duty
during World War II. Newspapers referred to him as “Colonel” or “General” as he rose in
military rank, and he won easy reelection as D.A. in 1943 during the leave of absence.36 He
resigned as district attorney in August 1945 to run for mayor again.
Meanwhile, an ailing President Roosevelt nominated Miles McDonald to move from the
D.A.’s office to become the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York in
February 1945. FDR had passed away by the time McDonald was confirmed for that position on
May 16, 1945.37 McDonald did not stay for long: less than three months later he accepted the
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Democratic nomination to run for the district attorney position vacated by mayoral candidate
O’Dwyer.
The prosecutorial politics rose to extraordinary levels for the election of 1945, even by
New York City standards. Governor Dewey appointed fellow Republican George Beldock in
August 1945 to serve as interim Brooklyn D.A. until the election, at which time Beldock would
run on the Republican ticket against McDonald.38 Beldock wasted no time. After only a few
weeks in office, he requested that a special grand jury be empanelled to investigate his
predecessor O’Dwyer’s conduct as district attorney. The grand jury would look into how
O’Dwyer and his office handled several cases. The most notorious case involved the
unsuccessful prosecution of Murder, Inc.’s Albert Anastasia.39
Conveniently, the grand jury managed to hurry to complete the first phase of its work just
one week before election day by issuing a “presentment.”40 The presentment contended that
O’Dwyer and some others working in the district attorney’s office had mishandled certain cases
by “maladministration” and “gross laxity and inefficiency.”41 The grand jury explained that the
presentation was so important that “no delay should be tolerated,” in anticipation of the obvious
contention that the presentation was timed to influence the election.42 Interim appointee Beldock,
then actively running to keep the job, promptly delivered a long radio address to blast mayoral
candidate O’Dwyer by repeating the findings of the grand jury. O’Dwyer brushed aside the
allegations, pointed out that he was serving his country at war during much of the time in
question, and easily defeated his Republican opponent in the mayoral election.43
The Brooklyn Eagle called Miles McDonald the “forgotten man” of the 1945 election
because his opponent Beldock campaigned by attacking O’Dwyer, not McDonald.44 Still,
McDonald won easily and even won by more votes than O’Dwyer’s margin of victory in
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Brooklyn.45 Beldock would have almost as much time as interim D.A. after the election as he did
before the election, so he continued the grand jury inquiry into mayor-elect O’Dwyer. The grand
jury made another presentation that was critical of O’Dwyer before Beldock left office, and then
McDonald wisely facilitated the continued work of the grand jury by keeping on staff the
attorneys who handled the investigation.46 The foreman of the grand jury even told the press that
the grand jury would continue its work under McDonald instead of seeking a special
prosecutor.47 McDonald managed to give the appearance of being a straight shooter, perhaps he
gained insight into the activities of his former boss, and the grand jury investigation of O’Dwyer
would peter out anyway. A judge dismissed two of the main allegations against O’Dwyer on
legal grounds, and Governor Dewey declined to take the steps necessary to continue the grand
jury’s work.48
By the next major municipal election season in the fall of 1949, Ed Reid of the Brooklyn
Eagle had already started his research that led to his exposé on gambling, organized crime, and
police corruption. Republican candidate Newbold Morris tried to make headway against Mayor
O’Dwyer with campaign accusations that linked O’Dwyer with mobster Frank Costello.49 More
specifically, Morris produced a list of the locations of 124 betting parlors that operated so openly
that they “couldn’t possibly exit without corruption.”50 Samuel Seabury, the prominent
anticorruption figure from the previous two cyclical scandals, endorsed Morris and urged battle
with the “Tammany machine.”51 Bronx District Attorney Samuel Foley came to O’Dwyer’s
defense to remarkably declare, “I can say of my own knowledge that the city was never cleaner
or freer from rackets than it is at present.”52
The attacks on O’Dwyer did not resonate with the voters. He won reelection easily. In the
race for Brooklyn district attorney, McDonald’s Republican opponent emphasized allegations
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that McDonald’s office had failed to investigate charges of police brutality against African
Americans.53 McDonald won in a landslide. He was in a strong position to respond to the
Brooklyn Eagle’s articles that started to be published just a month after the election.
McDonald’s point person on the investigation was Assistant District Attorney Julius
Helfand, who led the office’s rackets division. In contrast to McDonald’s route of Catholic
schools, Helfand attended Brooklyn public schools and N.Y.U. law school. He served one term
in the state assembly and practiced law before joining the district attorney’s office in 1935 and
working on the Murder, Inc. investigations. When McDonald joined the office in 1940 as a
fellow assistant district attorney, Helfand gave him sound advice on how to try criminal cases. 54
McDonald and Helfand worked well together as the police corruption investigation unfolded.
The Brooklyn Eagle’s leading political columnist noted that McDonald did not mind sharing the
spotlight with Helfand.55 The final report of the investigation by the grand jury and the district
attorney in 1954 is called the Helfand Report by some commentators because of Helfand’s
involvement from start to finish, and because McDonald had become a judge by the time the
report was issued.56 Helfand would go on to become the chairman of the New York State
Athletic Commission, where he took strong steps against corruption and organized crime
influence in professional boxing.57
After Justice Leibowitz granted the extension of the December 1949 grand jury on
December 22, 1949, McDonald put together an aggressive investigation. McDonald told Police
Commissioner William O’Brien (who would later resign in the scandal) that he needed a group
of young police officers newly graduated from the police academy because youthful-looking
officers could better infiltrate gambling situations in schools. In fact, McDonald was more
concerned with getting freshly minted officers because they were less likely to have been tainted
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by corrupt officers.58 Helfand interviewed prospects from the academy’s graduating class of
three hundred without telling them the prospective assignment, and he selected twenty-nine of
the officers. The selected group was much more diverse than the baby-faced cops that O’Brien
might have expected would be chosen. The officers reported to a hotel room on January 2, 1950,
where Helfand warned them that they faced a job that would cause other cops to call them rats.
They were given the opportunity to walk away from the assignment, but all twenty-nine stayed.59
Many of those cops would later face physical threats and vicious taunts to their wives from
veteran officers.60
The officers and other investigators worked undercover to infiltrate gambling rings at
colleges and other locations. By April 1950, raids conducted pursuant to the investigation
repeatedly found gambling paperwork that kept track of “ice,” meaning payoffs to police. At a
traditional corner candy store used by numbers runners to drop off their records of bets, a raid
produced a list of the license plates of undercover cars used by the district attorney’s office.
When the NYPD inspector whose division covered the candy store was called before the grand
jury, he ducked the subpoena by claiming he had a nervous condition that suddenly required him
to check into a private sanitarium.61 Clearly, growing indications of police corruption would
overtake gambling in importance to the investigation, but the full extent of corruption could not
be demonstrated by raids and arrests of uncooperative low-level gamblers. McDonald decided to
target Harry Gross––the “Mr. G” that reporter Reid had overheard about in a bar months earlier.
Before McDonald could produce results about Harry Gross, however, the investigation
hit a low point and nearly collapsed in the matter of Captain John G. Flynn. Flynn was the acting
commander of the 16th Division with territory that included a raided bookie parlor in Bay Ridge.
The grand jury subpoenaed Flynn, and he gave testimony that seemed routine. A few weeks
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later, on July 16, 1950, he shot himself to death at his desk in his station house. Although Flynn
left a suicide note specifically stating otherwise, Mayor O’Dwyer took the opportunity to claim
that McDonald and the grand jury investigation had driven Flynn’s actions. O’Dwyer compared
McDonald’s tactics to “witch hunts and the war of nerves made popular by Hitler.” He also took
aim at the Brooklyn Eagle for writing “sneering articles” about police.62 Flynn’s widow gave an
interview to the Brooklyn Eagle in which she blamed the investigation for “hounding” her
husband, who was “the most honest and clean living man who ever went to Brooklyn.” She
believed the motivation for the reckless investigation was that “Miles McDonald wants to further
his political ambition––he wants to be a rackets-buster and eventually be Governor.”63
The fallout from Flynn’s suicide worsened when cops from police organizations
encouraged Mrs. Flynn to confront McDonald. Some cops escorted her to a courthouse where
McDonald was appearing on a case. She tearfully rushed up and screamed repeatedly, “You
killed him. . . . My Johnny’s blood is on your hands” at the stunned McDonald. McDonald tried
to calm her while the cops who arranged the confrontation looked on. McDonald would call it
the worst moment in his life.64 Some six thousand NYPD officers attended Flynn’s funeral in
Queens—then the largest police funeral in the city’s history.65
Fast-moving events, though, kept the Flynn suicide from impeding the investigation for
long. Several police organizations wrote a formal complaint to Judge Leibowitz about how
prosecutors treated Flynn. The judge promptly instructed the grand jury to suspend its work to
consider the allegations in the complaint. On August 16, 1950, the grand jury issued a report
finding that Flynn had not been mistreated in the investigation, that he seemed well during his
testimony, and that the D.A. and his staff were “fair, fearless, and honest” in all matters before
the grand jury.66 Courtroom successes also bolstered the legitimacy of the investigation. By the
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end of May 1950, the D.A.’s office had obtained four convictions of bookies and received
additional funding from the city’s Board of Estimate to hire more prosecutors and investigators.67
The first indicted police officer came to trial soon after the Flynn funeral in late July 1950. Lt.
James Reilly was charged with perjury relating to his receipt of $6,000 from a bowling alley
operator. Although the trial judge issued a directed verdict of acquittal on legal grounds, the case
presented by Assistant D.A. Helfand clearly showed Reilly’s inappropriate receipt of what was
an apparent payoff.68
By the time of Mayor O’Dwyer’s outburst about witch hunts and Hitler barely eight
months after his landslide reelection victory, his political future was in jeopardy. The state
Democratic chairman and the Brooklyn borough president denied suggestions that they had
arranged for McDonald to investigate O’Dwyer to force the mayor’s resignation, while rumors
circulated that O’Dwyer sought to be appointed U.S. ambassador to Mexico.69 On the national
scene, the U.S. Senate’s Kefauver Committee started its televised road show of public hearings
about organized crime on May 28, 1950, and seemed certain to delve into allegations about
O’Dwyer. President Truman and Democrats worried about upcoming 1950 midterm elections
and did not need reinforcement added to the stereotype of the corrupt big-city Democrat.
O’Dwyer saw the handwriting on the wall and secretly filed his retirement papers on
August 1, 1950, while still denying rumors that he would resign. On August 15, he rode a train
with his wife returning from Washington and told the press that President Truman had just
convinced him to accept the ambassadorship to Mexico. A reporter described the much younger
Mrs. O’Dwyer as “happy as a schoolgirl.” In contrast, the mayor spat out terse responses to
reporters.70 Honored at a conference by the Police Benevolent Association a week later,
O’Dwyer said proudly that he had stood up for honest cops in the Brooklyn investigation who
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were “being pilloried and ruined unjustly.”71 A Broadway parade honored the mayor on August
31. He had waited the minimum of thirty days after he filed for retirement in order to preserve
his pension. Reminiscent of disgraced ex-mayor Walker sailing from the West Side piers to
Europe eighteen years earlier, O’Dwyer left town on a train from Grand Central en route to
Mexico.72
While the Flynn suicide and the O’Dwyer resignation dominated headlines in the
summer of 1950, the investigation continued to build a case against Harry Gross. Gross’s main
wire room was located in a frame house in Inwood on Long Island, just beyond the city’s limits.
By September, investigators tapped phones in the wire room, quickly picking up countless
gambling calls and a few explicit calls of Gross or his underlings speaking with police about
payoffs. These wiretaps appear to be the first ever used in an investigation related to one of the
cyclical police scandals. McDonald’s police and investigators raided the Long Island wire room
and other Gross-related locations simultaneously on September 15, 1950. Thirty-four persons
were arrested, none of whom were police.73 One of the raided locations was across the street
from the D.A.’s office. Investigators arrested Gross at his hotel suite in Brooklyn Heights. 74
Similar to how the courts under Judge Seabury seemed hospitable to Manhattan D.A.
Whitman’s efforts in the Curran-era scandal some four decades earlier, the hard-nosed judge
Samuel Leibowitz presided over judicial actions that helped the Brooklyn investigation.75 Judge
Leibowitz extended the December 1949 grand jury, instructed grand jurors strongly about their
duty, and provided McDonald with court orders and arrest warrants as needed. After Gross’s
arrest, Judge Leibowitz moved quickly on two fronts. First, he lashed into the police department
as he presided over an unusual and highly publicized night session of his court for Gross’s
arraignment. Police Commissioner William O’Brien, already irritated that he had been “ordered”
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to appear at the court session, delivered the blame-shifting argument that bookmaking existed
because the courts never gave jail sentences to arrested bookies. Leibowitz responded, “An
honest Police Department can stop bookmaking in 24 hours.” O’Brien sat in court as Leibowitz
permitted prosecutors to play a particularly incriminating wiretap tape. O’Brien’s remark about
taking action when he had “proper evidence” caused the judge to raise his voice, “What’s the
matter, don’t you believe what you hear?”76 The special court session amounted to judicial
theater to gain further momentum for the burgeoning scandal. The next day, Commissioner
O’Brien announced a massive NYPD inquiry into corruption. A few days later, he resigned.77
Judge Leibowitz’s second move was more substantial, yet still theatrical, as he attempted
to convince Harry Gross to assist investigators. Gaining Gross’s cooperation had become the key
to McDonald’s investigation firmly making the jump from gambling to corruption. After his
arrest on September 15, Gross went back and forth on whether he would divulge all to
prosecutors. On September 19, Judge Leibowitz twice broke from public court sessions to have
long private talks with Gross. Only Gross, the judge, and a court stenographer were present (with
the transcriptions soon released). Gross still wavered, so Leibowitz ordered that he be held as a
material witness at the request of Assistant D.A. Helfand on $250,000 bail and a twenty-four
hour guard on his jail cell by the sheriff’s office.78 Gross’s inconsistent behavior raised red flags
for prosecutors that, with hindsight, should have been heeded more closely.
Gross remained incarcerated, his bail reduction applications denied, and he stood trial on
bookmaking charges in January 1951 before the ubiquitous Judge Leibowitz. The D.A.’s case
was overwhelming. An associate testified that Gross’s twice-monthly payoffs to police were so
large that they needed two men to carry the cash.79 After hearing testimony from just one other
witness, Gross pleaded guilty to sixty-five counts of bookmaking. The counts were all
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misdemeanors, but he faced substantial prison time with Judge Leibowitz not being likely to shy
away from imposing consecutive sentences. Gross still balked at cooperating with prosecutors,
and he remained in custody under high bail. By the end of February 1951, Gross relented and
began multiple grand jury appearances in which he fully described his corrupt relations with
police in response to Assistant D.A. Helfand’s questions.80 By mid-March, in reward for his
cooperation and testimony, Gross had his material witness order lifted and his bail reduced to a
manageable $25,000.81 Based on Gross’s testimony, the grand jury returned the indictment
charging twenty-one police officers on May 9, 1951. The indictment named another fifty-six
police officers as co-conspirators who were spared being charged because of statutory
requirements for corroboration.82
Three particular aspects of the investigative response by McDonald and the Brooklyn
D.A.’s office were new or unusual in the cyclical scandals, and three other aspects seemed
borrowed directly from earlier playbooks.
In the new or unusual category, first, the investigation directed more attention to very
high-ranking police than in the earlier scandals. McDonald pushed hard to gain Gross’s
cooperation in order to implicate police at least as high as the inspector level. Two inspectors
would be indicted and another six were named as unindicted co-conspirators in the massive May
1951 indictment.83 In November 1951, Assistant D.A. Helfand contended that this top-down
(rather than bottom-up) attack on police corruption was “as it should be,” even though the
sweeping indictment of police had already suffered its courtroom disaster, including dismissal of
charges against the indicted inspectors.84
Second, investigators cleverly used the NYPD’s own records to support allegations that
payoffs affected police actions. At the heart of the corruption scheme was police protection of
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known gambling locations, so investigators obtained police reports of the previous responses to
some of those locations. For instance, a location in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn. was clearly a horsebetting parlor—civilians complained repeatedly to police about it, a search warrant seized
extensive gambling evidence, and gamblers who operated there confirmed what was obvious. To
support the charges that police were paid off, investigators obtained the records of the police
department’s 16th Division, which showed half-hearted responses to the civilian complaints that
concluded, “complaint unwarranted.”85 Prosecutors used those discrepancies in quizzing police
officers in the grand jury.
Third, and perhaps most important of the new developments in the Gross scandal,
investigators used telephone wiretaps to obtain evidence. The underlying crime of gambling that
fueled the corruption relied heavily on telephone communications, and parties using the phones
seemed unguarded in their conversations. The New York State criminal code allowed
prosecutors to apply for a wiretap order with relative ease.86 D.A. McDonald had evidence
against Gross for months, but decided to make the move to arrest Gross after intercepting
particularly explicit telephone calls.
Regarding aspects of the investigative response that were familiar from earlier times,
first, as noted above, the seemingly close coordination between D.A. McDonald and Judge
Leibowitz harkened back to the relationship between D.A. Whitman and Judge Seabury in the
Curran-era scandal. The crusader-like zeal of Judge Leibowitz may have emboldened McDonald
to charge ahead with the investigation in the face of strong police and political opposition, not to
mention the public’s ambivalence about the crime of gambling.
Second, prosecutors expanded on the approach of financial investigations of police as
pioneered in the 1930s Seabury era. Payoffs were so common (and oversight so ineffective) that
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some officers kept their ill-gotten monies in their bank accounts. The Brooklyn D.A. issued
subpoenas for cops’ bank records to find signs of payoffs.87 After the police inspector avoided
testifying about his finances because of his supposed nervous condition, the undeterred
McDonald simply turned to questioning the inspector’s wife.88
Part of the process of gathering financial information about a police officer at times
included requiring the officer to fill out a twenty-three page, sixty-eight question questionnaire.89
Then the officer might be required to sign a waiver of immunity prior to giving grand jury
testimony, all under the threat of losing his job.90 Courts would later disapprove of this tactic as
violative of the Fifth Amendment, but in the Gross-era scandal it produced a third similarity to
earlier scandals—that police defendants were frequently charged with perjury. The prosecutorial
tool of perjury had come into use in the Curran era and dominated prosecutions in the Seabury
era. In the Gross era, perjury became the charge used in the reindictment of some officers after
their original charges were dismissed in the prosecutorial fiasco of trying to use Harry Gross as a
trial witness. In fact, the great majority of officers ultimately convicted of a criminal charge were
convicted of perjury.

The Prosecutions
A total of thirty-five police officers (or ex-police officers) faced criminal charges relating
to the scandal of the 1950s. That was much higher than the number charged in the Seabury era
(18) and the Curran era (17), but lower than in the Lexow era (47). While the number of charged
cops in the Curran and Seabury eras might have been limited because the prosecutors largely
confined themselves to the matters specifically referred to them by the investigative
commissions, McDonald and the Brooklyn D.A.’s office had no such limitation because there
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was no independent commission in the Gross era. The oft-extended 1949 December grand jury
was, like most grand juries in America, nominally independent while being steered by the
prosecutor. Research uncovered no instance where D.A. McDonald failed to obtain exactly the
action that he wanted from the grand jury. However, the prosecutorial freedom suggested by the
D.A. not having to follow a path dictated by a commission did not produce wide-ranging
prosecutions. The dominance of gambling-based cases gave this scandal the most narrowly
focused prosecutions of any of the cyclical scandals.
For the only time in all of the cyclical scandals, the center of prosecutive activity shifted
away from Manhattan. This scandal was, of course, a Brooklyn scandal that was investigated by
a district attorney’s office and a grand jury that were limited to handling crimes that occurred at
least in part in Brooklyn (Kings County). Every one of the thirty-five police officers charged in
the scandal was prosecuted by the Brooklyn district attorney.91 One defendant (Ptl. Bartholomew
Nicastro) was convicted of federal tax evasion charged by the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York (still Brooklyn) after he faced other charges that the D.A. brought. 92
All of the thirty-five charged cops were male. It appears that all were white—the
Brooklyn Eagle printed photographs of many of the defendants. The police department was still
virtually all white. Perhaps a slight trace of diversity crept in with some 40 percent of the
defendants having identifiable Irish surnames (14 of 35), down substantially from the earlier
scandals.
Although prosecutors charged two inspectors (along with naming six others as unindicted
co-conspirators), most of the indicted cops came from the patrolman level. Table 6.1 shows the
ranks of the defendants.
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TABLE 6.1. Ranks of police charged in Gross-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Rank
No. charged % of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Inspector
2
6
Captain
1
3
Lieutenant
3
8
Detective
1
3
Sergeant
1
3
Patrolman
27
77
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
35
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

So, despite prosecutors’ attempts to aim at higher-ranking police, the ranks of the defendants
were even more bottom heavy than in the earlier scandals because of the large number of
charged patrolmen. This was likely because day-to-day enforcement of gambling laws (and the
corrupt failure to enforce) largely fell upon plainclothes officers at the patrolman rank.
Breaking down the primary charged conduct against police defendants in this scandal
presents issues because several of the defendants who gained dismissals in the big trial were then
charged and convicted on other offenses. For those officers, table 6.2. uses the charges of
conviction, instead of the charges of dismissal, as their primary charged conduct.
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TABLE 6.2. Primary charged conduct in Gross-era prosecutions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Conduct
Cases
% of total
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Consp. to obstruct justice
17
49
Perjury
13
37
Contempt
4
11
Tax evasion
1
3
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
35
100
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

There were actually twenty-one cops charged with conspiracy to obstruct justice, as described
more fully below. Four were subsequently charged and convicted on other charges (three for
perjury and one for tax evasion). Charges of bribery/extortion and assault that were common in
the earlier scandals were absent. The trend from the Seabury era toward prosecution-friendly (or
prosecution-manufactured) perjury charges continued, particularly after the D.A.’s ill-fated
overreliance on obstruction of justice charges. As shown in the description below of the
prosecution of Captain Workman, the D.A. pursued perjury charges aggressively and in a
manner that more modern court decisions would not allow.
The prior police scandals included civilians involved in prostitution, liquor, and gambling
violations; later scandals would add drugs to the mix. The only vice of this scandal was
gambling. Of the thirty-five charged defendants, thirty-four were clearly alleged to have engaged
in conduct in which gambling was the underlying civilian activity, shown in table 6.3. Most were
charged in the mega-indictment that alleged Harry Gross’s gambling payoffs, and others were
charged with perjury or contempt for trying to conceal the nature of assets they held. For
instance, Patrolman Antonio Vigorito failed to disclose ownership of a bar and liquor store in
Florida on his required financial questionnaire. He bought them using a different name and paid
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mostly cash, and Harry Gross had previously named him as receiving gambling payoffs
(although he was not charged in the big indictment), so it is reasonable to conclude that he was
attempting to conceal payoffs from gambling on his financial questionnaire, although the perjury
charge did not include that allegation.93

TABLE 6.3. Primary underlying civilian activity in Gross-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Activity
Cases
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Gambling
34
97
Undetermined
1
3
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
35
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

In the single “undetermined” case, Patrolman John Carey was convicted of perjury for failure to
disclose stocks held by his wife on his financial questionnaire.94 Although he testified before the
grand jury that handled the gambling investigation, and his case was assigned to Judge
Leibowitz, who presided over so many gambling-based cases, no accounts of the prosecution
specifically stated a connection to gambling.
The cases against the thirty-five charged cops were disposed of as shown in table 6.4. As
before, defendants subject to multiple prosecutions are counted as convictions if any of the cases
against them resulted in convictions.
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TABLE 6.4. Dispositions of Gross-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Disposition
Cases
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Guilty at trial
11
32
Guilty plea
5
14
Total convicted
16
46
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Dismissed
16
45
Conviction reversed
1
3
95
Not guilty at trial
1
3
Defendant suicide
1
3
Total not convicted
19
54
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
35
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Overlooking that the Brooklyn D.A. suffered what may have been the most startling
prosecutorial trial defeat in city history, the prosecution had a successful record in winning every
case that was left to a jury’s decision. The only not guilty verdict resulted from the judge’s
direction for legal reasons. None of the earlier scandals came close to such success by
prosecutors with juries.
Sentences imposed on convicted cops were quite strict, especially considering that many
of the charges were misdemeanors and none involved charges of violence.
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TABLE. 6.5. Sentences of convicted Gross-era defendants
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Sentence
No. of cases
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2½ to 5 years
5
0–3 years
2
18 months
1
1 year
3
7 months
1
30 days
2
Suspended
1
96
Unknown
1
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
16
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The sentences illustrate how the justice system treated allegedly corrupt police both leniently and
harshly. On the one hand, dozens of cops (the unindicted co-conspirators in the big case) were
never charged because of the legal requirement of corroboration, another cop received a directed
verdict of not guilty for the same reason, and eighteen others walked free from their trial after the
prosecution’s witness balked. On the other hand, prosecutors pursued cops relentlessly with
mandatory questionnaires, multiple grand jury appearances, and financial investigations, and
judges imposed harsh sentences on those who were finally convicted.
Through the sentencing phase, Judge Leibowitz continued to act aggressively against
corrupt cops, seeming to push the limits of judicial impartiality. The five defendants who
received sentences of two and a half to five years all stood trial and were convicted of the felony
of first-degree perjury. Four of those defendants (Joseph O’Brien, James Reardon, Antonio
Vigorito, and Joseph Workman) were sentenced by Judge Leibowitz.97 Leibowitz lashed out at
the defendants’ corruption and pushed hard for their cooperation. He stated in court that Officer
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O’Brien had received the “lion’s share” of Harry Gross’s payoff money, sentenced O’Brien to
two and a half to five years, but then offered “extreme leniency” if he were to cooperate, along
with another week of freedom to think it over.98 When sentencing former patrolman James
Reardon, Judge Leibowitz spoke as if the investigation were his own. Perhaps referring to the
previously resigned Commissioner O’Brien and Mayor O’Dwyer, Leibowitz complained that
“there is one big fish that escaped, right next to the king fish, but we won’t go into that at this
time.” To advance with the investigation, the judge nearly begged for Reardon’s cooperation:
“Even at this late moment I am willing to give him an opportunity—one that has been offered on
various other occasions and turned down—to name the higher-ups in the department who
received graft.”99 Both cops turned down the judge’s overtures and accepted their sentences.
The officer who received the sentence of seven months, Vito Romano, had been
sentenced earlier by Judge Leibowitz to the more common two and a half to five years, but he
agreed to cooperate for a sentence reduction to what amounted to time served.100 Research found
only one trial that included testimony from a cooperating cop (Officer Max Brendler) against a
police defendant (the aforementioned James Reardon). Overall, the blue wall of silence stood
quite strong in this scandal, despite the efforts of prosecutors and Judge Leibowitz.

The Big Case
After the reluctant Harry Gross agreed to cooperate, D.A. McDonald bet everything on
him. The resulting indictment in May 1951 was, despite the rather dull legalese of an indictment,
stunning. Every defendant was a cop, twenty-one in all. Every named co-conspirator was a cop,
fifty-six in all. Identifying a co-conspirator by name was not necessary for legal purposes, and
modern practice frowns on it.101 McDonald seemed to have three objectives in packaging Harry

193

Gross–based charges in this way. First, after overcoming fierce resistance from politicians and
police in his investigation, he wanted the indictment to spread accusations of police corruption as
widely and deeply as possible. By this route, he would educate the public on the extent of
corruption, maintain momentum for the investigation, and shake up the police department as
much as possible. Second, McDonald likely sought the benefit of what prosecutors may quietly
refer to as the “spill-over effect.” That is, the trial jurors would hear so much evidence about so
many corrupt cops that they would have trouble distinguishing among defendants and would
allow incriminating evidence to spill over between defendants. Third, McDonald may have
anticipated a limited shelf life to Harry Gross’s value as a witness. If prosecutions were broken
up into numerous indictments, Gross’s testimony might lose effectiveness (or he would lose
willingness) after undergoing trial after trial of cross-examinations. Whatever McDonald’s
motivations, the big case approach that he took risked that the entire prosecution could fail.
Postindictment events moved quickly, particularly with Judge Leibowitz pushing the
case. Along with his desire to bring swift justice to corrupt police, Leibowitz wanted to thwart
legal efforts to remove him from the case. On June 4, 1951, less than one month after indictment,
the case was scheduled for trial. Defendants gathered outside of the courtroom on the sixth floor
of the Central Courts Building on Schermerhorn Street in Brooklyn. Defendant Charles
Panarella, a retired plainclothes patrolman (all defendants were either retired or suspended),
suddenly broke into a run and leaped out of a window. He died after landing on a building
extension three floors below. He held a crucifix and took the plunge in view of his eighteen-yearold son and his brother, a police captain. After the body was removed, Judge Leibowitz declared,
“This trial will proceed.” In fact, Leibowitz simply presided over the selection of a single juror
and adjourned the trial until September, apparently because it would be more difficult for a
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higher court to remove him from a trial that had already commenced.102 Panarella’s suicide
occurred less than a year after Capt. Flynn’s. Leibowitz’s strategy worked: applications to
remove him from the case were denied.103
While waiting for the trial to continue, Harry Gross was not in custody, but he was under
guard 24/7 by officers from the squad of young cops assigned to the D.A.’s office. He stayed in a
hotel for convenience and security as the trial resumed in September 1951. On September 11,
just the second day of trial, Gross visited his family on Long Island with the police escorts. The
visit seemed perfectly normal as Gross packed extra clothing for the trial and chatted with his
wife in the dining room while one of the officers sat in the living room (the other officer having
gone out for a meal). Gross excused himself to wash his hands in the kitchen, slipped out the
back door, silently coasted his Cadillac down the driveway, and drove away.104
McDonald later acknowledged, “Everything hinged on Gross. Without him we had
nothing.” 105 He feared that Gross would be killed before authorities located him. But a healthy
Gross was found just the next afternoon in Atlantic City at—where else?—a race track. He
grumbled to police that they interrupted him just when he was about to hit a winning streak.106
On his return to Brooklyn, Gross claimed that he was ready for the trial and that he simply had
become nervous and needed some recreation. McDonald never found evidence that Gross was
threatened or otherwise tampered with during his one-day absence, but he certainly believed that
was a strong possibility.107
When the trial resumed, there were eighteen defendants. The original twenty-one had
been reduced by the suicide of Officer Panarella and two other defendants had their cases
severed. Patrolman John Gilgan was severed due to illness and, in what seemed more important
at the time, Inspector Frederick Hofsaes was severed because Judge Leibowitz had previously
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held him in contempt.108 Harry Gross seemed to be completely on board with supporting the
prosecution. On September 18, 1951, he reassured prosecutor Helfand (“Julie, I’m going to give
it to them”) and then took the witness stand to describe how he dropped out of school and held a
number of jobs before becoming involved in the bookmaking business that included paying off
police.109 Gross grew nervous, though, as his testimony came closer to the substance of the
charges against the defendants. He identified all eighteen of the defendants, but when Helfand’s
questions started to require responses that incriminated the defendants, Gross announced that he
would answer no more questions. An hour-long huddle with prosecutors revised Gross’s position
to claiming that he was not feeling well and would return the next day.110
Matters only worsened for prosecutors the next day. Instead of seeming nervous and ill,
Gross snarled and spit out responses. He refused to answer Helfand’s questions, including
dozens of questions in which Helfand tried to have Gross acknowledge his prior grand jury
testimony. At one point, Gross walked away from the witness stand until court officers forcibly
returned him. Judge Leibowitz bellowed, ““I’ll give you a thousand years in jail. I’ll bury
you.”111 Gross already awaited sentencing on his bookmaking guilty pleas; Judge Leibowitz
added sixty contempt citations.112 Finally, D.A. McDonald came to the courtroom and, in tears,
moved for dismissal of the charges against the eighteen defendants. The ecstatic defendants
celebrated in the court room.113 The biggest case ever against New York cops was over.114

Captain Joseph Workman
The day after dismissal of the big case, McDonald prepared to continue the fight. He told
reporters that Brooklyn had been the site of the worst defeat for Americans in the Revolutionary
War and that he, like our forefathers, would ultimately win the war.115 Basically, he pursued two
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routes: first, get Gross back on board and find out who “fixed” him; second, bring criminal
charges where possible against the cops who enjoyed dismissals in the big case. McDonald was
partially successful on the first route because Gross would resume his cooperation and testify at
administrative hearings against police, but McDonald never proved any sort of witness
tampering relating to Gross. The second route was also partially successful for McDonald. At
least four of the defendants who had dismissals in the big case were prosecuted and convicted on
other charges.116 An example was the case against Captain Joseph Workman.
By early 1951, McDonald had developed the major investigative strategy that did not rely
on Harry Gross’s cooperation. Under a provision of the city charter, all New York City
employees were required to testify if called before a grand jury or trial. They could be fired for
noncompliance.117 McDonald drafted a twenty-three-page questionnaire that asked for details
about personal finances going back six years. Some five hundred police officers received the
questionnaires and were required to fill them out under penalty of job loss or discipline.118 Some
officers received their questionnaires when they were actually summoned before the grand jury.
In addition, police officers were required to waive immunity before the grand jury before
testifying. That is, they would not receive the otherwise automatic assurance that their testimony
could not be used against them. Some legal issues arose over whether officers who were
suspended or who had resigned could be subject to all of the coercive requirements.119
Captain Joseph Workman joined the NYPD in 1925. He filled out one of D.A.
McDonald’s questionnaires in January 1951 and he appeared before the grand jury. Within a
month, he resigned from the department.120 By doing so, Workman joined hundreds of officers
who resigned because of pressure from the investigation.121 Officers who retired might have
wanted to protect their pensions, felt that prosecutors would be less interested in retired cops, or
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hoped to avoid the testimonial requirements applied to city employees. In his questionnaire
submitted to the grand jury, among other points, Workman swore that he did not own personal
property valued in excess of $500 (approximately $4,500 in today’s dollars).122
Workman’s grand jury testimony sat unused like extra ammunition for prosecutors while
he was indicted in May 1951 as one of the twenty-one defendants in the big case. The indictment
alleged that Harry Gross met with Workman in 1947 in the captain’s office of the 70th Precinct
near Ocean Parkway in Brooklyn, where they agreed that Workman would receive one hundred
dollars per month for every bookmaking parlor in the precinct. The relationship between the two
men was so unusual, and Gross’s influence was so widespread, that Workman allegedly asked
for Grossman’s help in having a particular police officer (one of the co-conspirators) transferred
to the plainclothes unit. Perhaps even more unusual was the allegation that Workman asked for
Grossman’s assistance in getting Workman’s daughter admitted to Sweet Brier College in
Virginia.123 In any event, those allegations against Workman were lost in the dismissal of the big
case in September 1951.
McDonald quickly turned back to Workman’s questionnaire and grand jury testimony. A
fourteen-count perjury indictment returned in December 1951 charged that Workman lied to the
grand jury when he swore to the accuracy of his questionnaire responses, when his responses
overlooked, among other things, $9,430 in jewelry and $5,280 in furs.124 Workman’s lawyer
failed to have the indictment dismissed because of supposed deficiencies in how he was sworn
for the grand jury and other technical objections.125 The allegations did not allege corruption,
only that Workman actually owned substantially more in personal assets than he swore to.
Prosecutors spiced up evidence of what Workman actually owned with testimony from a young
woman—a “redhead,” according to press headlines. In an example of the niceties of the time, she
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was allowed to testify without giving her name in the public record. Instead, she whispered her
name to Workman’s attorney. The jurors considered her testimony about how Workman paid to
furnish her Manhattan apartment and gave her jewelry, and they convicted Workman of two
counts of perjury.126
Judge Leibowitz offered Workman “every consideration” in sentencing if he were to
cooperate with the D.A.’s office.127 Workman declined the offer. Leibowitz, never one to mince
words, criticized Workman as a “Judas Iscariot who has betrayed his trust and a moral leper of
the worst kind,” and imposed the maximum sentence of two and a half to five years.128 Workman
stayed out on bail until gaining a reversal of the conviction on appeal on June 1, 1953. Several
counts of the indictment had been withdrawn by Judge Leibowitz before the case went to the
jury, but the jury had already heard evidence relevant to those counts. The Appellate Division
decided that some of the evidence was prejudicial to the defendant, particularly noting the
evidence about furnishing the girlfriend’s apartment.129
Workman’s second trial began on December 1, 1953. Judge Leibowitz did not preside
over the case for reasons explained in neither press accounts nor court opinions. The new judge,
Seward Bodine, came on temporary assignment from Seneca County, which is some two
hundred miles from Brooklyn. It would seem likely that an assignment judge took the case away
from Leibowitz, or Leibowitz recused himself, after the reversal for judicial error and
Leibowitz’s intemperate remarks about the defendant.130
Workman testified at the second trial. At times tearful, he tried to explain his
questionnaire and his grand jury testimony with stories that included his wife receiving gifts of
jewelry from her wealthy sister and other jewelry being lost to burglars.131 The new jury
convicted Workman of perjury after only three hours of deliberation. Judge Bodine sentenced
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Workman to the same two and a half to five years that Leibowitz had imposed, but without the
bombastic berating of the defendant.132 Workman again gained bail pending appeal based on the
issue that a chart displayed at trial that listed furs and jewelry had not been accepted into
evidence. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, as did the New York State Court of
Appeals.133 No issues arose about the constitutional propriety of the “perjury trap” set essentially
by coercing Workman to answer the questionnaire, waive immunity, and testify before the grand
jury. On January 15, 1955, Workman surrendered to be transported to serve his sentence at Sing
Sing.134 He was the highest-ranking police official to be convicted in the scandal. Neither of the
inspectors indicted and dismissed in the big case faced other criminal charges.

Conclusions
Although the Gross era was the only cyclical scandal that did not involve an independent
investigative commission, some types of outcomes seemed unchanged. In prior scandals, the
prosecutors (almost always the Manhattan D.A.) handled the cases that had been directly referred
by, or at least reviewed by, the particular commission. Brooklyn D.A. McDonald investigated
and developed his own cases that his office prosecuted with neither the assistance nor hindrance
of a commission. Yet, despite being in full control of the decision-making process, he still fell
victim to the dangers of trying to build a case around a problematic witness. McDonald
misplaced his confidence in Harry Gross because Gross was articulate, had an extraordinary
memory, and his testimony could have been bolstered by wiretaps and other corroborative
evidence to overcome his lack of credibility. Earlier prosecutors in cyclical scandals might have
complained about the commissions saddling them with bad trial witnesses, but McDonald picked
his witness and ended up with the worst trial experience of any of the prosecutors.
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The other cyclical scandals featured the investigative commissions being able to call
witnesses for public hearings and ultimately to issue a report that summarized the corruption
findings. McDonald’s commissionless investigation seemed to strive for similar results. While
McDonald called many police officers before the grand jury, their testimony usually remained
secret as required by law unless they were indicted on perjury charges. How McDonald drafted
the indictment in the big case evaded some of the grand jury secretiveness; the unusual step of
naming fifty-six unindicted co-conspirators essentially disclosed that the grand jury had heard
evidence of their corruption. The large number and varied ranks of the co-conspirators clearly
suggested systemic corruption, which is a big picture often not shown well by the case-by-case
approach of criminal prosecutions.
As for the lack of a final commission report, the Brooklyn D.A. tried to make up for that
by issuing a 121-page report that summarized most aspects of the investigation from December
1949 to April 1954.135 As thorough as it might have appeared, however, the report was still a
prosecutor’s report describing a grand jury investigation, so it lacked the wider perspective of an
independent commission. The report and the investigation it described had extraordinary impact
on the city and the police department—the mayor and police commissioner resigned, hundreds of
cops resigned or were dismissed, hundreds of other cops were transferred, and dozens were
prosecuted. But the prosecutor-led investigation did not force administrative reforms in the
police department that might avoid the next corruption scandal.
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Chapter 7
The Knapp Commission–Era Scandal

It’s one thing to accuse a policeman of corruption, and another thing to prove it.
—Edward Kiernan, president of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association,
commenting on early published allegations of police corruption in 19701

By 1970, New York City had already skidded down much of the “long slide” described
by George Lankevich.2 The Brooklyn Eagle, famed for triggering the previous police scandal,
suspended publication because of a strike by workers in January 1955, and then closed
completely a few months later. The New York Giants and the Brooklyn Dodgers of professional
baseball’s National League deserted the city in 1957. Pennsylvania Station, one of the most
admired buildings in America, was demolished in 1963. The city’s one million manufacturing
jobs in 1950, already down from wartime levels, plummeted by 50 percent in the next twenty
years.3 The city looked down-and-out. Columnist Murray Kempton observed, “The faces of New
York remind me of people who played a game and lost.”4
Perhaps, the city’s decline gave the electorate a perception of less leeway for public
corruption, and the city’s top political officials seemed to become more professional and fit for
office. Vincent Impellitteri served ably as mayor, although for only one elected term.
Impellitteri’s position as city council president made him acting mayor in 1950 following
William O’Dwyer’s resignation in the last police scandal, and then he won election as a thirdparty candidate later that same year. In 1950 Tammany Hall had a new boss in Carmine
DeSapio, who tried to help the aging political organization maintain power by inching away
from its corruption-soaked and mob-influenced roots. Tammany successfully sponsored Robert
Wagner, Jr. as the Democratic candidate for mayor in 1953. Wagner served three terms largely
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untainted by scandal, perhaps made easier because all of his terms fell between the cyclical
police scandals that had undermined several of his predecessors. Tammany’s move toward
somewhat better government, however, did not prevent its loss of power. In 1961, Mayor
Wagner felt sufficiently emboldened in his reelection campaign to openly break with DeSapio
and Tammany. DeSapio went on to lose to reformer Ed Koch for the leadership position in
DeSapio’s home district of Greenwich Village. By the time of the next police scandal, the
political landscape had shifted so much that city voters no longer had the option to vote
Tammany out of office.
The city had changed in extraordinary ways when Mayor Wagner declined to run for a
fourth term in 1965. While Wagner was in office, some eight hundred thousand non-Hispanic
white residents left the city.5 The housing they left behind largely turned over to black and
Puerto Rican residents; the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 continued quotas that restricted
immigration that might have opened the city more widely to other populations. The city’s
difficult transformation strained fiscal resources and sparked racial tensions among residents
over school desegregation and other issues. Set off by the fatal police shooting of an African
American youngster in July 1964, Harlem became the scene of America’s first major urban riot
of the 1960s. Although Los Angeles, Cleveland, Newark, and other cities would later have much
larger disturbances, the summer of 1964 in Harlem showed that New York was susceptible to the
urban “long, hot summer” like any American city. Fears of more civil disturbances led some city
officials to take no action on allegations of police corruption because a corruption investigation
might alienate the police department, the city’s line of defense.6
Hollywood recognized the appeal of New York’s deterioration. The film Death Wish
depicted a dangerous city in which feral criminals committed atrocities that drove a businessman
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to a vigilante rampage.7 Closer to the scandal, the story of one of the whistle-blower cops
became the movie Serpico. The dirty and chaotic city shown in the film was a fitting home for
the story’s corrupt police department.8 Even the lighthearted comedy The Out-of-Towners built
its humor on the city being so out of control that it could deliver neither basic services nor
personal safety.9
While the nearly all-white police force fumbled in handling race relations, the department
seemed unable to face the challenges of the changing city on multiple fronts. An epidemic of
heroin use hit the city’s minority residents in the 1960s.10 Crime soared. The 390 recorded
homicides in New York City in 1960 climbed to 1,444 in 1970, the year that the police scandal
broke.11 The massive scandal painted the police as corrupt, in addition to the unmistakable
indicators of residential flight and crime increases suggesting the department’s ineffectiveness in
protecting the city. The city’s fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s caused layoffs of thousands of
police, and cops took to the streets in disruptive protests that did little to enhance the image of
their order-keeping function. With the cyclical scandal and its aftermath, the NYPD hit the low
point of its history.

The Triggering Event
Lardner and Repetto assert that a “chance meeting” between two young cops in 1966 “set
the process in motion” for the 1970s police scandal.12 The cops were David Durk and Frank
Serpico, and they met when both were assigned in January 1966 to a training program at the
police academy. While Lardner and Repetto are correct that the Durk-Serpico meeting set a
process in motion, the true triggering event (more consistent with Parkhurst’s sermon,
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Rosenthal’s murder, Rothstein’s murder, and the Brooklyn Eagle’s exposé) would not occur until
April 1970.
David Durk did not fit the stereotypes of a New York cop. He was Jewish, the son of a
Manhattan doctor, and educated at the highly selective Stuyvesant High School and graduated
from Amherst College. After a year of Columbia Law School, he joined the police department in
1963. His productive police work and education allowed him to rise in the ranks of the
department, but his refusal to accept payoffs cast him as an outsider and he was shuttled between
assignments by untrusting superiors. By early 1966, the assignment shuffle took Durk to
plainclothes training and his encounter with Frank Serpico.13
Although Serpico cultivated the image of the eccentric outsider, his background in
coming to the police department was quite conventional. He grew up in a working-class Italian
American family in Brooklyn and graduated from a Catholic high school before enlisting for
service with the army in Korea. He picked up some credits at Brooklyn College and did private
security work before joining the police department in 1959. Serpico’s first assignment at a
precinct in Brooklyn exposed him to lower-level police corruption: free lunches from delis, free
liquor from bars, bribe offers from motorists, and sleeping on the job. His transfer to plainclothes
duty in January 1966 led to his fuller immersion in exotic undercover disguises and an
unconventional lifestyle and to his exposure to more serious police corruption.14
Peter Maas’s biography Serpico described the interaction between Durk and Serpico,
although the relationship was essentially stricken from the movie adaptation, perhaps for
narrative purposes. In contrast to the scruffy, excitable Serpico, the conservatively dressed Durk
was smooth and articulate. Durk also had political connections that might have aided his rise in
the department. In particular, Durk developed a friendship with Jay Kriegel, a fellow Amherst
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alumnus and a high-ranking advisor to Mayor John Lindsey. Durk also gained a desirable
assignment to the city’s Department of Investigation. After Serpico received an unwanted cash
payoff in 1966, he was optimistic that contacting Durk would begin productive steps against the
police corruption that both men abhorred. Both were disappointed, however, when a captain in
the Department of Investigation declined to start an investigation and instead advised Serpico to
forget about the payoff.15 Their meeting with Arnold Fraiman, commissioner of the Department
of Investigation, was similarly unproductive, apparently through a combination of Fraiman’s
reluctance to rock political boats and his belief that Serpico was, at best, unreliable.16
When Durk tried to play his city-hall card, the results were even more frustrating. His
friend Jay Kriegel, who had become Mayor Lindsay’s chief of staff, met with both Durk and
Serpico in 1967. Kriegel initially voiced support for taking anticorruption steps, but then
expressed concerns about alienating the police department. Mayor Lindsay’s national reputation
depended on keeping New York riot free—the Harlem disturbance in 1964 had not occurred on
Lindsay’s watch. Roiling the police department might upset New York’s remaining levels of
urban peace. Kriegel strung Durk along for a couple of years with no action from the mayor’s
office.17 When John Lindsay died in 2010, the ever-loyal Kriegel wrote glowingly of Lindsay’s
success in avoiding a major riot in New York, and of how Lindsay took steps toward a civilian
review board and reducing police use of force, but he omitted any mention of the police
corruption scandal that exploded under Lindsay.18
Serpico did manage to attract some limited investigative and prosecutorial attention to his
complaints of corruption in the 7th Division in the South Bronx. The circumstances highlighted
the difficulties that many people had in dealing with Serpico. Further, the circumstances showed
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the importance of the triggering event in the broader scandal because the Serpico-based 7th
Division cases might have come and gone like countless other small cases of police corruption.
In Serpico’s vice-related undercover work he declined his share of payoffs, but he did not
want to inform on the cops he worked with. He had an informal conversation with the rackets
chief of the Bronx D.A.’s office and contacted a police captain whom he believed to be honest.
The plodding, reluctant anticorruption mechanisms of the police department began to move,
slightly. Serpico gave information about the corruption of his street-level partners, although he
pleaded for an investigation into the corruption of higher-ups in the department. At police
headquarters, the first deputy commissioner heard some of the allegations and decided that the
investigation should stay in the Bronx rather than expanding.19 Serpico finally met with Burton
Roberts, the aggressive and blustery Bronx district attorney. Serpico and Roberts grated on each
other. Serpico complained that only “flunky cops” were targeted and balked at fully cooperating,
but he finally testified before a Bronx grand jury in June 1968.20 Roberts put cops before the
grand jury under grants of limited immunity, asked questions about gambling enforcement, and
ultimately charged eight cops of the 7th Division with perjury in June 1969.21 The underlying
activity of the charged cops was essentially the same that Serpico had previously reported to the
uninterested Commissioner Fraiman of the Department of Investigation. The cases garnered
minor headlines and most of the prosecutions were unsuccessful. D.A. Roberts blamed Serpico.22
With no citywide jurisdiction, no investigative commission, and no significant exposure
of wider corruption, the Bronx prosecutions of the 7th Division cases might have been the extent
of the police scandal if Durk had not pursued one last option. He maintained some contact with
reporters from the New York Times and increased the contact with David Burnham, the new
police reporter for the newspaper. Durk regularly met with Burnham for months, spent days at
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Burnham’s desk at the Times, and tried to urge exposure of higher-level corruption. But the Grey
Lady seemed hesitant to walk down the street of gritty investigative reporting, particularly where
the results might reflect badly on the favored Mayor Lindsay. Finally, Durk reassured Times
editors with a corruption show-and-tell from six persons: himself, Serpico, Inspector Paul Delise,
and three other cops who have remained anonymous.23 The Times decided to go with the story.
Burnham’s page 1 story (“Graft Paid to Police Here Said to Run into Millions”) ran on
Saturday, April 25, 1970.24 Robert Daley wrote that the story was “like a basketball dropped
from a great height” because it kept bouncing and bouncing, that is, having continued effects on
the city, public officials, and the police department.25 The story criticized Fraiman, Kriegel, and
others previously contacted by Serpico for inaction when they received reports of corruption.
Burnham wrote of corruption “woven into the very fabric of the policemen’s professional life”
and described well-organized gambling-related payoffs and less structured narcotics-based
payoffs. In addition, payoffs from bodegas, construction companies, and liquor venues were
routine. Although no sources were named in the story, many of the allegations were quite
specific. Over a year later, in perhaps the most fitting recognition of Burnham’s story as the
triggering event, the first words of the body of the Knapp Commission Report were, “On April
25, 1970, The New York Times printed a story presenting lengthy and detailed accusations of
widespread corruption in the Police Department.”26

The Response
There was no doubt that NYPD corruption in 1970 was headed to a commission-level
investigation due to the prominence of the New York Times and the distressing nature of the
corruption allegations. In addition, Mayor Lindsey was not beholden to a political machine that

217

he needed to protect and keeping his head in the sand about police corruption no longer served
the city or his presidential ambitions. Mayor Lindsay had learned in advance of Burnham’s
pending exposé. In an obvious attempt to take some sting out of the allegations, Lindsay
appointed the Rankin Committee just two days ahead of the story. Lee Rankin, corporation
counsel for the city, headed the committee. Other members included police commissioner
Howard Leary, Bronx D.A. Roberts, and Manhattan D.A. Frank Hogan. Lindsay initially stuck
with this in-house investigative approach despite serious criticism. Rankin tried to defend the
decision by claiming that an outside, independent commission would lack needed expertise.
After the first meeting of his committee, he stated, “I don’t think that an outside committee,
having no familiarity (with the problem) could do the work with the same skill and effect
required of us.”27 State Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz publicly agreed with Rankin and
stated that the committee was “a panel of outstanding people who I am sure will do a thorough
job.”28 A couple of weeks after the committee’s formation, Lindsay optimistically claimed that
he looked forward to the committee’s first report.29
Lindsay seriously miscalculated in his attempt to head off the scandal with the
preemptive appointment of the committee. A growing chorus of public officials called for a
stronger response to the allegations in reporter Burnham’s stories.30 On May 14, 1970, after
holding four meetings in its three-week existence, the Rankin Committee sent a long public letter
to the mayor. The committee made some sensible recommendations, such as changes in the
pension rights for cops under investigation and the manner in which cops might report corrupt
activities without reprisals. The existing business-as-usual in the city’s administration of police
must have been to avoid attempting reforms because those sensible recommendations seemed
easy to produce when the pressure turned up a bit. In any event, the real bombshell in the May 14
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letter was that the Rankin Committee declared itself inadequate to tackle police corruption and
recommended that Mayor Lindsay disband the committee.31
The fledgling committee’s exit was certainly no surprise to the mayor. Police
Commissioner Leary did not even attend what would the committee’s last meeting as he had
become the most obvious example of the conflicts of interest in the committee. Word leaked
from city hall that the mayor would appoint a different body to investigate police corruption. 32
Congressman Ed Koch urged that Lindsay support the appointment of a state-wide commission
by Governor Nelson Rockefeller to examine police corruption.33 Instead, just as he did a month
earlier, Lindsay used an executive order to appoint a five-member investigative panel. He did
pursue two important changes to address critics: first, appointees would serve on a full-time basis
in order to devote enough attention to their task and second, appointees would not be law
enforcement officials to avoid conflicts of interest.34 The blue-blooded mayor did not need to
descend down the social ladder to find his commission chairman. Percy Whitman Knapp (he
stopped using his first name before college) was listed in the Social Register and collected his
education at the Dwight School, Choate, Yale, and Harvard.35 Although he lived in Greenwich
Village, he managed to pursue his favorite sports of skiing and horseback riding.36
The formal name of what became known as the Knapp Commission was the Commission
to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City’s Anti-Corruption Procedures.
Joining Chairman Knapp as commissioners were attorneys Arnold Bauman, Franklin Thomas,
and Cyrus Vance. The only nonattorney was Joseph Monserrat of the city’s board of education.
Thomas, an African American, and Monserrat, who was Hispanic, added what was considered
diversity at the time for the all-male commission. At the mayor’s request, the city council later
granted subpoena power to the commission, and the Board of Estimate provided funding.37 The
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commission successfully fended off a challenge to its legality filed, predictably, by the
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association.38
Knapp did not let his well-mannered upbringing stop him from occasionally stepping on
toes. At an unplanned session with reporters on July 30, 1970, just minutes after Knapp and the
other commissioners were sworn in at the mayor’s office, Knapp opined that his commission
would do a better job of investigating the police than the city’s district attorneys. He explained
that the district attorneys relied on the NYPD on a day-to-day basis, and that this reliance was an
“inhibitive factor” that disrupted investigations of police.39 As true as that observation might
have been, the district attorneys bristled. Knapp’s comments appeared to have been impromptu,
but he scarcely could have planned a better way to wave a red flag in front of the prosecutors.
The district attorneys would soon go on a binge of prosecuting cops to an extent never seen
before or since in the city.
Knapp made some key decisions early in the process. First, he hired Michael Armstrong
as chief counsel for the commission. Armstrong had a prosecutorial background that included
directing complex investigations as the head of the fraud unit in the United States Attorney’s
Office for the Southern District of New York. Second, Knapp hired about one dozen field
investigators, most of whom had experience as federal investigators. These positions would
allow the commission to engage in proactive investigations, rather than just reviewing police
reports and escorting witnesses to hearings, and drawing staff from outside of the NYPD gave
the investigation greater independence. The commission’s single investigator with an NYPD
patrol background resigned soon after being hired.40
The Knapp Commission was not the only anticorruption response stirred by the triggering
event. The city’s somnambulant Department of Investigation gained some vigor with the 1969
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appointment of Robert Ruskin to replace Arnold Fraiman, the commissioner who had ignored
Frank Serpico.41 While the Knapp Commission was still ramping up in August 1970, Ruskin
moved aggressively against three cops believed to be extorting money from midtown businesses.
When the cops gave evasive responses to questioning by the Department of Investigation, Ruskin
moved to have them held in civil contempt. The court rebuffed Ruskin’s efforts, however,
because the Department of Investigation lacked authority to grant immunity to the cops, so the
contempt proceeding violated the officers’ Fifth Amendment rights.42
Even the NYPD tried to at least give the appearance of moving aggressively against
police misconduct. In August 1970, as part of an investigation into whether a police detective
sold confidential information to private parties, the Department of Investigation forwarded a
memo to the NYPD with a list of officers who appeared to be employed by a private security
company. Embattled NYPD Commissioner Howard Leary moved quickly. Seventeen cops,
including one captain and several detectives, were reassigned or demoted as they were brought
up on departmental charges for failing to obtain permission to hold off-duty jobs.43 As Leary
tried to show that the NYPD could clean its own house, he complained bitterly that the Knapp
Commission would become a McCarthyesque smear campaign against the department.44
In early September 1970, while the Knapp Commission was still getting off the ground,
Leary quit his post as police commissioner. He never submitted a letter of resignation; he simply
stopped showing up. As reports of his resignation leaked out, the NYPD was silent because
Leary was gone and nobody had been authorized to act as the commissioner.45 Leary’s four years
as commissioner were turbulent, marked by crime increases, synagogue bombings, sniper attacks
on police, police dissention and demonstrations, civilian review board controversies, and even
the bombing of police headquarters.46 With the Knapp Commission looming, Leary’s quasi-
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resignation may have signaled that he had simply had enough. His bitterness showed when he
tried to dodge subpoena service and then gave grudging, unhelpful testimony to the
commission.47 He later became a criminal justice professor in New Jersey.48
The Knapp Commission’s revealing investigations, dramatic hearings, and impactful
report might have given an impression of the commission as a powerful machine that
methodically plowed through all issues of police corruption. In fact, the commission’s very
existence was touch-and-go at times, its investigations struggled, and presenting compelling live
witnesses was difficult. Commission counsel Michael Armstrong recalled his early frustration as
investigative efforts mostly turned up only minor offenses. Commission attorney Nick Scoppetta
cultivated the important cooperation of Detective Robert Leuci (later the title character of the
book and movie Prince of the City), but federal prosecutors wanted to keep Leuci working
undercover instead of testifying in public hearings.49 The commission gained the cooperation of
a cop caught red-handed taking a payoff, but he so deteriorated under the pressure of the
situation that the commission decided he was unusable at public hearings.50 The commission’s
initial funding and subpoena authority only extended to the end of 1970, and the combination of
budget restraints and underlying political opposition made continued city funding unlikely.
Mayor Lindsay was so confident of the short life of the commission that when he filled the
vacant police commissioner position he assured candidate Patrick Murphy, “By the New Year,
you won’t have it looking over your shoulder.”51
Mayor Lindsay swore in Murphy as police commissioner on October 9, 1970, about one
month after the quasi-resignation of Howard Leary, who did not attend the swearing-in of his
successor.52 Murphy later described a disturbing connection between on-going police corruption
and the sporadic criminal prosecutions of police in the 1960s. He concluded that police
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corruption had continued largely because the department declined to address it administratively.
He placed much of the blame at the doorstep of John Walsh, the long-serving first deputy police
commissioner. Rather than tackling administrative reforms that might have directly attacked
corruption, Walsh would occasionally feed corruption cases to be prosecuted by Manhattan D.A.
Frank Hogan. Murphy credited Walsh with high personal integrity, and praised Hogan for his
willingness to prosecute cops, but Murphy saw the relationship as one that empowered Walsh for
“striking at a small, unpredictable fraction of the corruption cases coming to his attention while
the core of the problem remained unaddressed.”53 Murphy obtained Walsh’s resignation.
Contrary to the mayor’s prediction, the Knapp Commission continued past the New Year
into 1971. With city funding unavailable, the commission applied for a grant from the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the U.S. Department of Justice. The grant
funded the commission for another six months. At the urging of Mayor Lindsay and Police
Commissioner Murphy, the city council also extended the commission’s subpoena power.
Although Murphy continued to have the Knapp Commission looking over his shoulder,
he managed to use it to his advantage. He believed that the changes needed in the NYPD were
unattainable if pursued only by his own reform-minded administration, however forceful and
well intended it might be. The institution of the NYPD was simply too entrenched and resistant
to change. So Murphy invoked Knapp as a sword of Damocles, as Murphy later described, to
prod his commanders to address corruption problems before possible exposure by Knapp that
would cause embarrassment or worse. To one recalcitrant borough commander Murphy intoned,
“It’s you who’s going down the tubes on this corruption business, not me. It’s a new ball
game.”54 The Knapp Commission gave Murphy cover for departmental reforms: grumbling cops
could believe that Murphy was only doing what he had to do because of Knapp pressures. While
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Murphy later conceded that he “desperately needed” the commission, he was a bit dismissive of
Whitman Knapp and Mike Armstrong as “newcomers” who were excited to talk about cops in
the sanctuary of the Yale Club.55 Whatever the motivation, Murphy’s shake-up of the NYPD’s
anticorruption apparatus would be so swift and thorough that the Knapp Commission had to
conduct a second round of interviews of police supervisors assigned to anticorruption positions
because Murphy had changed all of the officers as well as most of the procedures.56
The Knapp Commission seemed particularly proud of having gained the cooperation of a
number of police officers. Regarding the possibility of a corrupt cop openly describing his
activities and knowledge, the report asserted, “We were informed by people experienced in
police work that no police officer had ever given such information and that none ever would,
even if he himself were caught in a corrupt act and were offered immunity in exchange for his
testimony. The tradition of the policeman’s code of silence was so strong, we were advised, that
it was futile to expect such testimony from any police officer. The most that could be expected
was anonymous information or, if we were extremely lucky, testimony given under oath on an
anonymous basis.”57 The report’s assertion was misleading. Captain Max Schmittberger testified
about his own corruption and the corruption of other cops before the Lexow Committee in 1894,
and a small number of other cops cooperated during the Curran- and Gross-era scandals.58
Regardless of the historical context, the report boasted of having gained cooperation from
five corrupt cops. The cooperating cops were a mixed bag. Most prominent was Robert Leuci
(the “Prince of the City”) who knew of corruption in the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) of the
Narcotics Division, but he did little direct work for the Knapp Commission and never testified at
the public hearings because the U.S. Attorney’s offices in Manhattan and Brooklyn needed him
for continued undercover work. Like Frank Serpico, Leuci resented that the Knapp Commission
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focused only on cops and ignored corruption elsewhere in the justice system.59 Of less
importance, and never memorialized by Hollywood, was Waverly Logan. Finding Logan did not
take much effort by the commission: he had already been dismissed from the department and had
spoken about corruption with a reporter on television. Logan could not be used in any active
investigative role, but gave believable testimony at the public hearings about routine, low-level
corruption.60 Edward Droge was another cop involved in low-level corruption, a “grass-eater”
instead of a “meat-eater,” to use the terms popularized by the commission proceedings.61
Commission investigators caught Droge through a recording made by a drug defendant who was
supposed to pay cash to him. Droge was already on leave from the department to attend school,
so his cooperation was limited to providing information and public testimony instead of acting
undercover.62 The other cooperating grass-eater was Al Jannotta, the cop mentioned above who
could not be used to testify.63 He would be convicted at trial for taking thirty dollars from a tow
truck operator.64
The commission’s fifth cooperating corrupt cop was Bill Phillips. Phillips’s story is one
of the most remarkable in NYPD history. A true meat-eater, Phillips spent fourteen years on the
force engaging in almost unrelenting corruption by extorting gamblers, businesses, and
prostitutes, although he claimed that he never took the “dirty” money of payoffs related to guns
or narcotics. The commission heard of Phillips from a civilian informant who reported that
prostitute Xaviera Hollander (soon to be famous as the “Happy Hooker”) paid off Phillips.
Commission investigators caught Phillips on tape in recordings made by the cooperating
civilian.65 After he decided to help himself, Phillips became the commission’s star cooperator.
Smooth and glib, he successfully worked undercover and then dazzled the press and public as the
first police witness at the commission’s public hearings. After his work for the commission, he
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became the central witness in a series of perjury cases against cops (described below) brought by
the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. The commission’s report effusively
praised Phillips’s cooperation for nearly seven pages, citing his “ingenuity” and “courage.”66 The
report, however, included a footnote stating that Phillips was indicted in New York County for a
double homicide that occurred in 1968. Sticking with the pro-Phillips tone, the footnote also
stated that the case was tried to a hung jury that was ten to two in favor of acquittal, and a retrial
was scheduled. After the report was filed, Phillips was convicted and received a sentence of
twenty-five years to life that was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Decades later, Mike
Armstrong continued to believe that Phillips was innocent, possibly framed as retaliation for his
cooperation. He blamed the conviction in the retrial on Phillips having an ineffective defense
attorney.67 Phillips obtained parole in 2007.68
While the commission’s televised hearings had the biggest impact on the public, the
biggest impact on prosecutors and on the role of criminal prosecution in anticorruption efforts
came in the commission’s recommendation for establishing the position of a special state
prosecutor. Knapp’s casual remark in July 1970 shortly after creation of the commission about
the problems of district attorneys in prosecuting cops seemed to become a guiding principle in
the commission’s final report in December 1972. The report stated, “A basic weakness in the
present approaches to the problem of police corruption is that all agencies regularly involved
with the problem rely primarily on policemen to do their investigative work. . . . The District
Attorneys in the five counties . . . depend primarily on policemen to conduct investigations.”69
The commission concluded that police officers and civilians did not report matters of police
corruption to district attorneys because they distrusted those offices to handle corruption cases
and, even worse, feared retaliation for having made such reports. The commission held itself out
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as a model because it was staffed with investigators who were not members of the NYPD. In
addition, the special prosecutor would have to be a state position because a city office could not
adequately target corrupt officials who might hold noncity positions. Perhaps as a nod to the
concerns voiced by Frank Serpico, Robert Leuci, and others, the commission recommended that
the special prosecutor be authorized to investigate “anyone involved in the criminal process,” not
just cops.70
Further, the commission wanted the special state prosecutor position created
immediately. To accomplish this and to avoid any delay that might be caused by review of the
proposal by meddlesome elected state legislators, the commission suggested that Governor
Rockefeller issue an executive order for the creation of the position of a Special Deputy Attorney
General within the New York State Attorney General’s Office with “jurisdiction in the five
counties of the City and authority to investigate and prosecute all crimes involving corruption in
the criminal process.”71
As far reaching as the commission’s recommendation for a special state prosecutor might
have seemed, Governor Rockefeller took it even further. The commission wanted a special
prosecutor with authority to investigate, convene a grand jury, issue subpoenas, and take cases to
court, but the main function would be to oversee the district attorneys, who would retain their
primary authority over corruption matters.72 The special prosecutor would use his full
prosecutorial authority sparingly, such as when there might be a jurisdictional conflict between
district attorneys. Rockefeller instead chose an option proposed, according to Armstrong, by the
governor’s aide, Maurice Nadjari. The Nadjari model had the special prosecutor as a large
agency that would take the lead in all matters of corruption in the city. Conveniently, Rockefeller
named Nadjari as the first special prosecutor.73
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Two points stand out in the creation of the special prosecutor. First, according to
Armstrong’s account, the intense three-day session that resulted in the Nadjari plan was a huddle
between Knapp, Armstrong, the state attorney general, and several high-level state officials. The
district attorneys, who were supposed to be the first line of corruption fighting according to the
supposed preferences of the Knapp Commission, were not part of the discussion. The district
attorneys were angry over the many months of perceived slights coming from the Knapp
Commission’s formation and proceedings. In the process that led to choosing the Nadjari model,
if it had seemed that the Knapp Commission had already thrown the district attorneys under the
bus, then the Rockefeller administration backed the bus over them a few times.
Second, clear alternatives existed to the Nadjari model. The commission’s more modest
preference for a special prosecutor was one. For another, after receiving the preliminary Knapp
Commission report, Mayor Lindsay proposed appointment of a statewide criminal justice
commissioner who would have authority to investigate and monitor, but not to prosecute. Not
surprisingly, the Lindsay proposal was in line with the preferences of the city’s five district
attorneys. The district attorneys had all met with Lindsay and spoke of a similar proposal for a
statewide auditor for criminal justice matters. Lindsay also contended that the state “recklessly
abused and distorted” its concern about corruption in the city while ignoring possible corruption
elsewhere in the state.74 Lindsay’s complaint harkened back to the earlier cyclical police
scandals, particularly to the appointment of the Lexow and Curran Committees, when city
Democrats believed that upstate Republicans tried to score partisan political points under the
guise of fighting corruption in the city.75
The Knapp Commission had its greatest effect on the prosecution of police corruption by
creating a strong, well-funded (some would say abusive and overfunded) special prosecutor. That
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development infuriated the sitting district attorneys and spurred them to greater action on
prosecuting police corruption. The Knapp Commission greatly influenced prosecutors in other
areas as well. The proactive investigations conducted by the commission by using street
informants and undercover operations raised the bar for how aggressively prosecutors should
pursue their investigations. The publicity-savvy commission made sure that the public knew the
results of the investigations, so the district attorneys wanted to appear to be keeping up for the
sake of their egos and reelection prospects. With the fading of Tammany Hall by the 1970s, the
district attorneys likely had to be concerned more with public opinion and less with political
bosses than the DAs of earlier scandal eras. Earlier prosecutors might have brushed aside
demands for action on police corruption if they were secure in what mattered more: Tammany
support. In addition to leading by investigative example, the Knapp Commission also directly
referred many cases to the district attorneys. Those cases could not be swept under the rug, if that
option even entered the thoughts of the newly fired-up D.A.s.

The Prosecutors
Particularly in comparison with the earlier cyclical scandals, the Knapp-era scandal
produced so many prosecutions by so many different offices that the circumstances and
personalities of the particular prosecutors seemed to matter less. Everybody was prosecuting
cops. Nevertheless, three of the prosecutors stand out: Manhattan D.A. Frank Hogan, Bronx D.A.
Burton Roberts, and Special State Prosecutor Maurice Nadjari.
Frank Hogan is still held in high regard as the model of the modern urban prosecutor,
although he became a prosecutor almost by happenstance, never made his reputation in the
courtroom, and flopped when he tried for other positions. Hogan grew up in modest
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circumstances, wanted to play professional baseball, and then switched to newspaper reporting
and studied journalism at Columbia University. After graduation, he decided that a legal career
would pay better than newspaper reporting, so he returned to Columbia to attend law school,
where he did not distinguish himself, even failing criminal law. Private practice was difficult in
the Depression, but Hogan caught the eye of Thomas Dewey. When Dewey assembled a staff in
1935 after being appointed as a special prosecutor investigating organized crime, he hired
Hogan. Dewey assured that Hogan would spend more time in the office than in the courtroom by
appointing him as the administrative assistant after Dewey’s election as district attorney in 1937.
When Dewey, a Republican, ran for governor in 1941, he recommended four people who might
succeed him as district attorney. Hogan was the only Democrat on Dewey’s list, Tammany Hall
decided to back him, and Hogan was elected D.A. at the age of thirty-nine.76
Hogan built his reputation on his low-key professional management style. The prestige of
being a prosecutor in Manhattan attracted highly qualified applicants, so Hogan’s longevity in
office nurtured a small army of loyalists who served under him and went on to assume
judgeships, elective office, or powerful legal positions (such as Whitman Knapp). Hogan failed
in his run for the U.S. Senate in 1958, and the 1960s brought controversial prosecutions of black
militants, campus radicals, and obscenity charges.
By 1970, some thought Hogan’s time had passed. The Knapp Commission may have
pushed for the appointment of a special prosecutor partly because Knapp thought Hogan’s
measured style was insufficiently aggressive to catch corrupt cops, and the commission may
have felt emboldened to attack the sitting district attorneys because of Hogan’s diminished
influence. Indeed, Hogan’s position as the most prominent member of the Rankin Committee did
little to keep Mayor Lindsay’s idea alive. The sinking of the Rankin Committee, the barbs
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thrown by Whitman Knapp, the commission report’s criticism of prosecutors, and the creation of
the powerful special prosecutor’s post certainly disrupted the end of Hogan’s career. Hogan
might have retired after his eighth term in office in 1973, until an unexpected primary challenge
from a man he thought unfit to be district attorney made him decide to run. He won both the
primary and election easily, but he was gravely ill. He resigned on December 26, 1973, just
weeks after his reelection, entered the hospital the next day and stayed there until his death in
April 1974.77
Burton Roberts was one of the veterans of Frank Hogan’s office. As Hogan was soft
spoken, Roberts used a voice that reached fog horn levels. Because Hogan did not require that
his assistants working under him conduct themselves in his own restrained way, Roberts
flourished as an aggressive courtroom prosecutor. After decorated service in World War II
followed by N.Y.U. Law School, he worked with Hogan from 1949 until 1966, when the Bronx
district attorney lured him north to be the chief assistant D.A. After the district attorney resigned
to pursue a judgeship, Roberts became acting district attorney, and then was elected to a full term
in 1969. Author Tom Wolfe used Roberts as the model for the testy but honorable judge Myron
Kovitsky in the novel Bonfire of the Vanities.78
Roberts’s relatively short tenure as Bronx district attorney coincided with the developing
story of the police scandal. He was an early player as the scandal unfolded because Frank
Serpico brought police corruption allegations to him. Serpico and Roberts dealt with each other
through the lenses of their mutual suspicions: Serpico figured that Roberts would never go after
corruption higher than the street-cop level, and Roberts feared that that Serpico would never
fully cooperate (make recordings) or become a believable witness. Roberts successfully
pressured Serpico to testify in the grand jury, but Serpico felt betrayed and refused to testify at
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trial when the indictment included no supervisors.79 Again, Roberts pressured him. After they
argued about whether Serpico would have to shave his beard to improve his courtroom
appearance, Serpico testified in a perjury case against Officer Robert Stanard.80 Stanard was
convicted, and Roberts pushed hard for Serpico to be promoted to detective. NYPD
Commissioner Leary called Serpico a “psycho” and declined Roberts’s request.81 Roberts’s role
shifted away from dealing with Frank Serpico to dealing with the Knapp Commission.
As the prosecutor who pursued the Serpico-inspired charges in the Bronx and as a
member of the highly criticized Rankin Committee, Roberts had particular reasons to be irritated
by the Knapp Commission, on top of his irritable nature. The commission’s final report used
statements from Roberts to make points about the inadequacies of the district attorneys as police
corruption fighters. Regarding the reliance of district attorneys on the police to conduct
investigations, the report cited an example of a police lieutenant on the Bronx D.A.’s squad who
received a report about corruption of a detective on the same squad. Instead of acting on the
corruption allegation, the lieutenant arranged a transfer of the detective. The commission’s report
printed a statement to the press by Roberts that sounded overly sympathetic to cops and soft on
corruption when he suggested that the lieutenant was “motivated by compassion for a fellow
policeman.”82 As if to suggest inconsistency in Roberts’s views, the report also quoted Roberts’s
testimony before the commission, in which he complained about a judge giving a suspended
sentence to a convicted cop after the prosecutor asked for jail time.83
When the commission’s preliminary report came out, Roberts was the most outspoken
district attorney in opposition to the proposal for a special prosecutor. Roberts predicted a
“circus” at the suggestion of even the milder model of a special prosecutor (not the stronger
model later chosen by Rockefeller). Roberts called the special prosecutor a “gimmicky super-
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D.A.” who would pull attention away from the internal anticorruption reforms needed by the
police department.84 By the time of the special prosecutor’s appointment in September 1972,
Roberts was already headed for the exit with plans to run for a judgeship in Manhattan. He was
elected in November 1972, resigned as district attorney on January 1, 1973, and began sitting as
a trial court judge the next day.85 Rumors that he had moved his base to Manhattan in order to
run to succeed Hogan as New York County D.A. did not come to pass, perhaps due to Hogan’s
decision not to retire in 1973.86
Maurice Nadjari became the dominant prosecutorial personality of the Knapp-era
scandal, which was quite an accomplishment considering that people like Frank Hogan and
Burton Roberts were in the picture. Even four decades later, when New York’s governor
considers a special prosecutor to look into corruption or policing matters, the state’s experience
with Nadjari continues to serve as a cautionary tale.87
Nadjari was another alumnus of Hogan’s D.A.’s office. He served under Hogan from
1953 to 1967, when he left to become the chief assistant D.A. in Suffolk County. Although
Hogan disagreed vehemently with the creation of the special prosecutor position, he called
Nadjari a “friend” and sounded like an old teacher patting a former student on the head when he
explained, “He was with me a good many years. He’s a good assistant.”88 Hogan’s declining
health, however, meant that his successors would have to deal with Nadjari.
By the time Nelson Rockefeller received the draft of the Knapp Commission report, it
was clear that he had settled on Nadjari to be the point man in the governor’s decisions. Nadjari
was present for the three days of meetings between Knapp, Armstrong, and the governor. In the
middle of those meetings, Rockefeller instructed Nadjari to write up a plan for the special
prosecutor’s position, and Nadjari picked an option that created the largest, strongest, and most
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richly funded special prosecutor’s office that any of the parties might have imagined.89 Nadjari’s
plan was remarkable: the budget for its first year was $4 million, which allowed the hiring of two
hundred investigators. David Burnham, creator of the scandal’s triggering event, pointed out that
the special prosecutor’s budget would amount to one-quarter of the entire spending in New York
City for the prosecution of crime.90 If Nadjari intended to step on toes, he was able to ensure that
he had heavy shoes.
Nadjari lasted in the position of special prosecutor from his appointment in September
1972 until the state attorney general appointed a successor in June 1976. Governor Hugh Carey
tried to order Nadjari’s removal in late December 1975, but Nadjari resisted by strongly
suggesting that the governor wanted to thwart investigations of political corruption, so the
attorney general (Nadjari’s actual boss) gave Nadjari six more months on the job to complete
investigations. The end of Nadjari’s tenure brought about almost mind-boggling political and
prosecutorial maneuvering. For instance, Governor Carey appointed a special state investigator
(former judge Jacob Grumen) to investigate the special prosecutor (Nadjari) regarding Nadjari’s
suggestion that Carey acted from “improper influences” in trying to dismiss Nadjari. Grumen
conducted a four-month investigation and issued a one-hundred-page report exonerating Carey.
Nadjari dismissed Grumen’s work as “no investigation” and refused to back off the suggestion
that the governor acted improperly.91
Wildly opposing views of Nadjari’s work emerged from his time in office. Knapp
Commission counsel Armstrong summed up one view: “Nadjari turned out to be a disaster.
Aided and abetted by Judge John Murtagh, an unabashedly pro-prosecution judge who was
assigned to the special prosecutor on a permanent basis, Nadjari began a rampage. For the next
three years, judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel were subjected to high-handed and
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invasive, but well-publicized, prosecutions, often based on the flimsiest of legal theories.”92
Robert Leuci, who complained repeatedly during his cooperation that prosecutors focused
excessively on low-level cops, saw Nadjari’s efforts and downfall differently: “Maurice Nadjari
fought his way into the throne rooms and was targeting the political duplicity of the city. They
labeled him a zealot, and some of his staff certainly were. The appellate courts ultimately
overturned many of his convictions. But the man was a true believer. I liked him and admired
him, but I knew his days were numbered.”93 Some commentators often focused on Nadjari’s
physical appearance to an unusual degree, as if groping for something that might explain what
made him tick. Leuci described him as “dark-featured and handsome with shadowy,
expressionless eyes.”94 In a New York Times profile, Anthony Lewis went further: “Meeting
Maurice Nadjari, one can see immediately why he captivated Nelson Rockefeller. There is a
dynamism in him, the feeling of a caged tiger, along with a great deal of charm. . . . He is a
notably handsome man, with the look of a well-preserved Dartmouth athlete: dark, elegant
features, short black hair flecked with gray, blue oxford button-down shirt, dark blue blazer with
gold buttons.”95
Armstrong raised an important point in the unusual arrangement that the special
prosecutor’s office had with a judge specifically assigned to handle its cases. A prosecutor’s
actions sometimes can be emboldened or restrained depending on the inclinations of the judge
handling the matters that the prosecutor brings to court, from search warrants and wiretaps to
trials and sentencings. Justice John Murtagh provided judicial support for Nadjari’s efforts for
over three years, even while appellate courts became increasingly critical of Nadjari’s cases.
Finally, in late 1975, even Murtagh seemed to be fed up with Nadjari’s tactics when he dismissed
indictments brought by the special prosecutor against a politician and a judge.96 Murtagh died
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suddenly from a heart attack in his chambers a short time later while he was considering the
legality of the special prosecutor’s charges against the chairman of the state Democratic Party. 97
Whatever one’s assessment of Nadjari, there is no doubt that he raised the level of police
prosecutions to unprecedented heights. Besides the many cops that his office prosecuted, his
presence put pressure on the other prosecutors in the city. All of the five county district
attorneys, as well as the federal prosecutors, indicted cops in what seemed like a competitive
frenzy.
While Hogan, Roberts, and Nadjari were the most influential prosecutors of the Knappera scandal, Queens D.A. Thomas Mackell and Brooklyn D.A. Eugene Gold deserve mention—
not so much for their prosecuting but for being prosecuted. Mackell, a former cop and state
senator who was elected as the Queens district attorney in 1966, was indicted by Nadjari’s
special grand jury in April 1973. The convoluted charges focused on Mackell allegedly
obstructing justice by withholding information from Bronx D.A. Roberts about a Ponzi scheme
investigated by Roberts’s office, in part because individuals on Mackell’s staff had invested in
the scheme. Nadjari personally tried the case against Mackell and gained a jury conviction in
Judge Murtagh’s court. However, the conviction was overturned by a panel of the state’s
Appellate Division. The court’s opinion strongly criticized both Nadjari and Judge Murtagh,
found fault with the prosecution’s legal theory and insufficiency in its evidence, and, in perhaps
the most unusual aspect of its ruling, dismissed the case so Nadjari could not retry it.98 Mackell
had already resigned as district attorney shortly after indictment and under threat of being
removed by Governor Rockefeller. The removal of a district attorney in New York City had not
occurred since Governor Theodore Roosevelt removed Manhattan D.A. Asa Bird (“To Hell with
Reform”) Gardner in 1900 in the wake of the Lexow-era scandal.99

236

Brooklyn D.A. Eugene Gold seemed to be a steadying influence in the political and
prosecutorial tumult of the scandal. He was less prone to the anti-Knapp and anti-Nadjari
rhetoric than his Manhattan and Bronx counterparts. A native Brooklynite and experienced
criminal defense attorney, he won a special election in 1968 to fill the position when the sitting
district attorney became a judge. In his thirteen years in the position, the hard-working Gold
expanded the office from ninety prosecutors to over two hundred.100 During the Knapp-era
scandal, his office’s handling of the 13th Division cases showed how a large number of police
officers could be prosecuted on corruption charges with reasonable success, at least through the
trial stage. He retired seemingly without controversy in 1981, and his reputation was sufficiently
respected that a candidate running to succeed him used the campaign slogan “Good as Gold.”101
Gold’s arrest less than two years after he left office was shocking. In Nashville to address
the convention of the National District Attorney’s Association, Gold was accused of sexually
molesting a ten-year-old girl in her room at the Opryland Hotel. The girl was the daughter of a
prosecutor attending the convention. Two months later, Gold admitted to the facts of the charges,
which carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Almost as shocking as the crime was the
leniency of the agreed-upon disposition: after Gold served two years on probation and received
psychiatric treatment, the charges would be dismissed. Gold left the courtroom arm-in-arm with
his wife and planned to receive the psychiatric treatment in Israel, where he had a home. The
Nashville D.A. claimed that the disposition was “a fairly routine way of handling this type of
case.”102

The Prosecutions

237

Research located information about criminal charges against a total of 219 police officers
in prosecutions related to the Knapp-era scandal. This far exceeds the totals associated with the
Lexow era (47), the Curran era (17), the Seabury era (18), and the Gross era (35). The Knapp
total is almost double the number of those four previous scandals combined (117). The biggest
factor in the increase was the number of prosecutors’ offices that joined in the effort. The
previous scandal-related prosecutions were handled almost entirely by the Manhattan D.A.’s
office until the Gross era, when the Brooklyn D.A. stepped up. The Knapp era, of course, had the
direct contribution of the special prosecutor in that Nadjari aggressively obtained indictments
against many police officers. A less direct contribution of the special prosecutor was that the
publicity-savvy Nadjari (like the publicity-savvy Knapp Commission) put pressure on the district
attorneys to join the crackdown on police corruption by bringing more indictments. New York
City district attorneys were experienced in turf battles over cases with each other and with
federal prosecutors. When the prosecution of cops became another piece of turf that might be
grabbed by the special prosecutor or by the feds or even by another D.A., each of the district
attorneys grew competitive and brought more cases against cops.
Another factor in the huge number of police prosecutions was the nature of the police
corruption exposed in the scandal. While the Knapp Commission explored a range of police
wrongdoing, the most widespread corruption was the “pad.” The commission’s report defined
the “pad” as follows: “The ‘pad’ refers to regular weekly, biweekly, or monthly payments picked
up by a police bagman and divided among fellow officers. Those who make such payments as
well as policemen who receive them are referred to as being ‘on the pad.’”103 The commission
credited illegal gambling as the largest source of pad payments, along with many legitimate
businesses that needed licenses to operate. Besides generating money for participants, the pad
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served the perverse function of promoting loyalty and camaraderie among cops: the corruption
was something they all did together.104 The books and movies Serpico and Prince of the City
emphasized that cops on the pad felt that cops who declined payoffs were disloyal to brother
officers. Since large numbers of cops were on the pad, prosecutors had to charge many cops in
order to join the response to that sort of corruption.
Also, although more difficult to ascertain, the Knapp era seemed to herald a change in the
atmosphere surrounding police misconduct that supported the increased prosecution of cops.
Tammany Hall was almost gone so cops turned more to their union to look after their interests
and received less support from politicians. Crime was up, which seemed a particular concern for
the white ethnic community from which the police department drew members and support. With
the city’s rising crime and failing economic health, impatience grew with a police department
that not only failed to protect citizens but also hurt the economy by siphoning money from city
businesses. The city’s shrinking white population lost influence to a growing minority
community that had strong complaints about police misconduct beyond payoffs and systemic
corruption. Finally, the “blue wall” that kept cops silent about the misconduct of other cops
developed cracks. The Knapp Commission and the related prosecutions produced the first
significant numbers of police who informed or cooperated against other cops. Some cops
testified at trial for the prosecution, and snitches like Serpico and Leuci became famous in
bestsellers and movies. Even the NYPD seemed fed up with corruption: Commissioner Murphy
and the police department instituted reforms that included recruiting rookie cops to be “field
associates” who would secretly report on corruption matters.105
As in earlier scandals, prosecutions tended to happen in clusters. That is, multiple
defendants were charged as part of investigations of particular police units, squads, or precincts.
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The largest cluster, and perhaps the best known, came from the cases related to the Special
Investigating Unit (SIU) of the Narcotics Division. The book and movie Prince of the City
described Robert Leuci’s tortured decision to cooperate and the turf battles between prosecutors’
offices over how to deal with him. Research found 35 prosecutions of SIU officers, almost
evenly divided between the U.S. Attorney’s offices of the Eastern District (13) and the Southern
District (11) and the special prosecutor’s office (11). Another major cluster of prosecutions came
in the 13th Division cases, in which the Brooklyn district attorney prosecuted twenty-four cops
who had been assigned to plainclothes in the 13th Division, spread over four precincts in
Brooklyn. Some of the clusters were much smaller. For instance, all four members of the
gambling squad of the 32nd Precinct in Harlem were charged with perjury by the Manhattan
district attorney’s office.
With the larger number of prosecutions and the pressures of the scandal, unfortunately,
came three suicides by police. Det. Joseph Nunziata shot himself in a parked car in Brooklyn on
March 27, 1972, after learning that federal authorities wanted to ask him about a payoff from an
undercover operative.106 Lt. Fletcher Hueston shot himself in a Brooklyn Heights hotel room on
May 1, 1972. He would have been charged the next day in the indictment of cops under his
command in the 13th Division.107 Det. Dave Cody of SUI was a partner of Robert Leuci and was
considering cooperating in the investigation until he shot himself in a park in the Bronx after an
afternoon of heavy drinking on May 24, 1974.108
A total of nine different prosecutorial agencies handled the scandal-related prosecutions.
Table 7.1 shows the distribution of cases among those agencies.
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TABLE 7.1 Prosecuting authorities in Knapp-era cases
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Agency
No. charged
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Special prosecutor
48
Brooklyn district attorney
47
Manhattan district attorney
38
Bronx district Attorney
30
109
U.S. Attorney SDNY
24
U.S. Attorney EDNY
14
Queens district attorney
9
Staten Island district attorney 7
U.S. Attorney New Jersey110
2
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
219
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The number of police prosecuted by the special prosecutor was large, but the number certainly
could have been higher if Nadjari had not used his resources to pursue so many nonpolice
corruption targets.
Although the surname review for ethnicity is quite unscientific, it does appear to show a
shift in the NYPD away from its Irish-dominated roots, if not to genuine diversity. Some fiftyseven of the charged officers (26%) had identifiable Irish surnames, a large drop from the
previous scandals. Correspondingly, the number of identifiable Italian surnames (sixty, or 27%)
grew. Perhaps one dozen officers (6%) had names that appeared to be of Hispanic origin,
sometimes identified with both first name and surname (for example, Ramon Rodriguez and
Angel Ramon). Press accounts of the era, thankfully, did not usually comment on the race of the
defendants, but at least a small number of African Americans were defendants. One comment on
race was made by Justice Milton Mollen in Brooklyn. He pointed out at sentencing in one of the
13th Division cases that the defendant had worked to make sure that fellow African American
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officers in the payoff scheme received their fair share of graft. In a dubious development for
diversity, that sentenced defendant was the first woman (Wilma Greene) charged in any of the
scandal-related prosecutions.111 Justice Mollen would rise to appointment to the Appellate
Division, where he had to recuse himself from the decision to reverse many of the 13th Division
convictions.112 He went on to preside over the investigative commission in the next cyclical
scandal.
The ranks of the accused showed a lower percentage of defendants who were patrolmen
(54%) than in the previous two cyclical scandals, both of which had been quite bottom heavy in
charging the lowest-ranking officers (Gross: 77%, Seabury: 88%). Most of the defendants from
the large SUI cluster held the rank of detective, so the overall percentage of detectives charged
was quite high (26%) compared to all of the earlier scandals except for Lexow. Table 7.2 shows
the ranks of the defendants.

TABLE 7.2. Ranks of police charged in Knapp-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Rank
No. charged
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Inspector
2
1
Deputy inspector
2
1
Captain
1
.5
Lieutenant
10
5
Detective
57
26
Sergeant
28
13
Patrolman
119
54
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
219
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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As in all of the earlier scandals, prosecutors took aim at defendants at the high rank of
inspector. Inspector Thomas Renaghan, who commanded the Narcotics Division, was charged by
the Manhattan D.A. with misdemeanor-level contempt for his responses to a grand jury about
payoffs from a mobster. He was convicted at trial, sentenced to four months in jail, and then had
his conviction reversed by the Appellate Division.113 Inspector Robert Johnson was charged with
perjury by the special prosecutor for false grand jury testimony about bribe receipts and was
found not guilty at trial.114 Unsuccessful prosecutions of inspectors in earlier scandals came in
the Gross era (charges against two inspectors dismissed), the Seabury era (one inspector found
not guilty at trial), and the Lexow era (trial conviction reversed for one inspector). Only the
Curran era had success in charging inspectors with D.A. Whitman’s prosecution of four
inspectors (three convictions, one reversal).
The large number of defendants and the aggressiveness of prosecutors to find
prosecutable cases resulted in a wider variety of charged criminal offenses compared with earlier
scandals. Some questions arose in identifying the primary charged conduct. For instance, the
corrupt practices of the defendants in the cluster of cases from the Bronx Narcotics Division
included robbing drug dealers. These were tabulated as robberies, although they could have been
classified as drug-related offenses. Similarly, many of the bribery/extortion offenses attributable
to the SIU were drug related. The overall effect is that Table 7.3, showing the primary charged
conduct of the cases, may appear to understate the degree to which drugs became a driving force
of corruption in the Knapp era.
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TABLE 7.3. Primary charged conduct in Knapp-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Conduct
Cases
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Bribery/extortion
114
52
Perjury
54
25
Drugs
21
10
Tax violations
9
4
Robbery
7
3
Gambling
4
2
Civil rights
3
1.5
Larceny
2
1
Assault
2
1
Counterfeiting
1
.5
Contempt
1
.5
Homicide
1
.5
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
219
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The heavy reliance on perjury charges that began with the Seabury- and Gross-era prosecutions
seemed to begin to taper off, perhaps because court decisions on compelling testimony and
inferring immunity became more favorable to defendants. Bribery and extortion (combined again
here because of the occasional difficulty in factually distinguishing between them) were the
staple of the pad of regular payments made to pay off cops.
An important prosecutorial development was the application of federal civil rights law to
police misconduct. The U.S. Attorney of the Eastern District of New York obtained indictments
against three SIU detectives for robbing drug dealers as violations of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 242 for depriving the drug dealers of their civil rights without due process. The
three charged detectives had been partners of suicide victim Joseph Nunziata. This particular
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federal foray into police corruption was successful. All three were convicted and sentenced to
nine years imprisonment.115
The high volume of prosecutions in the Knapp era made identifying the underlying
civilian conduct a bit more complicated than the same task in earlier scandals. For instance, the
underlying conduct was mostly prostitution in the Seabury era and gambling in the Gross era. In
the Knapp era, however, the criminal prosecutions (like the Knapp Commission findings)
covered a wide range of police misconduct, so the underlying activity varied as well. Table 7.4
shows, for instance, whether a bribe payoff received by a cop or perjury committed by a cop was
related to drug activity.

Table 7.4. Primary underlying civilian activity in Knapp-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Activity
Cases
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Drugs
72
33
Gambling
83
38
Other unlawful
37
17
116
Other legitimate
27
12
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
219
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

This underlying activity breakdown confirmed the growing prominence of drugs in fueling
police misconduct. Gambling lost ground as a corruption source, particularly compared to its
dominance in the preceding Gross era. Gambling would continue to fade as a corruption source
as the legal state lottery grew and undermined the numbers game, although officials largely
ignored the Knapp Commission’s recommendation to repeal all criminal gambling laws.117
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The other vices of prostitution and liquor that drove early scandals had faded, but some of
the pads that collected from numerous sources included prostitution sources (note that Knapp’s
star cooperator Bill Phillips was caught because he took payoffs from a prominent prostitute).
Liquor was still a prominent social vice, of course, but its potential as a corruption source
diminished since the times of Sunday closing laws (Lexow era) or outright prohibition (Seabury
era). Still, liquor-related corruption certainly played a part in the payoffs made by bars and
restaurants that are included in the legitimate underlying activities.
The common practice in the earliest scandals of charging multiple indictments in the
same jurisdiction against a single defendant had ended. Just a very small number of defendants
faced both state and federal charges or charges in two different counties, which was an
accomplishment for orderliness in the tangle of prosecutors’ turf battles.
A breakdown of the dispositions of prosecutions in table 7.5 shows a higher percentage
of guilty pleas than in any of the earlier scandals. Much of this increase can be attributed to the
increase in the number of defendants who decided to cooperate with investigators and
prosecutors. Some cooperating cops were not prosecuted at all. In a high-profile example,
prosecutors from different offices argued heatedly with each other, leading up to the decision to
not bring charges against Robert Leuci.118 In a more representative example, Det. Louis
D’Ambrosio (a partner of suicide victim Nunziata) faced strong evidence with some of his
wrongdoing caught on tape, and he decided to plead guilty and cooperate to receive a sentence of
probation.119
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TABLE 7.5. Dispositions of Knapp-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Disposition
No. of cases
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Guilty at trial
50
23
Guilty Plea
46
21
Total Convicted
96
44
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Dismissed
15
7
Conviction reversed
7
3
Not guilty at trial
33
15
120
Died
3
1.5
Incompetent
1
.5
Total Not Convicted
59
27
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Unknown Disposition
64
29
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
219
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Seemingly consistent with Bronx D.A. Roberts’s complaint to the Knapp Commission,
many of the defendants who were charged and received convictions that withstood appeals were
given what might be considered lenient sentences that included no incarceration. However, some
charges of conviction were only misdemeanors, so sentences of nonincarceration for first
offenders might have been appropriate. Further, some of the sentences were affected by the
defendants’ cooperation. Also, and quite unusually, numerous defendants from the Brooklyn 13th
Division cluster of cases had their sentences reduced to probation on appeal even as their
convictions were upheld (described below). Table 7.6 categorizes the sentences of the 94
convicted defendants.
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TABLE 7.6. Sentences of convicted Knapp-era defendants121
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Sentence
No. of cases
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Nonincarceration:
Probation, cond. discharge, and/or fine
34
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Incarceration:
Less than 1 year
11
1 year
8
1 to 5 years
12
More than 5 years
13
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Unknown
18
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total sentenced
96
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

One aspect of the greater involvement by federal prosecutors in corruption cases was the
generally harsher sentencing that federal offenses brought to bear on convicted defendants. Of
the thirteen defendants who received sentences in excess of five years, seven were prosecuted
federally.

The 13th Division Cases
If a major accomplishment of the Knapp Commission and related police reforms was the
disruption of the routine, systemic collections of the pad, then the 13th Division cases in
Brooklyn were the best example of how criminal prosecutions fit (or did not fit) in the antipad
efforts. The 13th Division was one of fourteen divisions of the NYPD. Operating in the BedfordStuyvesant, Brownsville, Crown Heights, and Fort Greene areas of Brooklyn, it had a public
morals squad that handled gambling enforcement. About twenty officers, usually working in
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plainclothes, were assigned to the squad at any given time. The blow of losing an assignment to
the payoff-heavy squad was softened because the operators of the pad provided a generous
severance package to any officer who was transferred out.122
The severance plan was only one aspect of the astounding level of highly organized
corruption in the 13th Division pad. The racial diversity of the neighborhoods served by the 13th
Division caused the pad operators to assign black or white officers to make collections so a
gambling operator would have the comfort of being shaken down by a cop of his own race. The
squad collected $20,000 per month (well over $100,000 in today’s dollars), which was divvied
up according to rank and whether any extra payments needed to be made for severance or
because a pad participant had been arrested. Officers received about $10,000 per year, and
superiors received between $15,000 and $20,000. Discipline among participants was not always
perfect, however. After one participant made the payoff collections, he set his own car on fire
and claimed that the money burned up so he could keep it all.123
The Brooklyn D.A.’s office broke the 13th Division case by gaining the cooperation of
four of the participants in the pad. Of particular importance was Officer Steven Buchalski, who
was convinced to cooperate by Assistant D.A. Joe Hynes.124 Buchalski made tape recordings and
testified at trial and departmental hearings in exchange for not being prosecuted and being able
to stay on the police force. Three other officers received similar deals, and the prosecution
moved forward with the ammunition of a modern police prosecution—cooperating cops and tape
recordings.
On May 2, 1972, Brooklyn D.A. Gold obtained an indictment charging twenty-four
police from the 13th Division with participating in the scheme to take payoffs to protect
gamblers. D.A. Gold contended that the gamblers had organized-crime connections, but the
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indictment named only cops. Three sergeants were charged, and the other twenty-one defendants
held the rank of patrolman (or patrolwoman, for defendant Wilma Greene). Had he not
committed suicide the day before, Lt. Heuston would have been the highest-ranking
defendant.125 Testimony at a departmental hearing later asserted that an assistant chief inspector
who was in charge of the squad also received his share of the payoffs, but he was never charged
criminally or departmentally.126 With the twenty-four defendants, the 13th Division case was the
largest indictment of police in NYPD history, even larger than the twenty-one defendants of the
Gross-era indictment two decades earlier.
As a mega-case of Brooklyn cops charged with taking gambling payoffs, the 13th
Division case mirrored the Gross-era indictment, but the postindictment developments diverged.
The Gross-era defendants in the big case all hung together and went to trial with no guilty pleas
and no cooperators, leaving the prosecution to rely on Harry Gross.127 The 13th Division trial, in
contrast, had cooperating cops ready to go and five defendants had already entered guilty pleas.
The eighteen defendants who went to trial (one was severed) was the same number as in the
Gross mega-trial. While the Gross trial defendants celebrated the collapse of the prosecution’s
case and received dismissals, the 13th Division trial moved smoothly for the prosecution. Sixteen
defendants were found guilty and two were found not guilty. Justice Milton Mollen sentenced
nine of those convicted at trial to three years in jail, and the seven others received sentences of
one year. The five officers who previously pleaded guilty received sentences of probation. The
four officers who cooperated were allowed to remain in the police department.128
What appeared to be a textbook prosecution ran into difficulties on appeal. All sixteen
defendants appealed—four defendants had their convictions upheld by the Appellate Division
and one had died so his conviction was vacated. The other eleven convictions were reversed by
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the Appellate Division. New York State law required corroboration for testimony from an
accomplice. Since the police cooperators were accomplices in the payoff scheme at an earlier
point in time, their testimony required corroboration. The Appellate Division found insufficient
corroborative evidence to support the convictions of the other eleven defendants. It appeared that
an almost Gross-like prosecutive collapse loomed, but then the Court of Appeals reinstated the
convictions of seven of the eleven dismissed defendants.129
The appellate treatment of the cases did not seem particularly unusual up to that point in
the back-and-forth between the courts. The defendants convicted at trial appealed on fairly
technical grounds, the Appellate Division reversed most of the convictions, and then the Court of
Appeals reinstated most of those reversals. What followed next was unusual. The Appellate
Division expressed its outrage that the defendants had engaged in a “shocking betrayal of the
public trust” that did “grievous” damage to public confidence. Despite the corrupt conduct of the
defendants, however, the court decided that incarceration was not an appropriate penalty because
none of the cops had prior records, they were unlikely to reoffend, all had left the police
department, and several years had passed since the convictions. Incarceration, the court intoned,
would “undoubtedly cause severe and immeasurable damage” to the defendants’ families and
would “undoubtedly place additional strains on public resources.” The court reduced the
defendants’ sentences to periods of probation.130
So, the Brooklyn D.A. aggressively investigated the 13th Division, convinced reluctant
cops to turn against their colleagues by making tapes and testifying, built evidence of an
entrenched pad of extraordinary scope, indicted the largest case in NYPD history, took pleas and
convicted almost everyone else at trial, but ran into an appellate court that reversed convictions
and changed Judge Mollen’s jail sentences to probation. The prosecutors had taken pains to bring
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a case that did not rely on an undependable witness like Harry Gross, but their frustrated efforts
showed that many variables can undermine criminal prosecutions as a corruption remedy.

Bill Phillips and the SDNY Perjury Case
Like others before him in earlier scandals, Bill Phillips showed that a star witness before
an investigative commission may not be effective when the venue shifts to the criminal court.
Following up on the Knapp Commission’s use of Phillips to make undercover tapes, federal
prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office (S.D.N.Y.) called cops to the grand jury, where they
made false denials about their knowledge of illegal gambling and police corruption in East
Harlem. On November 4, 1971, shortly after the Knapp Commission began its public hearings,
U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour announced the indictment of eight patrolmen and two
lieutenants on a mix of bribery and perjury charges. The eight patrolmen and one of the
lieutenants worked in the 25th Precinct that covered East Harlem. Officer Phillips, who was
named as a co-conspirator in the indictment, also worked in that precinct. The other lieutenant,
Jack Kaminsky, was assigned to supervising plainclothes enforcement in the patrol borough that
covered northern Manhattan. The investigation had moved quickly: Phillips was still making
undercover recordings of cops for the Knapp Commission in August 1971, he testified at the
public Knapp hearings in October, Kaminsky denied knowledge of corruption in October before
a federal grand jury, and the case was indicted in early November.131
The ground shifted suddenly for Phillips and federal prosecutors. Phillips was living
under the protection of U.S. Marshals in the Witness Security Program while he was still paid by
the police department. An NYPD detective who had watched Phillips’s televised Knapp
Commission testimony thought that Phillips resembled the police artist’s sketch of the suspect in
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a Christmas Eve 1968 shooting in an Eastside apartment building that left two dead and one
wounded. The Manhattan D.A.’s office followed up in secret. The survivor of the shootings and
another witness identified Phillips through a one-way mirror after Phillips was brought to the
D.A.’s office on a pretext. Other evidence developed, including a tape on which Phillips seemed
to brag about having killed three people. Phillips testified before the grand jury, but he was still
indicted in March 1972. In the meantime, the Kaminsky perjury case was close to trial, and all of
the other SDNY cases relying on Phillips were pending. The PBA president proclaimed that
Phillips being indicted confirmed the “phony nature” of the whole Knapp Commission.132
The subject matter of the Kaminsky trial was whether he lied before the grand jury. A
tape recording that Phillips made with Kaminsky should have made the case quite
straightforward. The trial, however, focused on Phillips. Under indictment for the double murder,
Phillips bluntly claimed in his testimony that he had been framed by District Attorney Hogan in
retaliation for his Knapp Commission cooperation.133 As for the damaging twenty-minute taped
conversation about corruption that Phillips made with Kaminsky, Kaminsky testified that he had
not heard everything Phillips said, the conversation was taken out of context, and Phillips may
have altered the tape. The jury acquitted Kaminsky after less than a day of deliberations. 134
The fast collapse of the Kaminsky case showed clearly that Phillips, star of the Knapp
Commission, was unusable as a trial witness. The U.S. Attorney’s Office dismissed charges
against the remaining nine defendants. Most of the accused officers returned to their jobs after
departmental penalties of some lost pay.135 Phillips was found guilty of the homicides at his
second trial, as discussed earlier.

Conclusions
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Every cyclical scandal presented some changes in how police corruption cases were
developed and presented. The biggest changes might have occurred in the Knapp era. The Knapp
Commission’s insistence that prosecutors modernize their methods of investigating cops ushered
in the era in which tape recordings would become common in gathering evidence of police
corruption. The transition was not always smooth. Frank Serpico argued with prosecutors about
wearing a recording device, and a memorable scene in the Prince of the City movie showed actor
Treat Williams as Robert Leuci in pain as his body recorder short circuited. The move toward
taping was consistent with advances in technology that made recordings of all types (body,
telephone, bug, or video) more practical to use, as well as changes in laws that made intercepted
conversations more likely to be usable in court. The Kaminsky case, though, served as a
reminder that juries could still reject recorded evidence.
The Knapp Commission crowed about its success in using cooperating (or “flipped” or
“turn around”) cops to reveal corruption. Like recorded evidence, however, juries could still
reject cases based on the testimony of cooperators. A cooperating cop might not be a better
witness than the prostitutes or gamblers who testified in prosecutions in the earlier scandals.
While the Knapp report placed too much reliance on the word of a cop like Bill Phillips, the
report did recognize the important development of the breakdown of the culture that would not
allow a cop to inform on other cops. The NYPD and prosecutors could work together to give
favorable treatment to officers who cooperated, as in the 13th Division prosecutions, when the
cooperating cops were not prosecuted and kept their jobs despite their wrongdoing. A
contributing factor likely was the changing nature of the rank and file of the NYPD. As the force
evolved away from Tammany protection and Irish domination, officers in the more diverse
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department might have felt less allegiance to the unwritten rules of going along with corrupt
behavior.
The possibility of being prosecuted is supposed to serve as a deterrent to discourage the
activity. When cases are dismissed (like the S.D.N.Y. cases based on Phillips) or punishments
are lenient (like the 13th Division cases), the theoretical deterrent effect of prosecutions can be
diminished. Potential deterrence may be bolstered, though, by the investigative trend toward
more tapes and cooperators. Cops engaged in pad-type corruption that required the participation
of many individuals would feel less comfortable with both their fellow officers and the bribe
payers due to the increased likelihood that someone might be recording or snitching. Perhaps as a
consequence, the types of police corruption that emerged for the next cyclical scandal would
tend to involve smaller numbers of officers.
Finally, the participation of so many prosecutors’ offices in Knapp-era cases reduced the
chance of a return to prosecutorial reluctance to take on police cases. The startling Knapp
revelations and the well-publicized prosecutions would make it difficult for later prosecutors to
turn a blind eye toward police corruption. In the common situation of a prosecutor being
interested in personal advancement as well as pursuing justice, the example of Rudy Giuliani as a
young federal prosecutor working on Knapp-era cases stood out to show how prosecuting cops
can advance a career. Although the appointment of the special prosecutor did not work well by
most accounts, the participation of federal offices in the prosecutorial fray was groundbreaking.
In the 1980s and 1990s, federal prosecutors would take the lead in building police corruption
cases in major cities, over the objections of those who bemoaned the “federalization” of criminal
law.
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Chapter 8
The Mollen Commission–Era Scandal

Who’s going to catch us? We’re the police. We’re in charge.
—Corrupt cop Bernard Cawley in testimony before the Mollen Commission, when
asked if he had been afraid of being caught.1

Matters of municipal finance, labor unions, and crime control intersect in New York,
perhaps never so graphically as in June 1975 when one of the police unions published its “Fear
City” booklet. Featuring a death skull on its cover, the booklet gave over-the-top warnings to
tourists that New York City was far too dangerous to safely visit, while union officials gave
similarly strong warnings to city officials not to lay off cops.2 Concerns about finances and crime
nagged the city in the post-Knapp years and were the topics of two of New York’s best-known
tabloid headlines. In October 1975, the New York Daily News took dramatic license to proclaim,
“FORD TO CITY: DROP DEAD” when President Gerald Ford rejected prospects for additional
federal assistance for the city to stave off bankruptcy.3 Although President Ford would approve
federal loans to the city just two months later, the fiscal crisis turned Abe Beame into a one-term
mayor. Almost fifteen years later in September 1990, during what would become the city’s
record year for homicides, the subway murder of a young Utah tourist traveling with his family
prompted the New York Post to plead, “DAVE, DO SOMETHING!” to Mayor Dinkins in a
front-page headline.4 The crime issue made Dinkins the city’s next one-term mayor.
The near-bankrupt and crime-ridden city staggered in the post-Knapp years. Fiscal
reforms and oversight imposed on the city by Washington and Albany stripped the already
ineffectual Mayor Beame of much of his authority. The Son of Sam serial killings terrified city
residents from the summer of 1976 until the arrest of David Berkowitz in August 1977. If New
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Yorkers needed reminding of the fragile state of their city, the electrical blackout in July 1977 set
off days of looting and the destruction of large swaths of the city’s poorer neighborhoods. Mayor
Beame still tried to run for reelection in 1977, but the crowded field of challengers in the
Democratic primary resulted in the nomination of Ed Koch. Koch’s outspoken support for the
death penalty conveyed a tough stance on crime and separated him from most of the other
Democrats seeking the nomination.5 He easily won the general election.
The cheerleading side of Koch’s personality wanted to lead a comeback for the city. Seen
with the benefit of hindsight, the city may have had no place to go but up. The outflow of jobs
seemed to end in 1978, and commercial construction picked up while vacant office space
declined. The business community appreciated the city’s moves toward austerity, and New
Yorkers might have become more accepting of the higher college tuitions and transit fares and
hospital closings that came with this austerity.6 Although the city’s population bottomed out in
the 1980 census at barely over seven million, the 1965 reform of immigration laws had
encouraged some 800,000 immigrants to settle in the city in the 1970s in what would become the
beginning of population growth for the next four decades.7 The “white flight” to the suburbs and
elsewhere continued, but the trend seemed less dire for the future of the city when immigrants
were eager to arrive and reinvigorate city life.
The city remained one in transition, but the transitions finally showed signs of becoming
more favorable. Grand Central Terminal avoided Pennsylvania Station’s fate when the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the city’s landmarks law in 1978.8 Although less than a step forward for
music or culture, the opening of the Studio 54 disco in 1977 signaled a return of celebrity and
money to nightlife in midtown Manhattan. Hundreds of thousands of spectators filled Central
Park for the September 1981 concert by New Yorkers Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel. A couple
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of months later, Mayor Koch achieved the unprecedented endorsement of both the Democratic
and Republican parties and won reelection with an also unprecedented 75 percent of the vote.
After the decades of deindustrialization and suburbanization that drained the city, the 1980s
brought trends in national and international finance more favorable to the city. The Dow Jones
average more than doubled despite crashes and recessions, and Wall Street employment and
salaries boomed. Perhaps most surprisingly, the probusiness Koch administration delivered
surpluses in the city’s budget by 1982.
The sticking point continued to be crime. Despite all of the credit given to Koch for
reviving the city, the Koch years (1978–1989) never saw crime significantly reduced for any
sustained period. Fear of crime hung over the December 1985 shooting of four black men on a
subway car and the ensuing trial’s not guilty verdict for white New Yorker Bernhard Goetz.
Homicides dropped a bit in the early 1980s and then jumped to record-high levels with the crack
epidemic later in Koch’s tenure. Koch still steamrolled opposition from the Republican and
Liberal party candidates in 1985 and broke his own margin of victory record with a stunning 78
percent of the vote in his reelection, but his third term went downhill quickly. Democratic bosses
who were Koch allies became embroiled in corruption scandals.9 Although the corruption
charges never directly implicated Koch, the public sentiment turned less tolerant of Koch’s
abrasiveness. Koch’s blunt talk, which seemed appealing early in his mayoralty, became
particularly ill-suited to sensitive race issues. Racial tensions in the city grew with the deaths of
black men Willie Turks (1982), Michael Griffith (1986), and Yosef Hawkins (1989) at the hands
of white mobs in neighborhoods of Brooklyn and Queens. Koch harshly, almost gratuitously,
criticized Democratic presidential hopeful Jesse Jackson in 1988. His popularity dropped, he
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suffered a minor stroke in 1987, and by 1989 he faced opposition in the Democratic primary as
he sought a fourth term as mayor.
David Dinkins defeated Koch with surprising ease in the 1989 primary. Rudy Giuliani,
who built his reputation with prosecutorial success against mobsters and city politicians, gained
the Republican nomination. In his primary victory speech, Dinkins announced, “I intend to be
the toughest mayor on crime this city has ever seen.”10 Dinkins’s vulnerability on the crime
issue, however, quickly became clear. Giuliani gathered some support for being more
conservative than Dinkins, and some for simply being the candidate who was not black, but the
heart of Giuliani’s appeal was the prospect that he would address crime more strongly than
Dinkins. It was almost enough: in an overwhelmingly Democratic city, Dinkins barely squeaked
by political novice Giuliani in November 1989 in the closest election in city history. Dinkins
stepped into a difficult situation. After he was in office for only a few months, Time Magazine’s
cover story summed up the status of the city: “The Rotting of the Big Apple.”11
Stubbornly high crime, the crack epidemic, a national recession, and some weakening of
the city’s economy in the early 1990s stood in the way of Dinkins achieving the role of racial
healer that many New Yorkers expected. His relations with the police department worsened as he
pushed for establishment of a civilian review board to handle complaints against cops.12 On
September 16, 1992, some ten thousand off-duty cops gathered in City Hall Park in a disruptive
rally in opposition to the proposed review board. Demonstrators damaged property, blocked
Brooklyn Bridge traffic, and many used racist chants and signs directed at the mayor.13 While
any police misconduct at the demonstration was quite separate from the conduct to be revealed in
the already-brewing corruption scandal, some elements ran through both, including the image of
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city cops as angry white guys alienated from many of the citizens they served, and the
determination of the mayor to take action against the police.

The Triggering Event
The nature of the city’s police corruption had changed. The Knapp Commission,
departmental discipline, administrative reforms, and hundreds of prosecutions had disrupted the
“pad” of regular, largely vice-based payoffs to police. The state lottery and other forms of legal
wagering discouraged a return of gambling as a vice that might revive the pad. Prostitution,
pornography, and other sex-related businesses were altered by changes in public morality,
enforcement decisions, and technology that made those industries less likely to return to pad
payoffs. More generally, the pad lost fashion because it was too risky. Reporter Mike McAlery
noted, “The organized pad of the Knapp era was too organized. Too many people knew you were
involved. Any one of those people who knew what was going on could rat you out.”14 Lardner
and Reppetto observed that while the NYPD managed to keep its revamped post-Knapp vice
squads relatively clean, the “kids in the patrol cars were the ones who succumbed” to post-Knapp
police corruption.15
Perhaps motivated by a concern that better opportunities for corrupt activity would not
develop by waiting for assignment to a plainclothes or narcotics unit, some of the “kids in the
patrol cars” looked for more immediate corrupt opportunities. The NYPD adhered to the
professional model of policing that kept most cops in patrol cars. Like other people who worked
in the city, officers increasingly lived in suburbs outside of the city, adding to the alienation of
the mostly white cops from minority communities. The city’s streets in some neighborhoods had
unprecedented levels of crime and drugs. Particularly as crack cocaine came to the city by the
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mid-1980s, street-level drug dealing involved huge amounts of illicit money to tempt those patrol
officers.
One highly publicized case in 1986 set the tone for the latest variety of police corruption,
although it did not trigger a wider scandal. The investigation started off like clockwork: a drug
dealer in Brooklyn’s 77th Precinct was caught with a large stash, he offered to give up the cops
he paid off, police took him to Brooklyn D.A. Elizabeth Holtzman, she sent him to Special State
Prosecutor Charles Hynes (one of the successors to the deposed Maurice Nadjari), and he agreed
to cooperate to gather evidence against the cops.16 The 77th Precinct covered the struggling
Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood, where the precinct cops often engaged in serious crimes of
opportunity that included stealing money and drugs from drug dealers and making fake 911 calls
that allowed them to enter and loot apartments and businesses. Investigators confronted one of
the cops, Henry Winter, and he agreed to cooperate. Winter and his partner recorded other
corrupt cops, leading to indictments of thirteen officers in what became known as the Buddy
Boys case.17 The prosecutions did not go as well as the investigation: most of the charged
officers gained dismissals or trial acquittals, four pleaded guilty or were convicted, and one
committed suicide.18 One of the officers who pleaded guilty served one year in prison and then
took a part-time job at John Jay College while on work release and appeared in an anticorruption
videotape to be shown to police cadets.19
The Buddy Boys case garnered headlines, but it never gained traction as a triggering
event. In fact, almost the opposite occurred. Anticorruption efforts seemed to recede. Charles
Hynes served as the special prosecutor for four years, but he moved on to noncorruption work
toward the end of his tenure. He would later grumble that the NYPD stopped providing critical
corruption reports to prosecutors in the late 1980s.20 The Office of the Special Prosecutor shrank
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from a staff of 160 under Maurice Nadjari to a staff of 43 under Helman R. Brook, the largely
forgotten final special prosecutor. Governor Mario Cuomo disbanded the Office of the Special
Prosecutor in 1990 and promised to transfer equivalent funding to the district attorneys’ offices
for their respective anticorruption units.21 After the actual triggering event for the next cyclical
scandal popped up just two years later, some critics lambasted the special prosecutor’s office for
having allowed the corruption problem to fester.22 Perhaps worse, the Mollen Commission would
accuse the commanders of the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Division of intentionally impeding
efforts to uncover more widespread corruption after the Buddy Boys case.23
What would become the triggering event occurred on May 6, 1992, with the arrests of
some city cops on Long Island. Just one week earlier, on April 29, Los Angeles cops received
not guilty verdicts on charges of beating civilian Rodney King. Mayor Dinkins and the NYPD
understandably took credit for keeping New York quiet while Los Angeles burned. At the same
time, however, Suffolk County (Long Island) officers were wrapping up a drug investigation that
implicated NYPD Officer Michael Dowd, then of the 94th Precinct (Greenpoint in Brooklyn).
Suffolk County’s investigation had taken just a few months. An arrested drug dealer in Islip gave
information that led to a wiretap that revealed cocaine coming from a retired NYPD officer.
More wiretaps ensued that revealed the involvement of Dowd and other officers.
A front page Daily News headline called Michael Dowd “the dirtiest cop in NY.”24 Dowd
collected thousands of dollars weekly for protecting drug dealers in the 75th Precinct, committed
armed robberies of drug dealers and drug locations, and delivered drugs from Brooklyn for
distribution on Long Island (the subject of his arrest) and elsewhere. Dowd was even accused of
committing the on-duty kidnapping of a competing drug dealer who was then killed by the
organization that paid off Dowd.25
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Beyond the shocking nature of his corruption, one aspect of Dowd’s conduct stood out:
he took few pains to conceal his activities. Fellow cops, supervisors, and some members of the
department’s Internal Affairs Division all knew about at least some of Dowd’s conduct.26
Limousines would pick him up at the precinct for gambling trips to Atlantic City. Dowd would
drive his new red Corvette sports car from his expensive home on Long Island to his precinct in
the poor East New York neighborhood.27
An unrepentant Dowd explained some of his thinking in the 2014 documentary The
Seven Five. He joined the NYPD in 1982 and started taking money from motorists or apartments
as opportunities arose after about a year assigned to the 75th Precinct. As he became bolder in his
misconduct, other cops did not want to be his partner. Only when Dowd was able to recruit a
reliable partner did the corruption rise to a level to include, for instance, $8000 payments every
week from a drug dealer. Dowd’s boldness came partly from his confidence that cops would
never turn him in, partly from his contention that other cops appreciated his fast action when
they needed help on the street, and partly from his increasing liquor and cocaine abuse. Dowd
served twelve years in prison for his crimes. The partner whom Dowd induced into corruption,
Kenny Eurell, eventually cooperated after the Suffolk County arrests and was never prosecuted.
Dowd still cannot understand how Eurell could have informed on another cop. Eurell recalls that
when he cooperated and tried to gather evidence against Dowd, he finally felt like a cop again. 28
The Suffolk County arrests needed a nudge to become the triggering event. The
institutional structure of the NYPD, all the way up to the commissioner’s office, wanted to avoid
a major police scandal.29 The Suffolk County arrests of Dowd and the others might have become
an embarrassing, isolated miniscandal involving a few bad cops, maybe even more containable
than the Buddy Boys affair. But the depth of Dowd’s corruption had left a trail of departmental
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tolerance of corruption that was difficult to conceal. In 1986, Sgt. Joseph Trimboli took an
assignment in a Brooklyn unit that reported to the Internal Affairs Division, where he saw
repeated complaints of Dowd’s corruption that were swept under the rug. Trimboli’s frustrations
and the department’s obfuscations continued for years.30 Trimboli feared that the response to
Dowd’s arrest in Suffolk County would not address the severe deficiencies of the NYPD’s
anticorruption program. On June 15, 1992, after the Dowd case slowly began to fade from news
headlines, the New York Post ran a front-page story setting forth Trimboli’s story of how the
department allowed Dowd to operate. The effect was immediate: both the NYPD and Mayor
Dinkins took steps to address, or at least appear to address, the problem.

The Response
On the same day as the publication of the New York Post story about the department’s
pathetic efforts to deal with Dowd, Police Commissioner Lee Brown ordered a full study.
Recruited by Mayor Dinkins to be commissioner, Brown enacted administrative and patrol
changes that some observers credit with starting the city’s crime drop, but crime was still so high
that he received little credit at the time.31 Instead, he drew much hostility from the rank and file
of the NYPD. Some cops distrusted the African American commissioner, others disliked the
proposed civilian review board, and many derided Texas-native Brown as “out of town Brown”
for his frequent travels outside of the city. The responsibility for the study fell on First Deputy
Commissioner Raymond Kelly.32
By the time the report was issued a few months later, Brown had resigned as
commissioner, citing his wife’s ill-health, and Kelly became commissioner.33 The 161-page
report blamed most shortcomings on the fractured structure of multiple units in the department
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that all had some anticorruption responsibilities. Essentially, the report contended, the Dowd
case fell between the cracks because the organizational structure happened to have a lot of
cracks. Kelly proposed elevation of the Internal Affairs Division to the higher status of a bureau.
None of the officers who had done little to stop Dowd were publicly disciplined because, Kelly
said, it would not be “productive.”34 Kelly’s report was seriously criticized at the time, and the
Mollen Commission’s report bluntly rejected its findings.35 After leaving the NYPD, Lee Brown
went on to serve as the White House “drug czar” and the mayor of Houston, Texas.
The police commissioner’s attempt (first by Brown, then by Kelly) to control the
narrative after the New York Post story came as too little and too late. The cautious, deliberative
Mayor Dinkins did not have a plan in place when the Post story broke, perhaps waiting to see if
the department’s study might be an adequate response. One week after the Post story, however,
the mayor suggested that he might appoint a single investigator to look into police corruption. A
few days later, on June 25, 1992, he changed his strategy and appointed a commission to
investigate police corruption.36 The mayor’s decision for a five-member, mayor-appointed
corruption commission seemed borrowed directly from the Knapp-era model.
Mayor Dinkins’s deputy mayor for public safety, Milton Mollen, had recently stepped
down to take a lucrative position in private practice. Mollen had not even departed his own
farewell party at Gracie Mansion when the mayor asked him to lead the police corruption
inquiry. Mollen, a former state court judge, had previously earned some favorable response from
the NYPD because he presided over the Dinkins administration’s hiring of new officers, and
Dinkins thought that background might make the inquiry more palatable to cops. Mollen
reluctantly agreed and, according to Dinkins, Mollen himself decided on the model of the fivemember commission and selected the commissioners.37
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With Dinkins coming up for reelection in 1993 and the crime-focused Rudy Giuliani
preparing to challenge him again, Mollen took pains to attempt political balance in naming
commissioners. Harold Tyler, a Republican, was a federal judge after a stint doing civil rights
work in Robert Kennedy’s Justice Department. Herbert Evans, a Democrat and the only African
American commissioner, had served as the state’s chief administrative judge. Harold Baer, who
carried a Liberal Party label, was a former federal prosecutor and served as the director of the
controversial Lindsay-era Police Review Board.38 The fifth commissioner position went to Betsy
Barros, a Latina and a high-ranking assistant D.A. in Brooklyn. Barros would have been the only
woman to break into the boys’ club of membership in the commissions appointed in the cyclical
scandals, but she had to resign a few days later due to a conflict of interest because she had
minor involvement with an investigation of corrupt cop Dowd.39 Barros was replaced by
Roderick Lankler, a white Republican and veteran prosecutor who had served as one of the postNadjari special state prosecutors before that office was abolished.
Keeping the informal tradition of adopting the chairman’s name going back to the Lexow
Committee, the New York City Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and
the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department quickly became known as the Mollen
Commission. The commissioners were not paid, and the large staff of investigators and analysts
combined with staff paid out of the commission’s budget and others on loan from various
agencies and law firms. Mollen hired Chief Counsel Joe Armao on the recommendation of
Manhattan D.A. Robert Morgenthau.40 The Deputy Chief Counsel position went to Leslie
Cornfeld, making her the most prominent woman in the history of the scandal-related
commissions. Cornfeld assumed a particularly high profile as one of the main interrogators at
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Commission hearings—the cable television news service NY1 had just gone into service and
devoted many hours to live coverage of the hearings.
Perhaps determined to avoid the relatively lavish spending of the Office of the Special
State Prosecutor during Nadjari’s tenure, Mollen sought to keep the commission’s budget tight.
He turned down Park Avenue office space despite the convenience of proximity to his own law
office. And he stunned city administrators when he returned $200,000 in unspent funds (of the
$1 million budget) after the commission’s first year of operation.41
The Mollen Commission took the opposite approach of the Knapp Commission and hired
many former cops as investigators because they were “thoroughly familiar with the operations of
the Department, its culture, and the likely sources of corruption,” according to the Commission’s
final report.42 The Knapp Commission avoided using active or former NYPD officers so
investigators would not be tainted or conflicted by the widespread pad-based corruption of the
department in that era.
The Mollen Commission decided quickly where to focus its investigative resources. The
knowledge of its staff, dozens of interviews, reviews of complaints against cops, and the facts of
the Dowd case all pointed to the existence of “pockets of corruption” in police precincts of “high
crime” and “an active and open narcotics trade.”43 Commission investigators then decided where
to attempt their own proactive investigations. The commission’s final report occasionally took
caution in describing activities because some investigative matters were ongoing, but the report
did not hesitate to criticize the NYPD’s corruption investigations in two major areas. First, the
report contended that the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau took a narrow “rotten apple” approach
by identifying individual corrupt cops and ignoring more widespread and complex corruption.
The police department would regularly look for patterns and conspiracies in other criminal

276

investigations, but not in police corruption. The report bluntly attributed the department’s
approach to its “reluctance to uncover the full extent of police corruption in our City,” rather
than to any legitimate analysis of corrupt conduct.44 Second, the report pointed out that proactive
investigations like those undertaken by the commission were “sorely lacking from the
Department’s internal investigations for years.”45 The NYPD simply chose not to look for
something it did not want to find, while the commission’s report boasted that “whenever we
searched for corruption, we found it.”46
After the commission worked for over a year, Milton Mollen took pains at the first public
hearings in September 1993 to place its work in the context of the twenty-year cycles of police
corruption scandals. He described the cycles as “scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh scandal”
and contended that the cycles were not inevitable.47 After the expected praising of recent reform
efforts by the NYPD and noting that the vast majority of day-to-day operations of the department
were conducted honestly, Mollen emphasized that “investigations and prosecutions that
temporarily attract the public’s attention” could not resolve corruption issues.48
Mollen borrowed from the Knapp playbook with televised hearings featuring testimony
from corrupt cops, and the hearings even took place in the same meeting room of the New York
City Bar Association on West 44th Street that hosted the Knapp hearings.49 Just as the Knapp
hearings generated controversy with the testimony of corrupt cop Bill Phillips, the Mollen
hearings used Michael Dowd. In both instances, the commissions made deals with the devils of
police corruption and then clashed with other agencies that tried to take actions against those
devils. The telegenic and articulate Dowd lived up to his “dirtiest cop in New York” reputation
with unsettling testimony about committing robberies and dealing drugs. In July 1994, shortly
after the publication of the Mollen Commission’s final report, Dowd appeared before U.S.
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District Court Judge Kimba Wood for sentencing on his earlier guilty plea. Milton Mollen
supported Dowd’s request for leniency with a letter to Judge Wood setting forth how Dowd
provided “testimony and cooperation so valuable to the Commission and the public.” The federal
prosecutor on the case, however, strongly disagreed with Mollen’s position and called Dowd’s
purported cooperation “untruthful and evasive.” Judge Wood leaned more toward the
prosecutor’s position and sentenced Dowd to fourteen years, just one less than the available
maximum.50 Perhaps having learned from the unfavorable results in the Knapp era from using
Bill Phillips, no prosecutor called Michael Dowd to testify at a trial.
As reprehensible as Dowd was, he was upstaged in the televised Mollen Commission
hearings by the thuggish ex-cop Bernard Cawley. Cawley testified in rough street language that
he was known to other cops and his superiors as “the Mechanic” because of his skill in “tuning
up” (beating) people. According to his testimony, Cawley and other cops in the Bronx used leadlined gloves and other instruments to beat people whom they encountered on illegal raids of
supposed drug locations. The cops kept the money and sold the drugs, guns, and other property
that they found. Cawley participated in these raids hundreds of times in his four years in the
Bronx before his 1990 arrest on gun-running charges. Of neighborhood residents who hated the
police, Cawley testified, “You’d hate the police too if you lived there.”51
Dowd’s sentencing may have shown an unavoidable tension between the interests of an
investigative commission and those of a prosecuting authority. Assembling the Mollen
Commission had seemed much more deferential to prosecutors, particularly the five district
attorneys, than the record of the Knapp Commission. Whitman Knapp essentially questioned the
integrity of the district attorneys from the beginning when he suggested before the Knapp
Commission had even met that the D.A.s could not handle police corruption cases.52 The Knapp
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Commission’s final report hammered that point home by endorsing the position of special
prosecutor. Governor Rockefeller and his aide Maurice Nadjari caused further strain by
excluding the district attorneys from the decision making and then choosing a very strong model
for the special prosecutor. In contrast, Milton Mollen accepted D.A. Morgenthau’s
recommendation for the key position of chief counsel, and Commissioner Harold Tyler was a
close friend to Morgenthau.53 The Mollen Commission’s final report went out of its way to state,
“This Commission does not believe that local or federal prosecutors are reluctant to investigate
and prosecute corrupt police officers today. Nor have we found that the public typically
questions prosecutors’ ability to aggressively pursue such cases. On the contrary, we found that
both federal and local prosecutors were eager for us to refer evidence of police corruption to their
offices and that they are moving forward based on our evidence.”54 The report concluded that the
NYPD corruption problem needed an independent monitor, not a special prosecutor.
The Mollen Commission’s report drew attention to what it called “probably the most
common form of police corruption facing the criminal justice system”: the police practice of
making false statements in testimony and in documents such as affidavits, complaints, and
reports.55 The report popularized the cop-lingo term “testilying” for giving untruthful versions of
the circumstances of arrests and seizures. The untruths, which usually were crimes themselves as
perjury or false statements, often covered up more serious offenses of illegal searches, thefts,
payoffs, and brutality. The commission’s report specifically described the phenomenon of
officers who “stubbornly defend” the propriety of making false statements if it meant supporting
charges against a person who was actually committing crimes.56 Interestingly, this emphasis in
the commission’s report on perjury and other police falsification came at a time when
prosecutors did not increase the use of the crime of perjury to charge cops in the scandal-related
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prosecutions. The commission focused, however, on cops who lied in the regular course of what
they thought was their business. Prosecuted perjury cases, on the other hand, often involved
prosecutors setting perjury traps, as critics might call them, where prosecutors summoned the
cops before a grand jury and elicited perjurious testimony. Court decisions on granting immunity
and the right to remain silent limited those perjury traps in the Mollen-era prosecutions.
Although the Mollen Commission found that many cops rather routinely committed these
acts of falsification, it found almost no evidence of cops giving false testimony in exchange for
payoffs to have cases dismissed. The final report suggested that such corruption would be
foolhardy because of the risk of being caught by supervisors, prosecutors, or the courts. Instead,
a corrupt arrangement at the time of making or not making an arrest had a much better chance of
avoiding detection.57 This represented a shift from, for instance, the “elastic testimony” of the
Lexow era or the “turn out” of the Curran era, when cops would make arrests and then tailor
their testimony to cause case dismissals.58
In another area of contrast with prior eras, the Mollen Commission drew a connection
between police corruption and police brutality. The final report stated, “In sum, we found that
cops did not simply become corrupt; they sometimes became corrupt and violent. Until now
there has always been a distinction between corruption and brutality. Corruption was about
money; brutality was about unnecessary force and abuse of authority. That distinction has in
some cases blurred.”59 The report described various forms of brutality. Corrupt cops used
brutality in robbing drug dealers or in illegal raids of supposed drug locations. Other cops saw
the beating of drug dealers and other criminals as a justifiable imposition of punishment. More
generally, the report found that corrupt cops were more likely to be brutal cops, even when the
acts of brutality were not connected to corrupt activities.60 The commission blamed past NYPD
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commanders for failing to address brutality issues and optimistically noted that past deficiencies
appeared to have been overcome. 61 Sadly, the case of Abner Louima (1997) and others would
belie the commission’s optimism.
Following the public hearings in late September and early October 1993, the Mollen
Commission issued an interim report in late December 1993. By that time, Rudy Giuliani was
the mayor-elect and outgoing police commissioner Ray Kelly issued an unusually extensive list
of legislative proposals on police corruption matters.62 Political maneuvering ratcheted up in the
election season and the changeover in city hall. Kelly’s proposals seemed designed to steal some
thunder from the interim Mollen recommendations and to present his tenure in a better light after
the Mollen findings hit. With the twenty-page interim report, Mollen clearly wanted his
commission to exercise some influence over decisions that might be made as the Giuliani
administration took office. During the mayoral campaign, and true to his prosecutorial
background, Giuliani endorsed a revival of the Office of the Special State Prosecutor to handle
corruptions cases. Concerns arose that Giuliani might reject any findings of the Dinkinsappointed commission.63
Based on the hearings and the investigation, the Mollen Commission’s final report in July
1994 made its most significant contribution by bluntly describing the new permutation of police
corruption. The report declared that the bribery-based pad no longer existed, having been
replaced by “a new and often more invidious form of corruption.” The cops no longer just closed
their eyes to activities such as bookmaking; instead they were “acting as criminals, especially in
connection with the drug trade.” The criminal opportunities for the cops were both fortuitous and
the result of “created opportunities and premeditated, organized effort.”64
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The final report also confirmed that this new strain of police corruption occurred most
commonly in neighborhoods or precincts with high crime and extensive drug activity. If a major
component of the new style of corruption was robbing or taking payoffs from drug dealers, then
the corrupt activity necessarily happened in the areas where the drug dealers operated. The older
style of corruption flourished partly because of the element of public support for certain vices,
including sports betting, playing the numbers, or drinking on Sundays. Those activities occurred
across ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic lines in a variety of neighborhoods. So the older
corruption involved larger numbers of citizens participating in the illegal vices, as well as more
cops tasked to enforce laws in those areas. Fewer cops engaged in the new style of corruption,
and they focused their crimes on the most-troubled city neighborhoods. The largely minority
residents of those neighborhoods already had to deal with more than their share of poverty,
substandard housing, high unemployment, high crime, and drug dealing. On top of all that, they
had to deal with out-of-control cops who made most of the neighborhood problems worse by
aggravating racial tensions, undermining police legitimacy, and endangering instead of
protecting citizens. As ex-cop Cawley pointed out, no wonder the residents hated the cops.
As for creating outside oversight of the NYPD, Giuliani eventually moved away from the
special prosecutor model, but the political bickering only intensified as the city council overrode
Giuliani’s veto in early 1995 by creating an independent monitoring commission with members
appointed equally by the council and the mayor.65 With strong support from Manhattan D.A.
Morgenthau, Giuliani countered by issuing an executive order to create a commission with less
funding and more limited powers, and with all members appointed by the mayor.66 The
Commission to Combat Police Corruption continues to the present, although considered an
underfunded and ineffective anticorruption tool by many observers.67
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The Prosecutors
The three most active prosecutorial agencies in charging cops in the Mollen era were the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the district attorney’s offices
for New York County (Manhattan) and Bronx County. All three were led by prosecutors who
held their offices for unusually long time periods. Robert Morgenthau became D.A. in 1974 and
served until 2009, for an even longer tenure than his predecessor Frank Hogan. Robert Johnson
became Bronx D.A. in 1989 and serves to the present, the longest tenure in the history of that
office. Mary Jo White was sworn in as U.S. Attorney in 1993 and served until 2002, a tenure in
that position that might have been matched only by Robert Morgenthau in the 1960s if his two
stints in office are combined.
Morgenthau seemed determined to avoid the dismissive treatment that Frank Hogan
received in the Knapp era, particularly since Morgenthau himself received some of that treatment
after he took over from Hogan while the scandal was still hot.68 Morgenthau made sure that he
had a seat at the table as Mayor Dinkins formulated a response to the triggering event, and he
resisted proposals for establishing a new special prosecutor. As the Mollen Commission was just
getting started in late 1992, Morgenthau created a new unit to handle corruption cases. The
timing of the move suggested that Morgenthau sought to counter the opinion that district
attorneys could not adequately prosecute cops, and that he would not give the Mollen
Commission grounds to reach the anti-D.A. conclusions reached by Knapp Commission. He
even moved the new unit to satellite office space in SoHo to increase its appearance of
independence from the cop-dependant routine work of the main office.69
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Morgenthau came from an extraordinary background of political prominence and public
service. His grandfather was the last U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, best remembered
for his dire warnings about what became known as the Armenian Genocide. His father was
Franklin Roosevelt’s long-serving secretary of the Treasury, architect of New Deal programs,
and wartime strategist. Morgenthau himself grew up in wealth in New York City, attended prep
school at Deerfield and college at Amherst. In distinguished navy service in World War II,
Morgenthau survived a ship-sinking attack by the Germans in the Mediterranean and a Japanese
kamikaze attack in the Pacific.70 After Yale Law School and partnership in a prominent law firm,
Morgenthau was appointed U.S. Attorney by President Kennedy in 1961. He left office to
unsuccessfully run for governor against Nelson Rockefeller, then was promptly reappointed as
U.S. Attorney by JFK. His political elbows sharpened as he refused to voluntarily submit his
resignation to President Nixon, usually considered a routine matter when the White House
changes party. He finally resigned in 1970, then bided his time in private practice until winning
the position of New York County District Attorney in the 1974 special election held after Frank
Hogan’s death.
Morgenthau received some criticism for a slow response by his office to police
corruption of the 1980s, but that time period was unique because of the preeminence of the
special prosecutor.71 The Buddy Boys misconduct of that era did not happen in Manhattan,
although hindsight showed that other Manhattan-based corruption flourished. As the Mollen
Commission mulled the option of another special prosecutor, all five city district attorneys spoke
in opposition, with Morgenthau specifically recommending that an auditor be appointed every
four years by the mayor to review the police department’s anticorruption efforts.72 Morgenthau
and Mollen clashed publicly when Morgenthau wanted to bring perjury charges against an
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officer who had testified anonymously before the Mollen Commission about corruption in the
30th Precinct. Mollen spoke harshly of Morgenthau: “It’s no secret in law enforcement circles
that he is jealous and envious of the success of the Mollen Commission. Corruption had gone on
in that precinct for years and he was unable to uncover it. That’s a simple fact.”73 Morgenthau
relented and agreed not to prosecute if the officer resigned from the department.
Mary Jo White was born in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1947 and moved as a child to
McLean, Virginia, when her father was transferred to Washington in his job as an attorney for
the Social Security Administration. After college at William and Mary, she received a master’s
degree in psychology from the New School in New York, but she never used it professionally as
she enrolled at Columbia Law School the following year. After a few years in private practice at
a prestigious law firm, she joined the Southern District in 1978 as an Assistant U.S. Attorney.
She moved up the ladder as the chief of the appeals section of that office, then bounced back to
private practice in 1981. She returned to public service as the First Assistant U.S. Attorney in
Brooklyn in 1990, served briefly as Acting U.S. Attorney of that office, and received her
appointment to the Southern District from President Clinton in March 1993. White’s aggressive
nature became most apparent in terrorism cases (the World Trade Center had just been bombed),
but she brought it as well to the brewing police scandal as the Mollen Commission was in the
middle of its work.74 White contrasted sharply with her more restrained predecessor, Otto
Obermaier, who served as U.S. Attorney from 1989 to 1993.75 Since Obermaier’s predecessor
was Rudy Giuliani, the pendulum of prosecutorial aggressiveness seemed to swing back and
forth.
Several circumstances drove White’s strong moves on police corruption. White’s boss,
Janet Reno, brought a state and local law enforcement background to her appointment as

285

Attorney General, and she encouraged a larger federal role in fighting crime, which traditionally
had been the job of only state and local authorities. The widening NYPD scandal, of course,
created immediate opportunities for high-profile cases for a prosecutor looking to build her
credentials. In addition, the shift in the nature of police corruption as documented by the Mollen
Commission justified more federal involvement. Mary Jo White said in 1994, “Now that police
corruption has taken the form of drug-dealing, federal civil rights laws and the Internal Revenue
Service come in very handy.”76
Perhaps most important to the question of how many cops were prosecuted for what
offenses, White developed a contentious and competitive relationship with D.A. Morgenthau.
Morgenthau’s office was the most storied prosecutor’s office in the nation, while White’s office
was the preeminent federal agency. They existed a few hundred yards away from each other with
overlapping jurisdiction over the most coveted territory in the nation. Both prosecutors pushed
the boundaries of their offices. Expected conflicts rose to new levels when Morgenthau moved
boldly into complex white-collar offenses and Wall Street financial crimes, traditionally seen as
exclusively the feds’ domain. The Mollen-era police corruption prosecutions showed an unusual
number of defendants prosecuted by both White’s and Morgenthau’s offices—more commonly
an indication of conflict rather than cooperation.77 When Morgenthau ran for reelection in 2005,
White even stepped up to chair his primary opponent’s campaign. Morgenthau won easily.78
White went on to head the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Robert Johnson was born and raised in the Bronx. He graduated from James Monroe
High School and the City College of New York before serving in the U.S. Navy and attending
New York University Law School. After three years with the Legal Aid Society, then New York
City’s version of a public defender’s office, he joined the Bronx district attorney’s office as an
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assistant district attorney and remained there for eight years. He served about two years by
appointment as a trial court judge before winning election as the Bronx district attorney in 1988.
Johnson moved into the vacuum left by the sudden death of long-serving and well-regarded
Bronx D.A. Mario Merola. The death of Italian-American Merola became part of a transfer of
political power in the Bronx to Hispanic and African American domination. The Bronx was
already a “majority minority” borough, so the election of a Hispanic borough president and the
African American Johnson as D.A. seemed overdue.79
Johnson inherited a difficult situation. The Bronx was the city’s poorest and most crimeplagued borough and had been in decline for decades. Its district attorney’s office was
considered the least prestigious of the city’s prosecutors’ offices. Bronx juries were notoriously
reluctant to convict criminal defendants, contributing to Bronx prosecutors regularly having the
city’s lowest conviction rate.80 The police department often did not handle the challenges of high
crime and the minority population well, a problem emphasized by the sort of misconduct
revealed by the Mollen Commission. Johnson walked a tightrope between performing his duties
as the chief law enforcement official of the Bronx and attempting reforms called for by his
constituents. When he attempted to ban plea bargaining by his office in 1992, critics predicted
gridlock in the courts.81 His opposition to the death penalty in 1996 caused the governor to take
the case of a murder of a police officer away from his office.82 With police antagonized by
Johnson’s refusal to prosecute cases based on certain types of stop-and-frisks, and with
continued low conviction rates by his office, some political leaders moved toward seeking
Johnson’s resignation.83 The state legislature even voted in 2014 to remove the prison complex
on Riker’s Island from the Bronx D.A.’s jurisdiction as requested by the union of corrections

287

officers, although the governor vetoed the measure.84 Through it all, Johnson has become one of
the longest serving prosecutors in state history with over twenty-seven years on the job.

The Prosecutions
The Mollen-era scandal produced prosecutions of seventy-nine police officers according
to information disclosed by research. That was a large reduction from the Knapp era (219), but
still considerably ahead of the Lexow era (47), the Curran era (17), the Seabury era (18), and the
Gross era (35). Unlike the Knapp era, the Mollen era did not have the special state prosecutor
looking for cases and spurring the district attorneys. More importantly, the nature of the
corruption revealed by the Mollen Commission involved fewer officers—the Mollen “pockets”
compared to the Knapp “pad.” There were simply fewer prosecutable cases to go around, but the
cases often involved more serious wrongdoing.
Cases tended to result in more guilty pleas and fewer trial acquittals than in the earlier
scandals. With the exception of the 48th Precinct cases in the Bronx (described below), very few
prosecutions ended with not guilty verdicts at trial. The more serious nature of the offenses might
have meant that prosecutors took more care in bringing cases. Prosecutors used the sort of
troublesome witnesses that upset prosecutions in the 1950s (Harry Gross) and the 1970s (Bill
Phillips) less often. Also, more cops faced simultaneous federal and state charges, largely
because Mary Jo White (federal) and Robert Morgenthau (state) refused to yield prosecutorial
turf. Officers faced with charges from multiple jurisdictions might have been more likely to
plead guilty. Overall, guilty pleas resolved a higher percentage of cases than in the previous
scandals.
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Eight different prosecutorial agencies handled the scandal-related prosecutions. The
district attorneys in Brooklyn and Staten Island brought no cases. The Suffolk County D.A. was
active, having jurisdiction over the arrests from the triggering event. A breakdown of the number
of cases handled by each office needs to recognize that twelve of the prosecuted cops were
charged by both the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and a district attorney’s
office, usually Manhattan. Most of those cases were resolved by guilty pleas, perhaps because
the prosecutor in each jurisdiction insisted on a guilty plea for the statistics of that office. The
federal charges tended to involve drugs and civil rights violations, which might be regarded as
more serious than the common state charge of perjury. The list in table 8.1 credits those
combined state and federal prosecutions to the federal agency (the SDNY) in order to avoid
overcounting the number of police officers prosecuted. The number of SDNY cases also
prosecuted by a D.A.’s office is noted parenthetically.
One case noted in table 8.1 was prosecuted by the city’s Special Narcotics Prosecutor
(SNP). That position was created by the state legislature in 1971 to address the city’s drug
problem in a uniform manner with citywide jurisdiction, and its functions became more critical
after the 1973 enactment of the so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws. The city’s five elected district
attorneys vote to name the SNP.85 The case noted in the table involved an officer arrested in
1995 with six pounds of cocaine. That officer was previously implicated, but not prosecuted, in
the 48th Precinct investigation, so including the subsequent drug case seems appropriate as a
scandal-related prosecution.86
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TABLE 8.1 Prosecuting authorities in Mollen-era cases
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Agency
Officers charged
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
U.S. Attorney SDNY
26
U.S. Attorney EDNY
5
Manhattan district attorney
14
(and 10 jointly with SDNY)
Bronx district attorney
23
(and 1 jointly with SDNY)
Queens district attorney
3
Suffolk County
6
(and 1 jointly with SDNY)
Rockland County
1
Special narcotics prosecutor
1
Total

79

The single case from Rockland County involved a cop from the 48th Precinct in the Bronx who
was arrested on drug charges in 1993 in Rockland County and then cooperated in the wider
investigation of others in the precinct.87
The ethnicity count based on surnames becomes even less precise than in previous
scandals. Those with identifiably ethnic surnames might belong to families that had been in the
United States for a few generations with marriages that dilute a surname-based measure of
heritage. Nevertheless, the trend toward more diversity in the NYPD is clear. The Irish name
count among the prosecuted cops (17 or 22%) held fairly close to the Knapp-era numbers, and
the Italian name count (14 or 17%) dropped a bit compared to the Knapp era. The clearest
development was the increase in names of apparent Hispanic origin. Some 19 of the 79
prosecuted cops (24%) had Hispanic surnames, outpacing their corrupt Irish and Italian brethren.
Although not measurable by names and unidentified in routine court record and press accounts,
African American officers seemed to increase in representation among the prosecuted cops. The
30th Precinct in Harlem had a very large cluster of cases (the “Dirty 30”) that appeared to include
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a significant number of African American officers. Newspaper coverage from the 48th Precinct
had photographs of the defendants showing that two of the sixteen charged officers were African
American.88 As for gender diversity, just two of the seventy officers charged were female.
Important developments of the Mollen-era scandal are reflected in the ranks of the
prosecuted defendants (table 8.2). The lowest-ranking officers dominated the prosecutions to a
degree that exceeded the earlier scandals. Of the seventy-nine prosecuted cops, seventy-two
(91%) were patrolmen89 and seven (9%) were sergeants. No detectives, captains, or inspectors
were charged. Only 53 percent of the defendants in Knapp-era cases were patrolmen. Although
the Gross (77%) and Seabury (88%) eras showed high percentages of patrolmen charged, both
included prosecutions of high-ranking inspectors.

TABLE 8.2. Ranks of police charge in Mollen-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Rank
No. charged
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Patrolman
72
91
Sergeant
7
9
Total

79

100

The bottom-heavy prosecutions were consistent with the nature of the corruption uncovered by
the Mollen Commission. The Mollen-era corrupt cops tended to commit their crimes of theft,
robbery, break-ins, and drug dealing as outgrowths of their assignments in high crime
neighborhoods. They kept their spoils and did not have to “kick upstairs” to higher-ranking
officers as part of an organized payoff system.
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The lack of prosecutions of upper-ranking cops may show a weakness in criminal
prosecutions as an anticorruption tool. While the most overt corrupt activity of the Mollen era
was committed by street cops, much of their activity certainly occurred with the knowledge of
supervisors. The Mollen Commission’s report found a “widespread breakdown in supervision” in
the department and attributed much of the failure to a “willful blindness” by supervisors.90 The
blindness may have been due to a fear of reporting corruption and the unspoken understanding
that the department did not want another corruption scandal. In any event, and no matter what
significance the Mollen Commission attributed to supervisory shortcomings, no supervisor was
prosecuted for inaction that condoned the illegal conduct of the street cops. The criminal law’s
general requirement that a defendant commit the elements of a crime with affirmative acts might
have made such prosecutions impossible. Failing to act against corruption, by itself, is not a
crime.
Determining the primary charged conduct (table 8.3) against a prosecuted cop was
particularly complicated by the frequent charging by both federal and state offices, but some
patterns emerged in comparisons with earlier scandals. Drug and larceny charges were much
more common than in the earlier scandals, consistent with the Mollen Commission’s descriptions
of cops stealing from drug dealers. Also consistent with the Mollen Commission’s descriptions,
the crime of assault was charged to an extent not seen since the Lexow and Seabury eras.
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TABLE 8.3. Primary charged conduct in Mollen-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Conduct
No. of cases % of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Perjury /false statement
18
23
Drugs
15
19
Larceny
12
15
Assault
9
12
Civil rights
9
12
Extortion/bribery
8
10
Obstruction of justice
3
4
Firearms
2
2
Robbery
1
1
Burglary
1
1
Fraud
1
1
Total

79

100

The most important pattern was the clear emergence of civil rights violations as among
the strongest charges available to federal prosecutors to use against police. Although the laws
date back to Reconstruction, they were used only sporadically against state officials and were
subjected to decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court that narrowed their scope.91 By the 1960s, the
broader civil rights movement encouraged greater federal involvement and the Supreme Court’s
Price decision brought some clearer guidelines for prosecutors thinking about using the laws.92
The Knapp era saw the first use of civil rights laws against cops in scandal-related prosecutions,
but on an extremely limited basis. The charges became more common in the Mollen era and
contributed to the ascendancy of federal police prosecutions.
Perhaps the clearest indication of how prosecutions of police corruption changed in the
Mollen era comes in the breakdown of the activity underlying the charged police misconduct.
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The scandal prosecutions from the Lexow era of the 1890s through the Gross era of the 1950s
were propelled largely by misconduct based on either prostitution or gambling. Those cases
evaporated in the Mollen era. The 1970s Knapp-era prosecutions involved rather wide-ranging
underlying activity—particularly gambling, drugs, and legitimate business. In the Mollen era,
drugs dominated the scandal, as shown in table 8.4.

Table 8.4. Primary underlying activities in Mollen-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Activity
Cases
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Drugs
60
76
Other civilian activity
9
11
Unknown civilian activity
6
8
No civilian activity
3
4
No information
1
1
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total
79
100
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

The “other civilian activity” category covers a variety of civilian conduct that showed no
apparent illegality. For instance, three cops from the 48th Precinct in the Bronx were charged
with assaulting an individual singled out in a crowd from which someone called out “police
brutality” while the cops were trying to make an arrest and clear the area. All three were found
not guilty at a bench trial.93 In another example, a sergeant from the 52nd Precinct in the Bronx
was charged with beating a young passenger in a car that the sergeant stopped. The sergeant was
found not guilty in a bench trial.94 “Unknown civilian activity” refers to situations where the
civilian conduct, if any, was not specified. An example was the prosecution of three cops from
the 109th Precinct in Queens for the theft of money from a wallet in an apartment, described
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below. In the “no civilian activity” category, cops were charged with corrupt conduct that had no
civilian involvement. For instance, a sergeant from the 40th Precinct in the Bronx pleaded guilty
to insurance fraud for falsely reporting his car stolen. He was swept up in the cluster of 48th
Precinct cases because he abandoned his Jeep Cherokee in that precinct, which was also where
his girlfriend worked.95
The Mollen era saw the first widespread use of the sting tactic of investigations by which
targeted cops were deceptively offered an opportunity to commit a crime. The complexity of the
tactics varied. Some stings were fairly straight forward integrity tests, while others involved
more elaborate setups. For purposes of entry in table 8.2, if the sting was designed to simulate a
drug-related scenario, the resulting prosecution was considered to have drug-related underlying
activity although, of course, there was no genuine civilian drug activity in the case. The police
department had so many locations for sting operations that Commissioner Bratton quipped that
he had become a major real estate operator.96
In an example of a rather elaborate sting, in 1994 (soon after the release of the Mollen
Commission’s interim report) the Internal Affairs Bureau rented a shabby apartment on a block
of heavy drug-dealing activity in the 48th Precinct in the Bronx.97 The cooperating cop from the
48th Precinct who had been arrested on drug charges in Rockland County (noted above and
described further below) brought other cops to the location to “arrest” an undercover officer
posing as a drug dealer. The other cops stole $1000 from a closet in the apartment. The ruse
apartment stayed active for a few months, catching cops making arrests without cause,
committing other thefts, and “testilying” about where contraband was found. A blunder by the
Internal Affairs Bureau, however, ended the sting when investigators planted a gun in the
apartment that had been planted there before. The cop who recovered the recycled gun noticed
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another cop’s initials on the weapon, which was a common practice to identify a firearm in
police inventory.98 Prosecutions arising from the apartment are categorized as drug-related in
table 8.4.
In the dispositions of prosecuted cases, an important trend continued from the Knapp era.
The percentage of cases that resulted in convictions (60%) continued to rise. This is the soughtafter conviction rate that many prosecutors pursue relentlessly. It is the statistic most commonly
cited to measure the success of a prosecutor’s office. Concern about the conviction rate can
create a reluctance to charge cases that are difficult to prove as well as a disinclination to dismiss
charges without getting a conviction of some sort. While it seems clear that prosecutors of the
Mollen era were becoming more successful by the conviction-rate measure, it should be noted
that for the unit of analysis of the individual prosecuted cop, any conviction counts as a
conviction regardless of whether the same cop was not convicted on other charges. For example,
Officer Michael Kalanz of the 48th Precinct received a not guilty verdict on assault charges in
state court but was convicted by his guilty plea on obstruction of justice charges in federal
court.99 His case is counted as a conviction.
Table 8.5 summarizes the dispositions of cases.
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TABLE 8.5. Dispositions of Mollen-era prosecutions
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Disposition
Cases
% of total
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Guilty at jury trial
9
11
Guilty at bench trial
2
3
Guilty plea
37
47
Total Convicted
48
60
Dismissed
Not guilty at jury trial
Not guilty at bench trial
Total not convicted

5
6
10
21

6
8
13
27

Unknown disposition

10

13

Total

79

100

In another trend that continued from the Knapp era, an increasing percentage of charged
cops pleaded guilty (47%). Before the Knapp era, guilty pleas by charged cops were quite
uncommon. In the Mollen era, guilty pleas became the common route for case dispositions. The
Mollen era saw more of the factors that can contribute to prosecutors having stronger cases—
such as more tapes, more cooperating cops, or more federal cases—and stronger cases can
induce defendants to plead guilty.
In the Knapp era, the lengthier sentences of incarceration tended to be those imposed in
federal court. At that time, federal and state sentencing schemes were easier to compare. Longer
sentences in New York State (“state time”) were expressed in terms of minimums and
maximums, with parole eligibility commencing after service of the minimum sentence, which
was usually one-third of the maximum. Federal sentences did not prescribe a minimum term, but
parole eligibility commonly occurred after service of one-third of the imposed sentence.
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Therefore, a state sentence of two to six years was comparable to a federal sentence of six years,
which is why table 7.5, sentences of convicted Knapp-era defendants, uses the maximum
sentence to categorize a defendant’s state sentence. The federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
however, led to federal sentencing guidelines and the elimination of parole for crimes committed
after the effective date.

TABLE 8.6. Sentences of convicted Mollen-era defendants100
Sentence

No. of cases

Nonincarceration:
Probation, cond. discharge, and/or fine
Incarceration:
Less than 1 year
1 year
1 to 5 years
More than 5 years
Unknown
Total sentenced

5

12
5
11
6
9
48

Sentences that involved no incarceration proportionately dropped from the Knapp era (33
of 94 sentences, or 35%) to the Mollen era (5 of 35, or 14%). This likely resulted from the
Mollen era corruption being more serious in nature than in earlier eras, as pointed out often by
the Mollen Commission. In addition, the then-mandatory federal guidelines gave judges less
discretion to impose noncustodial sentences. Only one of the five noncustodial sentences was
from federal court: a sentence of four years probation and six months under house arrest for a
cop who cooperated in the 30th Precinct investigation.101
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Comparing the 30th and 48th Precinct Clusters: Rats and Bench Trials
Prosecutions of cops from the 30th Precinct in Manhattan (Harlem) and the 48th Precinct
in the Bronx (Tremont) were by far the largest clusters of cases. In all, thirty-four cops from the
30th Precinct and seventeen cops from the 48th Precinct were charged, totaling almost two-thirds
of the Mollen-era scandal prosecutions. The two clusters provided stark contrasts in the
outcomes of prosecutions and highlighted how cops caught in the investigation made different
choices to suit their predicaments: many 30th Precinct cops decided to cooperate and many 48th
Precinct cops chose bench trials.
When the anonymous “Officer Otto” testified before the Mollen Commission, he
described a precinct where the cops were particularly out of control. It turned out that Officer
Otto was Officer Barry Brown of the 30th Precinct. He had been recruited after completing the
police academy to be a field associate, the Knapp-era reform that enlisted cops who would report
secretly about activities in their precincts.102 The program was brilliantly designed, but in
hindsight, it did little to prevent misconduct at the 30th Precinct. Instead, it provided the Mollen
Commission with a dramatic witness and ruined Officer Brown’s career. Brown ended up
resigning from the police department, at least in part to avoid prosecution by D.A. Morgenthau
for repeated instances of perjury in criminal cases. Both sides had good points. To Mollen and
other Brown supporters, Brown simply went along with “testilying” to maintain his cover as a
field associate. To Morgenthau, Brown’s false swearing crossed a bright line of what a cop
should never do and resulted in tainted convictions that Morgenthau had to unravel.103
Cops in the 30th Precinct nervously watched Brown’s televised testimony. The fieldassociate program put Brown in the precinct and cops knew there could be others. Worse,
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aggressive investigations by the Mollen Commission, Internal Affairs, and various prosecutors
could be expected to use cooperators to make recordings and gather evidence. Cops accused their
partners of being rats and patted each other down to check for wires.104 Seeing actual cooperators
on TV and imagining more in the station house presented two alternatives to the wrongdoers of
the precinct that were not mutually exclusive: either fear the cooperators or join them.
The blue wall of silence suddenly was not so impervious. Of the thirty-four cops charged
criminally from the 30th Precinct, eleven chose to cooperate. Sometimes the investigation looked
like dominoes falling. George Nova, who was Barry Brown’s partner, faced drug charges and
decided to cooperate. Nova recorded Officer Alberto Vargas; Vargas recorded officers Ruben
Garza and Michael Walsh; Garza and Walsh informed on Officer Blake Struller; Struller
recorded Officer William Knox; Knox recorded Officers Theodore Giovanelli and Kevin Kay;
Giovanelli and Kay implicated Sgt. Kevin Nannery.105 From a prosecutorial point of view, this
willingness to cooperate allowed more cops to be charged and for the cases to be stronger
because cooperators often managed to make recordings. The end result was likely the most
successful prosecution of a cluster of cases in the history of the cyclical scandals: twenty-nine
convictions (23 by plea, 6 convicted at trial) and only five nonconvictions (three dismissals and
two found not guilty at trial) from the total of thirty-four cops charged. Of course, reliance on
cooperators still carried risks. The first Dirty 30 case to go to trial ended in a quick not guilty
verdict in federal court because the jury did not accept the testimony of cooperating cop George
Nova in the case against his former partner, John Arena.106
The 48th Precinct cluster of cases, much like the broader scandal, arose from a suburban
arrest of an NYPD cop on drug charges. Officer Timothy Zaccardo was supposed to be on duty
on a midnight tour in the 48th Precinct in the central Bronx when he was arrested miles away
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near his home in Rockland County in late 1993. Zaccardo agreed to cooperate, described major
misconduct in the 48th Precinct, and began work with investigators from the NYPD and the
Bronx D.A.’s office. A major component of his cooperation brought officers to the seedy
“\sting”\ apartment, described previously.107 Zaccardo’s arrest came shortly before the Mollen
Commission issued its interim report. The final report did not mention activities in the 48th
Precinct in deference to the ongoing investigation.
The crimes by cops in the 48th Precinct were similar to many of those uncovered in the
30th Precinct and elsewhere in the Mollen-era scandal: thefts, perjury, assaults, improper
searches, and unlawful arrests based on drug activity in a poor neighborhood. Notably, the 48th
Precinct misconduct continued unabated even after the 30th Precinct scandal broke, perhaps
suggesting the limited deterrent effect of catching other cops in wrongdoing. When the
investigation of the 48th Precinct finally went public, the result made for spectacular theater.
Sixteen cops were arrested and handcuffed, mostly in their suburban homes, and paraded before
the press before their arraignment at the Bronx courthouse on May 3, 1995. Commissioner
Bratton used the arrests as proof that the NYPD and the district attorneys could effectively
investigate cops without an independent monitor. Justice Burton Roberts, the blustery ex-Bronx
D.A. of the Knapp era, released all of the charged cops despite the prosecutor’s request for
bail.108
In sharp contrast to the dispositions of the 30th Precinct cases, just four cops among the
seventeen charged from the 48th Precinct pleaded guilty. Zaccardo pleaded to misdemeanor-level
charges in Rockland County, and two other cooperating cops pleaded guilty to felony charges in
the Bronx.109 The fourth guilty plea came from a noncooperating cop in federal court.110 Two
cops were found guilty at bench trials, making a total of only six convicted cops for a conviction
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rate of only 35% compared to 85% (29 convictions of 34 charged) for the 30th Precinct cluster.
Possible explanations abound for the differing outcomes for the two clusters. The 30th Precinct
cases were prosecuted by the powerhouse offices of the Southern District of New York and the
Manhattan D.A., while the 48th Precinct cases had the less-storied Bronx district attorney and
usually no federal involvement. The 30th Precinct investigation had the falling dominoes of cops
choosing to cooperate, but the 48th Precinct investigation may have ended early, perhaps because
of the already-vouchered gun planted in the sting apartment. Also, the 48th Precinct
investigation’s attempts to corroborate the testimony of cooperating cops fell short. Recorded
conversations in the sting apartment and in a wired-up car were often inaudible or contained
difficult-to-interpret cop talk.111
The biggest difference between the 30th and 48th Precinct cases, though, came in the
bench trials. Once the charged cops of the 48th Precinct decided not to cooperate and not to plead
guilty, they almost invariably chose bench trials. The New York State Criminal Procedure Law,
Article 230, grants a near-absolute right for a criminal defendant to waive a trial by jury in favor
of trial by a single judge.112 Choosing the nonjury route seemed especially advisable in the
atmosphere of the police scandal and common antipolice sentiment. Bernard Cawley (of the
neighboring 46th Precinct, not the 48th) summed up the concern in his Mollen Commission
testimony about how residents hated cops. Those same Bronx residents would be called to jury
duty.
While it is impossible to say that Bronx prosecutors would have done better with juries
hearing evidence against the defendants, they could not have done much worse. Of the eleven
charged cops who waived jury trials, nine were found not guilty by the presiding judges.113
Consistent with the common problem in trials against cops, testifying witnesses had credibility
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issues. In the 48th Precinct bench trials, some of the troublesome witnesses were the cooperating
cops. Presiding judges delivered not guilty verdicts after finding deficiencies in the testimony of
cooperating cops Richard Rivera and James Vasquez, both of whom had their own records of
serious illegal conduct.114 Officer John Lowe had an unusual series of court experiences on
assorted charges. He was found guilty by the judge in a bench trial, and then the same judge
vacated the conviction due to prosecutorial error. Lowe then had two jury trials end in hung
juries, and at another bench trial he was found not guilty.115 After winning at his bench trial,
Officer Lowe said with an insincerity that was clear even in print: “I think it’s good that they’re
cracking down on corruption. But don’t let the testimony of the bad guys destroy the lives of the
good guys.”116

The 109th Precinct Cases
Among scandal prosecutions, a relatively minor case arose in the 109th Precinct in the
middle class Flushing/College Point section of Queens. It was not part of a large cluster, no
civilians were beaten, and no drugs were distributed, but it reflected how a scandal could change
business as usual in the NYPD. It also reflected that Mollen-era police corruption was not
necessarily limited to high-crime, impoverished neighborhoods.
In February 1993, when the Mollen Commission was still in its formative stages, an
Asian man in Queens complained that cops had taken $1,400 from his wallet when four officers
responded to his apartment after a false report of a kidnapping. The victim dutifully reported the
incident to the NYPD, but the internal affairs unit found the report unsubstantiated.117 As the
Mollen Commission later concluded, the NYPD often did not look diligently for corruption for
fear of finding it.
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After the Mollen Commission gathered momentum, held hearings, and issued its interim
report, the anticorruption efforts of the NYPD started to stir. In early 1994, several officers of the
109th Precinct failed drug tests, including some officers who were at the scene of the $1,400 theft
a year earlier, and one of them told investigators about the theft. Investigative activity stepped up
further with an integrity test targeted at another of the officers from the $1,400 theft. In January
1995, Officer John Pylyp received orders to transport a supposedly abandoned van back to the
precinct. The van was wired for video, and Pylyp stole $200 from a wallet in the van, although
he tried to voucher the money a few hours later when he became suspicious. The investigation
did not go much further as police union delegates tipped off officers that sting investigations
were underfoot. Pylyp’s wife complained loudly that investigators threatened to take away
medical coverage needed to treat their son’s brain tumor in an effort to get Pylyp to cooperate. 118
In fact, it was revealed later that Pylyp did offer to cooperate, but the offer was refused because
of his credibility issues. More cautious than the 30th and 48th Precinct investigations, which used
virtually any cop regardless of his history, the decision not to use Pylyp effectively ended the
possibility of charging more cops in the 109th Precinct investigation.119
Pylyp and two others, Anthony Biancaniello and Joseph DiGregorio, were indicted in
March 1995 for the $1,400 theft, over two years after the crime and the initial muted response by
the NYPD. DiGregorio was already out of the NYPD due to the failed drug test, and he obtained
a dismissal of the charges against him. Both Pylyp and Biancaniello pleaded guilty, received
probationary sentences, and were dismissed from the police department. The fourth cop, who
revealed the theft, was not charged.120 Although the fallout from the overall scandal prompted
drug testing, the abandoned van sting, and revival of the old theft charge, the investigation did
not go far. The pocket of corruption in the 109th Precinct was certainly not as deep as the pockets
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in the 30th and 48th Precincts. Uncertain is whether investigators thoroughly examined the 109th
or if a disinclination to find corruption lingered.

Conclusion
Although the Mollen Commission successfully encouraged district attorneys to step up
anticorruption action, an important prosecutorial development was the continued increase in
federal involvement. With the trend toward the federalization of criminal law, federal
prosecutors handled more cases charging public officials. Also, federal prosecutors took their cue
from Attorney General Janet Reno and assumed a larger role in fighting street crime like drug
dealing, gangs, and carjacking. The new style of police corruption of the Mollen era gave federal
prosecutors both public corruption and street crime in one package. Legally, the big federal
development was the freer use of civil rights laws against the cops engaged in the new patterns
of corruption.
Despite the final report’s criticism of the NYPD’s “rotten apple” approach to corruption,
the nature of corruption revealed by the Mollen Commission was actually closer to a “rotten
apple” model than the “rotten barrel” model of the Knapp era. That is, an individual police
officer (the rotten apple) would be engaged in serious misconduct, albeit operating in a
conspiracy with other rotten apples. The problem was that the scandal-averse department took
little action against the rotten apples. As for a rotten barrel, the Knapp-era rotten barrel contained
widespread pad-based corruption. The Mollen-era rotten barrel was more like an accommodating
receptacle for the rotten apples’ activity in that supervisors did not stop it, the department did not
expose it, and the (relatively) honest fellow cops tolerated it.
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Corruption based on the lesser vices of gambling, liquor, and prostitution faded in the
Knapp era and disappeared in the Mollen era. Even the drug corruption of the Knapp era had
some orderliness to it as it joined those traditional vices in supporting pad-based payoffs. The
Mollen era broke down the relative orderliness of cops taking payoffs and substituted crimes
committed by renegade cops. By that evolution, the Mollen-era scandal elevated the importance
of prosecuting the offenders. The meat eaters dominated the corruption scandal, and those cops
clearly deserved to be prosecuted above and beyond other sanctions of transfers, dismissals,
demotions, subtracted vacation days, or lost pensions. Much of the police wrongdoing was
identical to the other serious crimes of drug dealing, thefts, break-ins, and assaults routinely
handled by prosecutors. The arguments against prosecuting cops—that the crimes were minor,
were best handled administratively, or lacked jury appeal—were spoken less often.
Although the Mollen-era conduct might have been more suited for the sanction of
prosecution, prosecutors had not done a good job at uncovering the wrongdoing until the Mollen
Commission goaded them to action. The Buddy Boys case should have spun off into more police
prosecutions, if not a full-blown scandal. Shocking conditions in the 30th Precinct should not
have been allowed to fester. Most of the blame for inaction should fall on the NYPD as it
strained to avert its eyes to avoid seeing corruption, as pointed out by the Mollen Commission.
The NYPD received complaints that were then investigated halfheartedly (109th Precinct) or
intentionally ignored (Michael Dowd). The prosecutors share that blame. The Office of the
Special State Prosecutor became less active in the years just before it was dissolved in 1990.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is conjecture to suggest that Mollen-era corruption
would have been addressed sooner and more aggressively, perhaps even avoiding the need for a
full-blown cyclical scandal, if the special prosecutor remained in existence. The special
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prosecutor’s office was discredited in the Nadjari years and dispirited in its final years, but
proper funding and management might have kept it focused on its mission. If nothing else, its
continued existence might have continued to do what it did in the Knapp era -- inspire or
embarrass the district attorneys to take action in police matters. Instead, the district attorneys did
not do enough to shake up the see-no-evil NYPD or aggressively investigate the overt police
criminality disclosed by the Mollen Commission.
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Chapter 9

Discussion and Conclusions

Examination of the circumstances of the six cyclical police scandals and of the related
prosecutions of over four hundred cops yielded compelling stories of an evolving New York City
and its citizenry, politics, crime, and policing. The research questions in chapter 2 focused on
descriptions of the prosecutions and what those descriptions suggest about the past and future of
police scandals and the prosecutive remedy.
This chapter divides discussion and conclusions into six topic headings:
1. Cyclical scandals: Past and future
2. Changing times and changing corruption
3. An increasing need for prosecution as a corruption remedy
4. Lessons learned for prosecutors
5. Gambling on the feds
6. A police prosecutor
The discussion areas certainly overlap. The cyclical scandals show the interactions over time of
factors that included prosecutors’ ambitions, political battles, police functions, community
attitudes, social conditions, legislative changes, and technological developments.

Cyclical scandals: Past and Future
After the Knapp Commission hearings of the 1970s, former Bronx D.A. Burton Roberts
summed up his thoughts: “Twenty years from now, there will be another police scandal. I cannot
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tell you why. I cannot tell you why Halley’s Comet comes over the skies every few years, but it
does. Corruption will be back, too.”1 His prediction was correct, of course, as the Mollen-era
scandal occurred on schedule. Although the six cyclical scandals defy a precise astronomical
explanation like Halley’s Comet, they may not be as inscrutable as Roberts suggested.
As noted in chapters 3 through 8, each cyclical scandal needed a triggering event. The
triggering events were two homicides (Curran and Seabury eras), two newspaper exposés (Gross
and Knapp eras), one suburban arrest (Mollen era), and one preacher’s sermon (Lexow era).
Although each event merited its status as the triggering event, and each was necessary (if not
sufficient) for the respective scandals to break, the dissimilarities among the events are notable.
Rev. Parkhurst’s sermon reflected the particular moral and political conflicts of the 1890s.
Jumping ahead a century, Michael Dowd’s arrest charges on Long Island were consistent with
the turn toward harsh, drug-based criminality by some cops in the 1990s. The newspaper stories
as triggering events differed because the Mollen era involved cooperation between the journalist
and the Brooklyn D.A. to publicize the scandal, while the Knapp era involved the journalist
working surreptitiously with whistleblower cops, to the embarrassment of prosecutors and the
police department. The homicides that triggered the Curran and Seabury era scandals had
strikingly similar facts (Jewish gambler/gangsters gunned down in midtown Manhattan), but the
former immediately touched off the police scandal while the latter caused a political scandal that
took a couple of years to arrive at some police corruption.
A variety of types of events have qualified as triggering events. To use a kitchen
metaphor, a pressure cooker might explode because of a faulty lid, a broken valve, an absent
cook, or some other reason; the point is that the device already contained enough pressure to
make explosion a possibility. Leaving the kitchen for the NYPD, every cyclical scandal exposed

316

ongoing corrupt activity by police. Police corruption continued and evolved through all of the
scandals. Back to the kitchen, there was always police corruption in the pressure cooker. It was
the response that operated cyclically, not the police misconduct itself.
At times, public figures perceived the need to set in motion the responses to the ongoing
corruption. Those public figures had mixed motivations of defensiveness and opportunism. New
York State Republicans saw political advantage in the Lexow Committee; the city board of
aldermen responded to the attention-grabbing success of the district attorney by appointing the
Curran Committee; Governor Franklin Roosevelt guarded his ambitions for higher office with
the request for inquiry by the court system that led to the Seabury investigations; the Brooklyn
D.A. wanted maximum exposure for his gambling and corruption crusade; and both Mayor
Lindsay and Mayor Dinkins appointed commissions to deal with police issues that threatened
their political futures. Each decision involved a calculation that a well-publicized investigation of
corruption was the appropriate route. The decisions of each era faced possible opposition from a
range of sources that included the police department, prosecutors, judges, cops, and politicians.
Consciously or not, decision makers appear to have considered whether enough time had
passed since the last major outside scrutiny of police corruption. The opportunistic decision
maker might seem selfish in calling for an investigation of cops if a similar investigation was
fresh in the public’s memory. Or, the defensive decision maker might seem desperate. The
question remains, why twenty years instead of, say, ten years or thirty years? Although lacking
the astronomical precision of Halley’s Comet, twenty years is a common generational measure.
NYPD cops retire after twenty years. With a few important exceptions like Samuel Seabury and
Rudy Giuliani, twenty years was sufficient time for the cast of characters in each cyclical scandal
to substantially change. Demographers use twenty years to describe an entire generation of
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Americans in two-decade categories like “Baby Boomers,” “Generation X,” and “Millenials.”2
Similarly, and as noted in chapter 1, Feinberg sees twenty years as the length of time for a
generation dealing with a new police scandal to have forgotten what happened in the previous
generation’s scandal.3 With twenty years as the default interval, the decision to empanel the
investigative authority created the scandal cycles, not the triggering events and not the police
misconduct.
At this writing, the seventh cyclical police scandal is overdue, based on the Mollen
Commission being named in July 1992 and issuing its final report in July 1994.4 Two major
reasons suggest that it will not happen. First, a mayor with an eye toward history should avoid
naming a commission to investigate cops. All six of the cyclical scandals contributed to the
downfall of the sitting mayor. In 1894, Mayor Thomas Gilroy declined to run for reelection in
the midst of Lexow Committee hearings.5 In 1913, Mayor William Gaynor was denied the
endorsement of his own Democratic Party after the Lexow Committee filed its report.6 In 1932,
Mayor Jimmy Walker resigned after being caught up in Samuel Seabury’s investigations. In
1950, Mayor William O’Dwyer resigned as the Brooklyn D.A.’s investigation entangled him. In
1973, Mayor John Lindsay chose not to run for reelection after the 1972 Knapp Commission
Report severely criticized his police department. Finally, in 1993, Mayor David Dinkins lost his
reelection bid to ardent police supporter Rudy Giuliani while the Mollen Commission worked on
its final report. The last two cyclical scandals featured the only investigative entities named by
city mayors. Both Lindsay and Dinkins had taken office with liberal, police-reform agendas that
failed to help them survive their police scandals.
Mayor Bill de Blasio may have taken note of the political damage from police scandals.
He was elected in 2013 on a strong platform of police reform, and he might have appointed a
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blue-ribbon commission to look into the variety of police issues of recent years: use of force,
stop-and-frisk, ticket fixing, or crime statistics abuses. That might have qualified as the next
cyclical scandal, and it would have been on schedule, but he did not choose that route. Perhaps
feeling that he needed neither the guidance nor the delays from waiting for an investigation and
report by an appointed commission, the mayor took a series of steps to effect reforms in the
police department. For instance, he ignored protests from the largest police union and ended the
city’s appeals of federal court rulings that directed the NYPD to reform controversial stop-andfrisk practices.7 The city council followed the mayor’s lead and considered its own police reform
measures, paying no attention to the precedent that the council’s forerunner took the lead a
century earlier to appoint the investigative commission of the Curran era.8
Second, the nature of police misconduct of the Mollen era militates against the
occurrence of another cyclical scandal or, at least, a cyclical scandal that reflects the anticorruption focus of the cyclical scandals. The organized pad previously described by the Knapp
Commission was essentially consistent with the vice-based corruption payoffs of all of the earlier
cyclical scandals. For the most part, cops got money from persons involved with liquor,
prostitution, gambling, and drugs. The corruption was widespread, even if the earlier cyclical
scandals disclosed only a slice of it. With developments that occurred over time and accelerated
with the Knapp Commission, traditional NYPD corruption changed. Legalized vices,
administrative reforms, cooperating cops, snitching victims, taped evidence, and aggressive
prosecutions all contributed to the pad system drying up. The most serious Mollen-era corruption
came from the bands of criminal cops preying on both the law breakers and the law abiders in
struggling neighborhoods. To use Sherman’s categories of police corruption, the Type III
pervasive and organized corruption of the Knapp era broke down and regressed to Type I rotten
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apples and rotten pockets of corruption in the Mollen era.9 If the rotten apples and rotten pockets
are continuing, they may be adequately handled by the department and the courts without
another cyclical scandal.

Changing Times and Changing Corruption
Police corruption goes where the money is. Goldstein defines police corruption as “acts
involving the misuse of authority by a police officer in a manner designed to produce personal
gain for himself or for others.”10 The personal gain for a corrupt cop might include sexual favors
or drugs to use, or even advancement in the department from arrests or seizures based on
falsehoods. But personal gain most often means money. The sources of that money evolved over
the one hundred years of the cyclical scandals.
The tables in chapters 3 through 8 showing underlying civilian activity indicate where the
corrupt cops of each scandal tended to get their money. The sources reflected changes in the city
itself. In the Lexow, Curran, and Seabury eras (1890s to 1930s), prostitution was the leading
source of money for the prosecuted cops. Numbers might have been skewed toward prostitution
in the Lexow era because of the morality theme of Rev. Parkhurst’s crusade and in the Seabury
era because the prosecutions focused on the NYPD’s vice squad. The world’s oldest profession
certainly did not go away in New York City after the 1930s, but changes came. Mobster Charles
“Lucky” Luciano was sent to the upstate prison in Dannemora on prostitution-related charges
from his arrest in 1936 following prosecutor Thomas Dewey’s crackdown on city prostitution
locations.11 After that, organized crime elements turned away from the risky business of
prostitution and depended more on gambling payments.12 Other factors in the de-emphasis of
prostitution as a corruption source were likely as important as organized crime’s decisions.
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Changes in public attitudes and practices over time certainly made the commercial sex trade a
less pervasive industry in the 1990s than it was in the 1890s.13 Further, advances in
communication technologies of pagers, cell phones, and the internet made maintaining a visible
house of prostitution less important to the business, resulting in a lessened need for making
payoffs to police to protect a particular location. When Thomas Dewey directed the raids on
dozens of brothels in 1936, one house that expected to move soon had two hundred change-ofaddress cards ready to mail to regular customers.14
Gambling, perhaps picking up from an organized crime retreat from prostitution,
dominated the 1950s scandal and was still prominent in the 1970s. But the legal state lottery
decimated neighborhood numbers gambling, legalized casinos in New Jersey took business from
city gambling spots, and communication advances took sports betting off the streets. By the
Mollen era in the 1990s, gambling was gone and drugs dominated as the sources of money for
the corrupt cops.

An Increasing Need for Prosecution as a Corruption Remedy
Prosecutors had their worst time in the first cyclical scandal. Reluctant D.A. Fellows was
prodded into prosecuting cops by Rev. Parkhurst and the Lexow Committee. The poor outcomes
(only two convictions out of forty-seven indicted cops) supported the conclusion that corrupt
cops had little to fear from prosecutors. D.A. Whitman brought more enthusiasm and success to
the prosecutions of the Curran era, but he prosecuted such a relatively small number of cops
(seventeen) that other cops might not have perceived a real risk of being prosecuted,
undermining any general deterrent effect from prosecutions. The same was true in the Seabury
era, with just eighteen cops prosecuted.
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The decade-after-decade persistence of broad-based, organized payoffs indicated that
prosecutions and other remedies were not solving the problem. The Brooklyn D.A. of the 1950s
tried to convict a large number of cops and expose others as unindicted co-conspirators in a
single case designed to reveal the pervasive gambling pad, but the case collapsed in court and
reinforced the notion that cops had little to fear from prosecutions. The tide shifted in the 1970s.
The Knapp Commission drew a clear picture of the widespread pad system. From a prosecutive
standpoint, an enormous number of cops (219) were charged by a large number of prosecutors’
offices that joined the fight. For a corrupt cop to be prosecuted was no longer a remote
possibility.
As the organized pad disintegrated and corrupt police conduct evolved into the overt
criminality described by the Mollen Commission in the 1990s, prosecutions became crucial as a
response to the corruption. The effect of deterrence is notoriously hard to detect, but the goal of
retribution from criminal sanctions grew more important as cops acted more like street criminals.
The assaults, drug dealing, and constitutional abuses committed in vulnerable neighborhoods by
the corrupt cops of the Mollen era were serious criminal offenses that demanded prosecution and
the possibility of incarceration more than, say, a corrupt cop of an earlier era who received an
extra fifty bucks a week from willing gamblers. With a relatively large number of cops being
prosecuted (79 in the Mollen era) and with a lower percentage of the police force actually
engaged in the new style of corruption, the likelihood of being prosecuted finally became a real
risk and kept open the possibility of a deterrent effect.

Lessons Learned for Prosecutors
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The cyclical scandals suggest that police prosecutions have gotten easier. Research found
a total of 415 cops prosecuted in the cyclical scandals, and 177 of those were convicted, for an
overall conviction rate of 42 percent. Factors that should be noted with that calculation include
the occasional spottiness of available information and that about half of the cases came from just
the Knapp era. In any event, the 60 percent conviction rate of the Mollen era (48 convicted of 79
prosecuted) was clearly better than any of the earlier eras.
Some of the improvements in the conviction rate can be attributed to prosecutors
obtaining stronger evidence that either induced guilty pleas or convinced juries. The Knapp era
offered the first extensive use of audio- and video-recorded evidence used in scandal-related
prosecutions. The Knapp era also saw an increase in the number of cops willing to cooperate
with prosecutors. Those developments of more tapes and more cooperators accelerated in the
Mollen era. Prosecutors may have also benefitted from less political interference with their
functions. Thankfully, modern prosecutors are not the Tammany-beholden political operatives
that they were in the 1890s. With less interference, prosecutors are more able to exercise
reasonable discretion about what cases to charge.
A prosecutor’s greatest concern may be using a witness who is unable or unwilling to
give credible testimony. Critical witnesses against cops in corruption cases are often the persons
involved in illegal activities who made payoffs for protection from law enforcement. Those
persons may have criminal histories and lifestyles that jurors frown upon, and they may have
reasons (fear of prosecution, fear of police retribution) to not tell the truth. Further, cops charged
with crimes are likely first offenders (in the eyes of the criminal justice system) and have their
jobs and pensions to worry about, so they are more likely to take their cases to trial than
nonpolice defendants. A criminal trial means that those vice-purveyor witnesses can be exposed
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to aggressive cross-examination. The first cyclical scandal quickly showed that brothel operator
Augusta Thurow would not be a believable trial witness, although she had done well in the more
comfortable hearings of the Lexow Committee. Mary Goode, “Chile” Acuna, Harry Gross, and
others continued as particularly problematic witnesses for prosecutors.
Prosecutors increasingly managed to avoid witness pitfalls. Civilian witnesses with
credibility problems can have their testimony corroborated with recorded evidence or with
testimony from cooperating cops. With more frequent cooperation from cops, however, the
witnesses of concern can be the cops themselves. Prosecutors made wise decisions to avoid trial
testimony from the likes of Bill Phillips in the Knapp era and Michael Dowd in the Mollen era.
But Mollen-era cooperating cops Richard Rivera and James Vasquez had problems as trial
witnesses despite having made tapes that prosecutors hoped would bolster their credibility.
Judges presiding over bench trials in 48th Precinct cases repeatedly rejected their testimony and
found their former precinct-mates not guilty.15

Gambling on the Feds
An important development in the police prosecutions over the history of the cyclical
scandals was the increasing involvement of offices besides the Manhattan district attorney. The
potential misconduct by the NYPD operates citywide (and beyond), so the participation of the
other district attorneys expands jurisdictional coverage across the city. Turf battles between
prosecutors that inevitably arise may seem an unproductive use of scarce resources and can
appear unseemly if made public. The American system of federalism spawns the multiple offices
and agencies in the criminal justice field. In the cyclical scandals, more prosecutors meant more
cops being prosecuted. Given the scope of police corruption revealed during the scandals,
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prosecuting more cops was an overall appropriate response, although the special state prosecutor
of the Knapp era certainly received criticism for being too aggressive.
More particularly, the increased involvement of federal prosecutors changed the
landscape of scandal-related prosecutions. Only the Manhattan D.A. brought cases in the Lexow
and Curran eras. Federal prosecutors appeared modestly in the Seabury era with two police
officers charged with Prohibition and income tax violations. One cop in the Gross era pleaded
guilty to a federal tax violation after his state charges were dismissed when the Brooklyn D.A.’s
case collapsed.16 The floodgate opened in the Knapp era with dozens of cops prosecuted
federally, largely a result of the expanded use of civil rights laws and drug charges. In addition,
every district attorney in the city brought cases and the special state prosecutor had its
spectacular, if short-lived, run.
With the Hollywood success of Serpico and Prince of the City and the political success of
Rudy Giuliani, prosecuting local cops became an attractive option for ambitious federal
prosecutors. Federal criminal prosecutions were expanding anyway, and Attorney General Janet
Reno encouraged a greater federal role in traditionally local criminal matters. In the Mollen era,
after the waning of the special state prosecutor, the feds became the most prominent prosecutors
of city police corruption. Mary Jo White was more than willing to go toe-to-toe with Robert
Morgenthau. Federal conviction rates were high and sentences were long. Federal prosecutors
had access to funding and investigative resources that the” locals” could only dream of. Federal
cases were resolved in the elegant efficiency of the U.S. courthouses instead of the crowed chaos
of the city’s criminal courts. Federal prosecutors could offer potential cooperators the choice
between draconian drug sentences or the witness protection program. When the feds chose to act
and had jurisdiction, they clearly had clear advantages over the district attorneys.
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However, the most influential development in modern American law enforcement
occurred soon after the close of the Mollen era with the attacks of September 11, 2001. Federal
authorities, especially those in New York, focused attention on antiterrorism. Public corruption,
of which police corruption is a small slice, is now just the number four priority for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (after terrorism, foreign intelligence, and cyber attacks).17 If the drugbased strain of police misconduct from the Mollen-era continues, the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration might be expected to occasionally arrest cops for drug offenses, but public
corruption is not part of the DEA’s mission.18 Some federal police prosecutions might arise when
an informant mentions cops, cop-related conversations turn up on a wiretap, or instances of
highly publicized police use of force give rise to civil rights cases. But federal authorities cannot
be expected to monitor police corruption. Future federal involvement in New York police
prosecutions on the level of the Knapp or Mollen eras is unlikely. Such a strong federal interest
in investigating and prosecuting New York cops may never return, and certainly cannot be
counted on.

A Police Prosecutor
With the loss of the special state prosecutor and reduction of the involvement of federal
prosecutors, the city’s five district attorneys are essentially on their own in deciding whether to
prosecute police.19 That was the status when Whitman Knapp concluded that district attorneys
could not or would not adequately investigate and prosecute cops. Granted, the district attorneys
were spurred to action in the Knapp era and their productivity in prosecuting cops continued in
the Mollen era. But the question remains of whether police prosecutions should be handled by
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elected district attorneys on a county-by-county basis, or if there are advantages in creating a
more central authority with greater independence.
Under circumstances indicative of the pitfalls of establishing a special prosecutor, New
York governor Andrew Cuomo signed an executive order in July 2015 directing that the state
attorney general supersede jurisdiction of county district attorneys in “certain matters involving
the death of an unarmed civilian … caused by a law enforcement officer.” Should there be
“significant question” as the whether the civilian was unarmed, the attorney general would have
discretion to choose to investigate and prosecute.20 The order was extremely narrow in scope,
and it came in reaction to a series of highly publicized deaths of unarmed civilians caused by
police in New York City and elsewhere. Although many hailed the governor’s action, some
family members of victims complained that the order did not go far enough, police unions added
expected protests, and the state’s district attorneys’ association objected.21 Serious confusion
soon arose over particular cases that the attorney general might or might not take over, requiring
the governor to attempt clarifications for the executive order.22 All five of the city district
attorneys objected to the order despite efforts by the governor and the attorney general to assuage
them in private meetings.23
The city already has multiple agencies with overlapping authority over aspects of police
misconduct. The Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) has a tortuous history dating back to
the early 1950s, when it was an internal unit of the police department, and it generated particular
controversy in the Lindsay administration when a public referendum overwhelmingly rejected
adding civilians to the board. The CCRB finally assumed an all-civilian format in 1993. In 2012,
the CCRB even gained administrative powers to prosecute some cases of misconduct at police
departmental trials.24 The CCRB is reasonably well funded, can issue subpoenas, and receives
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valuable information about police misconduct directly from civilians, but long-term
investigations are not practical in its mission.
The Committee to Combat Police Corruption (CCPC) was formed by executive order in
1995 when Mayor Giuliani molded a Mollen Commission reform recommendation to his
preferences. The CCPC monitors corruption controls of the NYPD largely by reviewing the work
of the department’s Internal Affairs Bureau. Even when looking at a hot-button topic like deaths
in police custody, the CCPC has stayed within its mandate by focusing on administrative
questions of whether officers involved in those cases should file written reports.25 The CCPC has
a prominent group of part-time commissioners (including former Knapp Commission counsel
Michael Armstrong), but its resources and its mandate are limited. As a leftover from the
Giuliani era, its time appears to have passed regardless of how well intentioned and productive it
may have been.
The Department of Investigation (DOI) dates back to reform efforts in the nineteenth
century. Although it has handled serious matters of fraud and other abuses in city agencies, its
role as an investigative agency in the cyclical scandals was negligible. In 2013, however, the city
council established the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (OIG-NYPD) within the
Department of Investigation. The OIG-NYPD has a sizable staff and a broad mandate to
investigate abuses in the department. It overlaps a bit with the complaint-receiving function of
the Civilian Complaint Review Board, and it essentially usurps the functions of the Commission
to Control Police Corruption. The enabling law for the OIG-NYPD called for the office to
“investigate, review, study, audit and make recommendations” about the “operations, policies,
programs and practices” of the NYPD.26 It has no prosecutorial authority.
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Having an inspector general for the NYPD represents a dramatic shift in the monitoring
of police corruption. The office may be particularly important if the most prominent police
controversies continue to move away from traditional corruption to other issues like stop-andfrisk, use of force, downgrading reported crimes, broken windows enforcement, ticketing quotas,
and such. Some cops will still need to be criminally prosecuted. Certainly some cops still take
payoffs, and some may still break down doors to steal drugs and money. Even the more recent
areas of controversy about policing practices that seem noncriminal in nature could give rise to
prosecution-worthy cases for perjury or official misconduct. Decisions about police prosecutions
may have become more complicated since the days of Whitman Knapp’s “The district attorneys
can’t do it” and Milton Mollen’s “Yes they can.”
The Knapp-era Office of the Special State Prosecutor was a flawed model that was poorly
executed. The city’s district attorneys’ offices are powerful in politics and law enforcement, and
the elected district attorneys often rise above the political fray to administer matters of the justice
system in fair, nonpartisan ways. No matter how poorly the district attorneys handled (or
avoided) police corruption cases, the tone of the criticism by Whitman Knapp and the
commission report was harsh. Insulting the district attorneys might have built momentum for the
special prosecutor proposal initially, but it was counterproductive in the long run. Creating a
lavishly funded, uber-prosecutor job filled by the aggressive Maurice Nadjari extended the insult
of the district attorneys. The end result was that the district attorneys ramped up their efforts to
prosecute cops, watched or participated as the special prosecutor came under criticism, and
waited for Rockefeller, Nadjari, and other supporters of the office to pass from the scene.
The value of the special prosecutor’s office became apparent as it faded for a few years
and then was gone in 1990. The police department had retreated into scandal-avoidance mode.
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The Buddy Boys case came and went without a big-picture prosecutor piecing together ways to
stop similar groups of renegade cops operating in neighborhoods across the city. When the
Mollen-era scandal broke, the district attorneys generally handled cases well, as the
commission’s report anticipated. But the new style of police corruption had been allowed to
fester in the absence of an office with the scope, expertise, and mission to detect it and respond.
As the Mollen era ended in the mid-1990s, much of the public attention devoted to the
NYPD shifted to the extraordinary story of the city’s crime drop. To pick just one of the stunning
measures of the crime reduction, the city had a 72% drop in homicides from 2245 in 1990 to
only 629 in 1998.27 The department’s crime tracking CompStat system was copied by other
cities, top departmental officials wrote books, and service in the NYPD became a resume builder
that could lead to the highest jobs in law enforcement across the country.28 There were problems,
however, within what appeared to be the good news about city policing. Some wondered whether
the department juggled numbers to keep crime statistics low, and others questioned certain
enforcement tactics. The Giuliani and Bloomberg administrations (1994-2013) basked in the
continuing crime drop and close scrutiny of the NYPD was not on their agenda. By the 2013
election, the department lost a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk
tactics purported to be important in controlling crime, and Bill de Blasio was easily elected
mayor on a platform that included strong attacks on police practices.29 A few months later, Eric
Garner died when being placed under arrest by police on Staten Island. Many cops responded to
the protests and criticisms with a drastic slowdown in issuing summonses and enforcing qualityof-life offenses.30 While a return to widespread police corruption of the Knapp era payoffs or the
Mollen era criminality seems unlikely, detection and response are critical for the other forms of
police misconduct ranging up to serious matters of misuse of force. Although the inspector
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general position may go a long way in that task, there should be a prosecutive component as
well.
A model for a special police prosecutor can be seen in the city’s Office of the Special
Narcotics Prosecutor. In 1971, Governor Rockefeller signed legislation to create a number of
new courts placed in New York City to handle drug cases.31 Under the plan, the city’s five
district attorneys would appoint an individual to be the Special Narcotics Prosecutor (SNP) who
would have an administrative staff and investigators, while the day-to-day work on cases and
court appearances would be handled by assistant district attorneys assigned to the SNP by the
respective district attorneys. Ironically, Rockefeller created this D.A.-friendly model for a special
narcotics prosecutor almost exactly one year before creating the D.A.-hostile model for the
special corruption prosecutor. The office of the SNP has operated since its inception with
remarkable stability and relative lack of controversy. Only four persons have served as the SNP
in over thirty years.32 The SNP was created in response to a perceived heroin epidemic, and it
has navigated through the passage and later revision of the Rockefeller drug laws, the surge of
crack usage, gang wars, open-air drug markets, the expansion of drug treatment alternatives, and
calls for decriminalization.33 The office brought a citywide consistency to prosecuting cases so
that similar drug cases would be treated in a similar manner whether occurring in Staten Island or
the Bronx. The office developed an understanding of the shifting pattern of drug issues in the
city to allow reasoned changes in policies and responses.
The cyclical scandals showed a range of what could be called prosecutorial deficiencies:
charging too many cops (Lexow, Knapp), charging too few cops (Curran, Seabury), having too
narrow a focus (Seabury, Gross), pursuing flawed cases (Lexow, Gross), and failing to charge
superior officers (Knapp, Mollen). Despite the similarities of aspects of the cyclical scandals (the
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twenty-year pattern, the triggering event, the outside investigation, the summary report), the
prosecutive responses were not consistent. A special police prosecutor would bring better
consistency to the prosecutive response for crimes allegedly committed by police. That
consistency would not necessarily mean that more cops would be prosecuted. Cops caught in less
serious wrongdoing might deserve to be insulated from the decisions of an overzealous district
attorney determined to bring police cases. Guidelines and practices for exercising prosecutorial
discretion can cull out conduct that technically might be criminal for administrative sanctions
without criminal prosecution. A special prosecutor can strike a balance guided by law and
impartiality between, for instance, activist organizations that want many cops prosecuted and
police unions that want few cops prosecuted.
District attorneys generally handle crimes that stand as discrete incidents, such as a
particular burglary, robbery, and homicide. Some police cases can be discrete incidents, such as
the use of excessive force in a particular arrest. But prosecutable police cases are often tied to
patterns of misconduct. Those patterns were apparent in the routine payoffs from the Lexow era
through the Knapp era, and even the more flagrant police crimes of the Mollen era showed
repeated conduct that formed patterns. A special police prosecutor can develop the expertise to
identify the patterns and take steps without waiting for the pressure cooker to explode in another
scandal. In addition, a prosecutor with the expertise to determine who gave implicit orders or
who looked the other way might be able to develop charges against higher-ranking police
officials along with the usual alleged wrongdoers of lower rank. And if the police misconduct
most needing prosecutorial scrutiny has moved away from taking payoffs and toward excessive
force or constitutional violations, then a special police prosecutor’s experience can bring a
consistent, law-based approach to screening and preparing those difficult cases.
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All five of the city’s district attorneys have specialized units with rather wide
responsibilities within which the prosecution of police would fall.34 The circumstances that were
of such concern to the Knapp Commission—that district attorneys relied on city police in most
of their day-to-day work–still remain and are simply part of how the justice system works. With
a citywide special police prosecutor in place, whistle-blowing cops like Serpico and Durk would
not have to wander looking for a prosecutor to hear their complaints. District attorneys might
appreciate a mechanism that distances them from the conflicts of interest that Whitman Knapp
saw in district attorneys prosecuting cops. While district attorneys tend to reflexively defend
their turf, they also may have sensed some relief when federal prosecutors took some
controversial police prosecutions off their hands. If the feds have withdrawn from devoting
extensive resources to investigating local cops, then another office may need to assume the task.
Assisted with investigations by the new inspector general, a special police prosecutor could make
reasoned, consistent, citywide decisions about which cops should be brought to court.
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